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1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has revolutionized the computing world and will continue to do so for
many years to come. The core technology behind cloud computing is virtualization. Large
datacenters offer computing resources in terms of virtual machines where users remotely
connect to perform their computing tasks or deploy their applications. Cloud services
include virtual machines, virtual platforms, and cloud-based software. Big corporations
that already possess large datacenters are able to generate additional revenues (e.g., Microsoft Windows Azure [42], Amazon EC2 [4]). Many new companies solely based on cloud
computing products are being added to the market (e.g., Salesforce.com [54], Rackspace
Hosting [51]). On the other hand, users, especially small and medium enterprises, now
have a wide array of options for securing their computing resources - they can rely on cloud
resources at any level (infrastructure, platform, or software). This enables users to balance
their financial requirement for computing - they can replace the upfront cost of procurement and ongoing cost of in-house maintenance with utilizing cloud resources depending
on their financial goals and limitations.
As an emerging field, cloud computing is the focus of many ongoing research. Among
many tracks of cloud computing research, we identify that increasing the efficiency of allocation of the computing resources is a very important problem. As more users and providers
enter the market, the more challenging the efficient allocation of computing resources will
be. Efficiency of allocation, or economic efficiency, is achieved when it is ensured that
the user who values an item the most, gets it. The value a user puts on an item can be
known only when the user bids for that particular item, i.e., expresses her demand for that
item and the amount she is willing to pay for it. However, to decide fairly who gets an
item, it is required that all the users express their true valuation to the system. When it is
guaranteed by a mechanism that the users can maximize their utility by telling the truth
(i.e., reporting their true valuations for the requested resources), we say that the allocation

2
mechanism is incentive compatible.
The resource allocation model in cloud computing uses virtualization techniques. Cloud
providers provision their computing resources into virtual machines (VMs) and users request the resources to accomplish their intended tasks. Current virtual machine allocation
mechanisms employed by the cloud providers are mainly fixed-price based mechanisms.
Economic theory shows that these mechanisms are not economically efficient. A fixed-price
based mechanism usually follows a first-come fist-served approach that does not necessarily
create incentives for the users to express their true valuation to the system. Regardless of
how valuable a resource is to a user, she pays a fixed price to get access to that resource.
On the other hand, a user who values a resource less than the published market rate cannot
even participate in the process of requesting the resource for herself. As the cloud computing platform matures toward a popular and highly-accessed system, such issues will be of
major concern for both the users and the providers.
An auction-based mechanism can provide fair allocation and economic provisioning of
computing resources as virtual machines. A cloud provider needs to predict the demand
of its resources in order to be able to provision them in a cost-effective and profitable way.
An efficient mechanism can provide this information in real-time in order to enable the
provider make their provisioning decision effectively. On the other hand, auction-based
mechanisms can also help the cloud users plan proper level of resources for the tasks they
want to execute. When a user knows that by asking for the resources they actually require
with the price they want to really pay for that, her perceived utility from the allocation
can be maximized, she will be able to realistically estimate her work performance and cost.
Auctions are categorized based on different criteria. We determine that combinatorial
auctions are best suited for allocating VM instances in clouds. Combinatorial auctions
enable users to express their requirement when the items they require are complementary
to one another. For example, a user hosting a web service may need three different servers
to use as database server, application server, and web server. If she cannot acquire all three
servers together, she would prefer not getting an allocation at all rather than acquiring a
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subset of her requirement. Combinatorial auctions provide bidding protocols that allow
complete expression of user requirements.
In this Ph.D. dissertation, we design combinatorial auction-based mechanisms to efficiently provision and allocate VM instances to cloud users, and determine their prices based
on the market demand. We formulate different models for the problem of VM provisioning
and allocation, and devise mechanisms to solve each of them. This will help a provider select a mechanism based on their particular needs. We have completed four research projects
as part of this thesis. We designed two combinatorial auction-based mechanisms to allocate
VM instances in a setting where they are assumed to be pre-provisioned. Later, we devised
a dynamic mechanism that considers the entire pool of computing resources of a cloud
provider as ‘liquid’ resources and provisions them dynamically into VM instances based on
a combinatorial auction. The above two mechanism design problems are modeled as offline
mechanism design problems. In an offline mechanism, the auction is run periodically and
allocates resources for only one period of time. Users requiring longer time must continue
bidding until they receive allocation for adequate number of times. In our last work in
mechanism design, we investigated the problem of online mechanism design. In an online
mechanism, users include the required time in their bids. Once a user wins her bid, she has
guaranteed access to the allocated resources for the time period she requested in her bid.
In another research work, we investigated the bidding behavior of users where we devised
an efficient bidding algorithm for users who would participate in combinatorial auctions
in clouds. We believe our work has laid a solid foundation for auction-based allocation in
clouds and has opened a number of directions for future research.

1.1

Problem Definition

In this section, we present the part of the problem definition and the notations that are
common throughout the dissertation. Specific definitions, assumptions, and notations are
covered along with respective research problems that we present.
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We assume that the cloud provider allocates its computing resources as m different types
of VM instances V M1 , . . . , V Mm . A weight vector w = (w1 , . . . , wm ) represents the relative
computing power of each type of VM instance. For example, suppose a cloud provider
defines three types of VM instances (small, medium and large), which we call V M1 , V M2
and V M3 . Let the configuration of these VMs be V M1 ≡ (One 2 GHz processor, 2 GB
memory, 1 TB disc storage), V M2 ≡ (Two 2 GHz processors, 4 GB memory, 2 TB disc
storage), and V M3 ≡ (Four 2 GHz processors, 8 GB memory, 4 TB disc storage). In this
case, the weight vector will be w = (1, 2, 4). Without loss of generality, we assume that
w1 ≤ . . . ≤ wm and w1 = 1. We also assume that there are n users u1 , . . . , un who request
bundles of VM instances to the cloud provider by submitting their bids. The bid of user
j
uj is denoted by Bj = (r1j , . . . , rm
, vj ), where rij is the number of V Mi instances user uj

requires in her bundle. vj is user uj ’s valuation for her requested bundle i.e., the maximum
amount she wants to pay for it. We define the rest of the terms in the following chapters
where we solve different variants of the VM provisioning and allocation problem in clouds.
The first problem we solve as part of our dissertation research is called the Virtual
Machine Allocation Problem (VMAP), which we present in Chapter 3. In this problem, we
assume that the cloud provider has a fixed number of statically provisioned VM instances
to allocate to its users. k1 , . . . , km denote the number of V M1 , . . . , V Mm instances available
for allocation. The objective of VMAP is to determine a set of winners among the users and
determine their payment so that the social welfare is maximized, satisfying the constraint
given by the available number of VM instances.
The problem we solve in Chapter 4 is to devise an efficient bidding strategy algorithm
for users who submit malleable parallel jobs to a cloud computing platform that uses combinatorial auction-based mechanisms to allocate VM instances to its users. Malleable parallel
jobs can be executed on any number of processors, given that the parallel speedup decreases
non-linearly with increase in number of processors. The objective of the problem is to generate an efficient bid Bj for user uj given the total workload and degree of parallelism of
the job she wants to execute, how much she values the speedup of the execution and her
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budget, and the system parameters such as communication overhead.
In Chapter 5, we define the Dynamic VM Provisioning and Allocation Problem (DVMPA)
where the number of different types of VM instances are provisioned dynamically based
on the market demand. In DVMPA, the total amount of computing resources is denoted
by M, where M is the total number of V M1 instances that can be provisioned using the
entire resources available to the cloud provider. Note that we assume that V M1 is the
least powerful VM instance with weight w1 = 1. In DVMPA, we also consider the cost of
operating the VM instances: cI is the cost for an idle V M1 instance for a ‘time unit’ and
cR is the cost for a ‘running’ (i.e., allocated to a user) V M1 instance for a ‘time unit’. Cost
of other types of VM instances are linearly proportional to their weight. Given the above
parameters, the objective of DVMPA is to determine a set of winners from the users, determine their payments, and determine the number of each type of VM instances to provision
so that the the profit (revenue – cost) of the cloud provider is maximized.
We define and solve the problem called Online VM Provisioning and Allocation Problem
(OVMPA) in Chapter 6. Unlike the above problems, OVMPA considers the duration of
time for which users request the VM bundle. Each user uj submits her bid to the mechanism
where she also includes the number of time units she requires to complete her application lj
and the deadline for task completion dj . The time instance aj the user submits her bid is her
‘arrival time’. The user’s bid and her arrival time constitute her type. An online mechanism
is invoked as soon as there are some outstanding bids and there are available resources in the
cloud. Therefore, computation of the mechanism is performed on incomplete information
i.e., before collecting information on all users and having all resources available. The
performance of an online mechanism is worse than offline mechanisms in terms of revenue,
but it provides more user satisfaction by guaranteed time and lower average payments. We
design the mechanism MOVMPA to solve the OVMPA problem in Chapter 6 and discuss
its properties.
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1.2

Outline of the Dissertation

In this section, we outline our dissertation and summarize our contributions. In the following we summarize the four research projects that we accomplished as part of this dissertation.
• Combinatorial Auction-Based Allocation of Virtual Machine Instances in
Clouds. We studied the fixed-price based VM instance allocation mechanisms in
clouds and modeled the VM instance allocation problem. We assumed that the cloud
providers have fixed number of different types of VM instances to allocate to their
users. The users bid periodically to get bundles of VM instances required for their
tasks. The cloud providers’ goal is to allocate the VM instances to the users who value
them the most, determine their prices, and maximize the revenue in the process. We
designed two combinatorial auction-based mechanisms CA-LP and CA-GREEDY to
solve the problem. We analyzed the mechanisms and proved that they are incentive
compatible. Finally, we ran extensive simulation experiments to compare CA-LP and
CA-GREEDY with the fixed-price based mechanisms currently used in clouds. Our
results showed that CA-LP performs best in all metrics than CA-GREEDY and fixedprice based mechanisms, but CA-GREEDY achieves comparable performance with a
much smaller time complexity. We conclude that CA-GREEDY should be used as a
general-purpose mechanism for allocating VM instances in clouds. We present this
research in Chapter 3. A paper describing this research was published in the Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology
and Science (IEEE CloudCom 2010) [71] and also received the Best Student Paper
Award. An extended version of this paper is under review for the Journal of Parallel
and Distributed Computing.
• Efficient Bidding for Virtual Machine Instances in Clouds. In order to successfully implement VM provisioning and allocation in clouds, it is crucial that the
users can easily participate in such mechanisms and get the best value out of them.
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In this research work, we show how a user can efficiently bid for the bundle of VM
instances to submit their jobs to the cloud computing platform. We considered a
setting where a cloud provider implements the CA-GREEDY mechanism and users
submit their bids to secure resources to run their malleable parallel jobs on the cloud.
Malleable parallel jobs can be run on any number of processors, with a non-linear
relation of the number of processors used to the speedup of job execution. We designed an efficient bidding strategy algorithm called EBS that takes into account
the job characteristics, system parameters, and user preferences to generate a bid
that comprises the best bundle for a particular job and the true valuation for that
bundle. This bid is submitted to the auction to maximize the user’s utility. We
proved that EBS has reasonable time complexity and experimentally showed that it
outperforms a naive bidding strategy. The results of this research were published in
Proceedings of the 4th IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing (IEEE
CLOUD 2011) [73]. Later, we extended this paper with more experiments investigating the results with varying the simulation parameters in more dimensions. We
submitted the extended version to Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
and it is currently under review. We present this work in detail in Chapter 4.
• Combinatorial Auction-Based Dynamic VM Provisioning and Allocation
in Clouds. In the previous research, we considered that the cloud providers statically
provision the VM instances and the mechanism allocates them to the users. In this
research, we incorporated the dynamic provisioning into the combinatorial auctionbased mechanism. We formulated the problem such that the entire resources are considered as ‘liquid’ resources and the number of different VM instances to provision are
determined based on the user demand. We also considered the costs for a VM instance
while it is kept idle and when it is allocated to a user. These costs are used to determine a ‘reserve price’ to avoid revenue losses. We designed a mechanism called CAPROVISION that performs a combinatorial auction that considers the dynamic provi-
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sioning and the reserve price. CA-PROVISION computes the number of VM instances
to provision and allocate to the users and the payment to be charged to each user
in order to maximize the profit of the cloud provider. We compare the performance
of CA-PROVISION with that of CA-GREEDY by performing extensive simulation
experiments using traces of real workloads from the Parallel Workloads Archive [23].
The results show that CA-PROVISION significantly improves the resource utilization
and percentage of served users when compared to CA-GREEDY. The profit obtained
by CA-PROVISION was higher in cases with high density of user demands. And CAPROVISION obtains higher profit in half of the cases where the user demands are low.
We conclude that CA-PROVISION performs better in general, where CA-GREEDY
performs better where the pattern of the user demands match the available resources.
We present this work in detail in Chapter 5. A paper describing this research was
published in the Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science (IEEE CloudCom 2011) [72]. An extended version of
this paper is under review for IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems.
• Online Mechanism for VM Provisioning and Allocation in Clouds. An
online mechanism computes the allocation and payment of items without having
complete information. In the context of cloud virtual machine allocation, an online
mechanism would be invoked as soon as some user submits her bid or some resources
become available for allocation. In a cloud computing platform, an online allocation
mechanism would have positive effects such as shorter waiting time for the users,
reduced idle time of computing resources, etc. However, since an online mechanism
works with incomplete information (offline mechanisms are invoked periodically at
fixed intervals, therefore they have complete information about the bids that arrived
during the past interval), it cannot achieve the same efficiency as the offline mechanisms. To ensure performance, an online mechanism must have a good competitive
ratio. In this research project, we formulated the problem of online VM provisioning
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and allocation in clouds. In this model, the users include the required time and deadline for their tasks in their bids. We designed the online mechanism called MOVMPA
to address this problem. MOVMPA is invoked whenever there are outstanding bids
and available resources in the system. It allocates the VM instances to the winning
users for the entire period they request them for. It also calculates the payment based
on the critical value payment in the online setting. We proved that MOVMPA has
good competitive ratio, reasonable runtime, and is truthful. We evaluated this mechanism with extensive simulation experiments using real workload data. We compared
MOVMPA with CA-PROVISION and found that MOVMPA performs better than
the theoretical competitive ratio, while providing better user experience. Our work
was published in the Proceedings of the 5th IEEE International Conference on Cloud
Computing (IEEE CLOUD 2012) [74]. We also prepared an extended version of this
paper for submission to the IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems.
We present this research in Chapter 6.

1.2.1

Our Contribution

In this dissertation, we addressed an emerging problem in cloud computing using game
theory and mechanism design techniques. We identified that cloud providers would require
combinatorial auction-based mechanisms to determine efficient allocation of resources to
their users and to increase their revenue in the process. Combinatorial auctions enable
users to express their demand of resources and their willingness to pay in a meaningful
way. On the other hand, auction-based provisioning and allocation mechanisms enable the
cloud providers determine their prices of resources dynamically and also provision to them
according to market demand. In the rapidly improving computing industry, where the price
and utility of a computing resources changes continuously, it is a difficult task for a cloud
provider to accurately predict demand and price their resources accordingly. Combinatorial
auction-based mechanisms allow creating a market that takes care of these complex tasks
automatically. In our dissertation, we investigated the problem in different settings. We
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designed two combinatorial auction-based mechanisms that allocate pre-provisioned VM
instances to users requesting bundles of VM instances. Then, we focused our attention on
systems where VM instances are dynamically provisioned based on the current market demand. Finally, we developed an online mechanism for dynamic provisioning and allocation
of VM instances. We performed theoretical analysis and simulation experiments with all
the above mechanisms. These results will enable a system designer to implement or adapt
one of the mechanisms based on their specific needs. We also investigated this problem
from the users’ point of view. We designed an efficient bidding strategy algorithm for
submitting malleable parallel jobs in clouds. We also provide theoretical and experimental
results pertaining to this algorithm. We believe our research will encourage implementation
of auction-based mechanisms in clouds and also initiate other research in this field.

1.3

Organization

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In the next chapter, we present background knowledge on combinatorial auctions, which is the foundation of this dissertation.
We also present a discussion of the related work in the existing literature in Chapter 2. In
Chapter 3, we present our research on designing combinatorial auction-based mechanisms
where the VM instances are pre-provisioned. We design two mechanisms CA-LP and CAGREEDY, prove their theoretical properties, and present simulation results comparing
them with fixed-price mechanisms. In Chapter 4, we present our research on designing an
efficient bidding algorithm to request VM bundles for malleable parallel jobs. We show
experimentally that our algorithm, called Efficient Bidding Strategy (EBS), outperforms a
naive strategy in terms of generating higher utility for the users. In Chapter 5, we present
the design of a dynamic provisioning and allocation mechanism called CA-PROVISION.
We present an online mechanism for dynamic provisioning and allocation in clouds in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 we describe the possible future directions of our research. We conclude
the dissertation in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly introduce the background on combinatorial auctions, which is
the foundation of this dissertation. We discuss further details, when necessary, along with
the specific research work we present. We also present the literature survey related to our
work in this chapter.

2.1

Combinatorial Auctions

Auctions are economic mechanisms that allocate an item or a set of items to participating
users. Users express their requests in terms of ‘bids’, which consist of a valuation (i.e., how
much she values an item or what is the maximum amount she wants to pay for it) and
a subset of the items (where a set of items are being auctioned). Combinatorial auctions
allocate a set of items to users, where users express their bids in terms of bundles of items
and their valuation of respective bundles. A user is called ‘single-minded’ if she requests
only a single bundle and is not interested in any subset of it. Formally, a combinatorial
auction allocates a set of items S to n users j = 1, . . . , n. We assume that the users are
single-minded and each user j submits a bid θ̂j = (Ŝj , v̂j ) to the mechanism. Here, Ŝj ⊆ S
is the set of items user j requires and v̂j is the maximum amount she is willing to pay for
it. The goal of the mechanism is to determine a set of winners W ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and their
payments p1 , . . . , pn . The users in the set of winners receive their requested bundles and
pay the price determined by the mechanism. In most mechanisms, the losing users do not
pay anything.
The ‘type’ or the ‘true bid’ of a user j is θj = (Sj , vj ), which she may or may not report
truthfully to the mechanism. Components of θj means that user j truly requires bundle
Sj ⊆ S and she receives a value of vj if she wins her bid. We express this as the valuation
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function shown below


 v if j ∈ W
j
Vj =
 0 otherwise

The quasi-linear utility of user j is the difference between her valuation function and the
payment determined by the mechanism, which is expressed as
Uj = Vj − pj
We assume that the users are rational, i.e., they may bid untruthfully if it benefits
them to do so. The goal of the mechanism is to achieve a specific system-wide goal with
the reported values and provide incentives so that the users obtain the maximum benefit
only by reporting their true values. We elaborate on this in the following section.

2.2

Goals, Properties and Challenges of Mechanism
Design

The most reasonable objective function would be to maximize the cloud provider’s revenue, but very little is known about revenue maximization in the context of combinatorial
auctions [44]. Therefore, the most common goal of combinatorial auction mechanisms is
to maximize the so-called social welfare, which is the sum of the reported valuations of the
winning bidders. This has a positive influence on the revenue, because valuations are the
maximum amounts users are willing to pay and they play an important role in determining
the payment. Therefore, assuming that the mechanism allocates non-conflicting bundles
to users, the goal of a combinatorial auction-based mechanism is to solve the following
optimization problem.
max

X

j∈W

v̂j

(2.1)
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subject to,
[

j∈W

Ŝj ⊆ S

Ŝi ∩ Ŝj = ∅

(2.2)
where i 6= j

(2.3)

Equation (2.1) states that the objective of the mechanism is to maximize the social welfare.
The constraint shown in Equation (2.2) is that the total resources allocated must adhere to
the total resources available. Equation (2.3) ensures that no item is allocated to multiple
bidders.
To achieve the above goal, the mechanism must provide incentives to the users so that
they report their values truthfully. A mechanism is truthful if a user can maximize her
utility by reporting her true value to the mechanism, irrespective of the bids of the other
users. Another desirable property of a mechanism is that it should be individually rational,
which means a user truthfully reporting her valuation will never incur a loss by participating
in the mechanism, irrespective of the other users’ bids.
There are certain challenges that we need to overcome while designing a combinatorial auction-based mechanism. First of all, combinatorial auctions are NP-hard problems,
therefore requiring us to find an efficient approximation algorithm for allocation. On the
other hand, classic auction-design techniques to achieve truthfulness do not directly apply
to approximate solutions. Archer and Tardos [8] showed that to design an approximation
mechanism, the allocation algorithm must be monotone and the payment must be determined using the critical value method. We discuss monotonicity and critical value in the
context of the specific research problems later.

2.3

Related Work

Auction-based allocation of computing resources has been widely studied in the literature,
especially in the distributed computing setting. One of the earliest use of auctions in
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computing was in reserving computing time of a shared minicomputer at Harvard University [60]. In this auction, an artificial ‘bidding currency’ was provided to the users in order
to participate in the auction to reserve computing time for them. Gagliano [26] also investigated the allocation of computing resources through auctions, where the tasks themselves
are provided enough intelligence to calculate the bid that is necessary to get the required
resources.
Auctions have been widely studied for scheduling and resource allocation in computational grids. Wolski et al. [68] compared commodities markets and auctions in grids in
terms of price stability and market equilibrium. Gomoluch and Schroeder [29] simulated
a double auction protocol for resource allocation in grids and showed that it outperforms
the conventional round-robin approach. Garg et al. [27] designed a double auction-based
meta-scheduler for grids, which schedules grid jobs into different clusters that improves
both user utility and system performance when compared to traditional meta-schedulers.
Das and Grosu [18] proposed a combinatorial auction-based protocol for resource allocation in grids. They considered a model where different grid providers can provide different
types of computing resources. An ‘external auctioneer’ collects this information about the
resources and runs a combinatorial auction-based allocation mechanism where users participate by requesting bundles of resources. The major difference between our research in
combinatorial auctions and the one presented in [18] is that we are considering allocating VM instances of a single cloud provider whereas Das and Grosu [18] considered the
problem of allocating different types of physical resources from multiple grid providers.
Dash et al. [19] formulated a mechanism design problem for task allocation in grids. They
considered an optimization problem where the goal is to reduce the overall system cost,
but selfish resource providers may misreport their capacity and cost parameters if they
benefit by doing so. They proposed a centralized and a distributed mechanism to solve
this problem. A system architecture for incentive-compatible resource allocation in grids
was proposed by Grosu [30]. The proposed architecture allows both users and providers
to deploy and participate in different mechanisms that determine resource allocation and
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pricing.
Recently, researchers investigated the economic aspects of cloud computing from different points of view. Wang et al. [66] studied different economic and system implications
of pricing resources in clouds. They performed experiments on Amazon EC2 and on their
own testbed concluding that the pricing scheme used by Amazon is unfair to the users.
Walker et al. [64] proposed a model to determine the benefits of acquiring storage services from clouds. The tool CloudCmp [36] was developed to assist users in choosing the
appropriate service providers based on the user’s requirements.
Buyya et al. [10] proposed an infrastructure for auction-based resource allocation across
multiple clouds. Altmann et al. [1] proposed a marketplace for resources where the allocation and pricing are determined using an exchange market of computing resources. In
this exchange, the service providers and the users both express their ask and bid prices and
matching pairs are granted the allocation. Risch et al. [52] proposed a testbed for cloud services designed for testing different mechanisms. They deployed the exchange mechanism
proposed by Altmann et al. [1] on this platform. A marketplace proposed in the above
research work is not easy to achieve because of interoperability issues of current cloud
platforms. The current focus on the cloud markets is mostly on the single provider and
multiple users model. Our research is therefore based on the single-provider multiple-users
model. A combinatorial exchange would be a possible extension of our work towards the
federated cloud platforms.
There have been significant efforts in designing auction-based allocation mechanisms
for clouds. Lin et al. [37] proposed the use of a simple (k + 1)th price auction for allocating
cloud resources. They showed by statistical analysis that when there is a large number
of resources and users, the auction can obtain an efficient allocation and a reasonable
revenue for the cloud provider. To the best of our knowledge, Amazon EC2 implemented
the first auction in clouds, named Spot Instances. Unfortunately, the mechanism behind
the Spot Instances is not publicly available. Researchers reported work on investigating
the Spot Instances and using them efficiently. Chohan et al. [16] showed how to accelerate
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MapReduce jobs using Spot Instances. They also analyzed the performance gain and the
cost effectiveness of this approach. Ben-Yehuda et al. [9] analyzed the pricing of Amazon
EC2 and claimed that it is not market-driven. They showed that the prices are randomly
generated considering a hidden reserve price that is not driven by supply and demand.
Campos-Náñez et al. [11] investigated dynamic auction settings for ‘utility computing’,
where the bidders are the service providers (service queues) that bid for one customer’s job
at a time. In their model, the available capacity of the queues is public knowledge and the
bidders only bid their prices. The service with the lowest bid is selected for the customer
that arrived. The authors showed that there exists a Markov Perfect Equilibrium for the
game.
The differences between the marked-based mechanisms designed for grids and those designed for clouds are mainly related to their underlying resource allocation model. Clouds
allocate resources in terms of VM instances while traditional grids allocate physical resources directly without involving virtualization. The market-based mechanisms are more
suitable for clouds since they are designed to make profit by selling services while traditional grids were designed mainly for sharing resources and not for making profits by selling
resources.
One of our research work deals with dynamic provisioning of VM instances, hence we
discuss some existing literature on VM provisioning here. Researchers approached the
problem of VM provisioning in clouds from different points of view. Shivam et al. [58]
presented two systems called Shirako and NIMO that complement each other to obtain ondemand provisioning of VMs for database applications. Shirako does the actual provisioning
and NIMO guides it through active learning models. The CA-PROVISION mechanism we
propose here performs both demand tracking and provisioning via a combinatorial auction.
Dornemann et al. [21] proposed on-demand resource provisioning for the Business Process
Execution Language (BPEL). Their work extends BPEL engine so that it can support
scientific workflows by dynamically provisioning resources from Amazon EC2 when the
demand surpasses the capacity of the BPEL host.
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Dynamic provisioning of computing resources was investigated by Quiroz et al. [50]
who proposed a decentralized online clustering algorithm for VM provisioning based on
the workload characteristics. The authors proposed a model-based approach to generate
workload estimates on a long-term basis. Our proposed mechanism provisions the VMs dynamically and it does not require the prediction of the workload characteristics, rather the
current demand for VMs is captured and the provisioning is decided by a combinatorial
auction-based mechanism. Van et al. [62] proposed an autonomic resource management
system that decouples VM allocation from the physical mapping of instances to resources.
They showed that their approach can simultaneously satisfy both service level agreement
and resource utilization criteria. Vecchiola et al. [63] proposed a deadline-driven provisioning mechanism supporting the execution of scientific applications in clouds.
The goal of our research on auction-based mechanisms is to improve the efficiency of
cloud resources and the revenue and/or profit of cloud providers. Other researchers investigated this area using different approaches. For example, some research work investigated
methods to increase the efficiency of the cloud data centers. Kansal et al. [33] extended
the power metering technique of physical computing resources towards a per-VM power
metering system. They proposed a metering capability for VM power capping which reduces the power provisioning costs in data centers. Meng et al. [38] proposed a technique
that finds and exploits complementary patterns of workloads to multiplex virtual machines.
This technique ‘packs’ multiple VMs into a smaller set of resources while maintaining the
quality of service.
Chen et al. [15] combined several factors of cost saving and optimal resource utilization
to minimize the cost for cloud providers and maximize their profit. Their solution combines
the use of vector arithmetics to ensure balanced utilization of computing resources and
efficient VM reconfigurations at runtime. Ghosh and Naik [28] utilized the fact that most
users request more resources than their application actually require to devise a strategy
to ‘over-commit’ cloud resources in order to maximize profit. Lampe et al. [34] presented
an equilibrium auction for allocating VM instances in cloud and showed that a heuristic
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algorithm performs much faster with little degradation in performance. But their approach
considers a bid to be a collection of many individual bids that request only one VM instance.
But, unlike combinatorial auctions, this equilibrium price auction cannot guarantee that a
user requesting a bundle will receive the entire bundle even if her bid satisfies the equilibrium
price. However, the authors did a good job in considering the capacity of physical machines
to determine the number of VM machines the cloud provider can allocate. Tsai and Qi [61]
developed a pricing strategy for cloud services to ensure fair pricing in a dynamic setting.
Zafer et al. [70] looked at minimizing the cost of users by using statistical analysis to
design a cost-effective bidding strategy for Amazon Spot Instances. Menychtas et al. [39]
proposed a framework for a cloud marketplace that will enable trading of cloud services
among multiple providers and users, while incorporating business terms (e.g., SLAs) into
the trading model.
The complexity of solving the combinatorial auctions, specifically the winner determination problem, was first addressed by Rothkopf et al. [53]. Sandholm [55] proved that
solving the winner determination problem is computationally hard. Rothkopf et al. [53]
and Sandholm [55] used the technique of pruning the search tree to devise approximation
algorithms. Andersson et al. [6] proposed an integer programming based solution to the
winner determination problem.
Zurel and Nisan [75] also presented an efficient algorithm for combinatorial auctions.
Lehmann et al. [35] studied combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders and devised
a greedy mechanism for combinatorial auctions. We extend this mechanism in Chapter 3
to design the CA-GREEDY mechanism. Archer et al. [7] considered another case of singleminded bidders where multiple identical copies are available for different types of items.
They provided a mixed integer programming based algorithm for winner determination and
showed theoretically that their solution performs better than generalized solutions for this
special case. We extend this mechanism such that it can be used to solve the VM allocation
and pricing problem we consider in Chapter 3. A detailed survey on combinatorial auctions
can be found in [20]. Cramton et al. [17] provides good foundational knowledge on this
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topic.
Recently, several researchers investigated the design of online mechanisms in different contexts. Parkes and Singh [48] designed a Markov Decision Process-based online
mechanism and later on provided an approximate solution for the same model for large
problems [49]. Hajiaghay et al. [31] proposed the idea of automated online mechanism design. Fundamentals of online mechanism design are covered in [47]. Carroll and Grosu [12]
designed an online mechanism for scheduling malleable parallel jobs on parallel systems.
They considered preemption of jobs in their model in order to provide for jobs with higher
valuation that are submitted later than the currently allocated jobs.
The marketing and advertising in the Internet has created a huge market driven by ad
auctions [22]. Chen et al. [14] investigated Internet auctions in a double-auction setting
where multiple copies of one item are sold. They showed that bidding the actual value
of the item is a weakly dominant strategy for the bidders in this setting. The development of cloud computing initiated research in developing and analyzing the market for
computing resources and services. Wang et al. [65] devised a ‘requirement-based’ bidding
language for combinatorial auction-based scheduling problems. The proposed bidding language enables the bidders to express otherwise complex requirements (e.g., specifying the
required makespan for the set of jobs submitted) as an atomic bid. They also developed
a branch-and-bound algorithm to solve the winner determination problem for this setting
and reported significant performance improvement over a commercial solver.
Recently, many researchers have investigated the design of efficient bidding strategies
for combinatorial auctions. Sui and Leung [59] proposed an adaptive bidding strategy for
combinatorial auctions. They considered a multi-round first-price combinatorial auction for
allocating computing resources. In their proposed bidding strategy the bidder updates her
bid dynamically based on the outcome of the previous bidding round, in order to maximize
her utility. A similar idea is used by Yi et al. [69] to design a strategy for bidding in the
Amazon EC2 Spot Instances auction [3]. The authors use statistical analysis to show how a
task can be completed at reduced cost and without premature termination on the Amazon
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EC2 cloud. Our work differs from the above two in that we are considering a combinatorial
auction mechanism which guarantees the maximum utility for a user when she bids truthfully. Therefore, our proposed bidding strategy is based on determining the user’s ‘true’
valuation for a bundle and it does not require knowledge of past auction outcomes. This is
a big advantage since the users do not require information from past auctions when making
bidding decisions. An et al. [5] proposed a bidding strategy algorithm that considers a
given ‘synergy’ value between different items, when calculating the valuation of a bundle of
items in general combinatorial auctions. In our work in Chapter 4, we defined the synergy
between the VM instances in a bundle based on a speedup function that takes into account
the overheads of execution on multiple VM instances. The speedup function we use is
an extension of the speedup function for malleable parallel jobs proposed by Havill and
Mao [32]. Carroll and Grosu [12] considered the problem of scheduling malleable parallel
jobs and designed incentive-compatible scheduling mechanisms to solve it. A comprehensive survey classifying parallel applications and their scheduling strategies can be found
in [25].
Other related research includes designing an agent for bidding in combinatorial auctions in grids [56] and proposing an efficient policy for obtaining cloud resources for large
applications [13]. Developing scheduling algorithms that satisfy the budget constraint of
the users were investigated by Oprescu and Kielmann [46] and by Shi and Hong [57]. The
bidding strategy that we propose in Chapter 4 also considers the budget constraints, but
as opposed to the work reported in [46] and [57], the users do not need to submit their
budget information to any scheduler. In our work in Chapter 4, the bidding algorithm will
generate the bid so that the budget constraint is satisfied. Therefore, the scheduler is not
involved in checking and guaranteeing that the budget constraint is satisfied.
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CHAPTER 3: COMBINATORIAL
AUCTION-BASED ALLOCATION
OF VIRTUAL MACHINE
INSTANCES IN CLOUDS
3.1

Introduction

Cloud computing enables individuals and small to medium enterprises satisfy their computational needs with no or minimum upfront costs of acquiring hardware and software.
On the other hand, cloud providers benefit by commercializing their huge computing resources through the cloud computing platform. A cloud computing platform abstracts the
underlying physical resources from the users by providing them with the view of virtual
machines (VMs). This enables easy management and pricing of the resources. Currently,
the majority of cloud providers price their computing resources based on the ‘size’ of the
VM instances offered. They define different types of VM instances by specifying the number and speed of processors, the memory size, the bandwidth allocation, etc. There are
two ways to ‘purchase’ the VM instances: pay as you go and long term contract. In both
cases users pay fixed prices per unit of time for using the resources; the only difference is
that by committing to a long term contract they usually pay less per unit of time for using
the same resource.
We argue that the currently used fixed-price schemes for allocation and pricing of resources have several drawbacks. First, they are not economically efficient [67], that is, they
cannot guarantee that the user who values a bundle of VM instances the most gets it.
Second, fixed prices do not necessarily reflect the equilibrium prices that arise from market
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demand and supply. This may lead to lower than optimal revenue for the service providers.
Finally, since in cloud computing platforms resources are sold for a period of time, it is desirable that user requests be evenly distributed throughout the day. In general, the current
fixed-price methods do not provide users with incentives for demand shaping (i.e., selecting
their execution time-frames in such a way that the system load is balanced over time). It
is possible to modify a fixed-price mechanism so that it provides such incentives by setting
up different fixed prices at different times of the day based on historical demand. This
needs statistical analysis and adjustment of prices as the demand pattern changes making
it hard to achieve dynamic price adjustment.
The inefficiencies in solving the resource allocation problem in clouds mentioned above
can be best addressed by employing auction-based mechanisms. Among different types of
auctions, the combinatorial auctions are the most suitable for solving the VM pricing and
allocation problem in clouds. In combinatorial auctions, the participants bid for bundles of
items rather than individual items [17]. This enables bidders to express their valuations in
a more meaningful way, especially when the items they require are complementary to each
other. To illustrate this, let us consider the following example. A cloud service provider
offers ‘small’ and ‘large’ VM instances. Suppose a user wants to deploy a three-tier web
application on the cloud. The application needs a database server, an application server,
and two web servers. The database and application servers are heavy weight and therefore
the user prefers large instances for them. The web servers are light weight and can be
hosted on two small instances. Thus, a user needs to run an application which requires
two small and two large VM instances. It is more meaningful for her to be able to bid for
the entire bundle she needs rather than bidding for each VM instance separately. Bidding
for each VM instance separately involves the risk of ending up acquiring just a subset of
her required set of VM instances. The motivation behind our work is that by designing
and deploying combinatorial auction-based mechanisms for allocating VM instances, the
cloud providers can guarantee fairness to their users as well as enjoy higher revenues and a
balanced load on their systems over time. Load balancing over time is actually a side-effect
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of using auctions for allocating VM instances. Users with lower valuations for the VM
instances will choose a time-frame that does not conflict with that of ‘high valuation users’.
For example, if large businesses request resources during the daytime, individual users may
consider that the nighttime slots are more suitable for them, thus balancing the load of the
system over time.
Application of auctions, however, is not entirely new to the cloud computing community. After allocating computing resources for the long-term and on demand users, Amazon
EC2 sells the remaining virtual machines (instances) through an auction called Spot Instances [3]. In this auction, the bidders specify their demand (i.e., the number and the type
of instances) and the maximum price they are willing to pay. Amazon periodically runs the
auction with active bidders to determine the current price and then users with bids higher
than that price are provided with their desired instances. All users pay the same price per
instance which is computed by the auction. A user getting the allocation may be terminated at a later point if the auction-determined price goes beyond her bid. This approach
is different from combinatorial auctions because one single price is determined based on
market supply and demand (i.e., equilibrium) and all bidders pay the same price per item
regardless of how much they value the item. On the other hand, in combinatorial auctions,
each winning bidder’s payment is calculated based on her and other bidders’ valuations.
Another important difference is that the Spot Instances auction does not support bidding
on bundle of instances, while combinatorial auctions were specifically designed to work
with such bundles. From Amazon’s initial effort of using auction-based allocation, it is
reasonable to expect that cloud providers will be interested in more efficient allocation and
pricing schemes in the near future. Combinatorial auctions will clearly be one of the most
desirable allocation schemes in this regard. This is supported by their successful application in various fields ranging from selling wireless spectrum to transportation procurement
for large industries [17].
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3.1.1

Our Contribution

We formulate the problem of allocating VM instances in clouds as a combinatorial auction
problem. The objective of this problem is to efficiently allocate VM instances of several
types to several users requesting a set of VM instances of different types. To solve this
problem, we propose two combinatorial auction-based allocation mechanisms. These two
mechanisms are obtained by extending the mechanisms proposed by Archer et al. [7] and
Lehmann et al. [35]. The mechanism proposed by Archer et al. [7] considers a combinatorial
auction problem where a user can include at most one item of a particular type in her
requested bundle. We relax this condition to allow users requesting more than one item of
a given type. Also, the mechanism proposed by Archer et al. [7] is suitable for combinatorial
auctions with many types of items where each type of items has few instances. We extend
the mechanism so that it can be applied to the VM allocation problem where there are few
types of items and many instances of each type.
The other mechanism we propose is an extension of the greedy mechanism proposed
by Lehmann et al. [35]. This mechanism determines the allocation based on the valuation
of the users and the total number of items they request. We extend the mechanism proposed by Lehmann et al. [35] so that it considers the relative sizes of the VM instances
and show that the properties of the original mechanism are maintained. We compare the
two proposed combinatorial auction-based mechanisms with the fixed-price based allocation mechanism used by Microsoft in their Windows Azure platform [41]. We investigate
the relative performance of these three allocation mechanisms by performing extensive simulation experiments. We also consider variants of the fixed-price mechanism in which the
fixed prices are different at different times of the day. We compare the performance of
these mechanisms with that obtained by our proposed mechanisms as well. The experiments show that the proposed combinatorial auction-based mechanisms clearly outperform
the fixed-price mechanism in terms of resource utilization, generated revenue, and allocation efficiency. We analyze the results and provide recommendations on where to use the
proposed mechanisms.
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Figure 3.1: VM instance allocation in clouds: system model

3.1.2

Organization

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we formally define the VM
instance allocation problem. In Section 3.3, we present the mechanisms we consider for
solving the VM allocation problem. In Section 3.4, we describe the experimental results.
We conclude this chapter by summarizing the contributions in Section 3.5.

3.2

Virtual Machine Allocation Problem

The cloud providers set different configurations of VM instances that the users can request.
A user requests VM instances of different types and pays the cloud provider for the time she
uses them. Usually, the prices for different types of instances for short-term use are fixed
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by the cloud providers in advance. Another possibility is that a user sets up a long-term
contract if she requires the resources for a long period of time, in which case she may obtain
them for a lower price. Here we consider the problem of efficient allocation and pricing of
VM instances for short-term use.
In Figure 3.1, we provide a high-level representation of the VM instance allocation
system we consider. The cloud provider has several VM instances of different types available
for allocation and runs a combinatorial auction-based mechanism to allocate them to users.
The auction mechanism consists of three steps. First, the mechanism collects ‘bids’ from
the users, which comprise the number of different types of VM instances a user requests and
the price she offers for that bundle. Then, the mechanism computes the allocation and the
payment based on the collected bids and the availability of resources. Finally, users who
get the allocation pay the cloud provider and obtain access to the resources they requested.
We define the Virtual Machine Allocation Problem (VMAP) as follows. Assume that
the allocation and prices are decided periodically by a given mechanism. Let the interval
between two such decisions be ‘one unit of time’. VMAP considers allocating the VM
instances for one unit of time. Assume that a cloud provider has m different types of virtual
machines VM1 , . . . , VMm . The relative computing capabilities (based on number and speed
of CPUs, memory, etc.) of these VMs are characterized by a vector w = (w1 , . . . , wm ),
where wi ∈ R+ , i = 1, . . . , m. We also assume that w1 = 1 and w1 ≤ w2 ≤ . . . ≤
wm . To illustrate this, we consider the types of instances currently offered by Microsoft
Azure Platform: Small (CPU 1.6 GHz, Memory: 1.75 GB, Storage: 225 GB), Medium
(CPU 2x1.6 GHz, Memory: 3.5 GB, Storage: 490 GB), Large (CPU 4x1.6 GHz, Memory: 7
GB, Storage: 1 TB), and Extra large (CPU 8x1.6 GHz, Memory: 14 GB, Storage: 2 TB). In
this example, VM1 , VM2 , VM3 , VM4 are the Small, Medium, Large, and respectively Extra
large VM instances. The weight vector characterizing the VM instances is w = (1, 2, 4, 8).
Let us assume that ki copies of VMi instances are available for allocation at a given
instance of time, i = 1, . . . , m. There are n users u1 , . . . , un , each requesting a set (bundle)
of VM instances and revealing how much she values that particular set. That is, a user uj
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j
is requesting VMs from the cloud provider by placing a bid Bj = (r1j , r2j , . . . , rm
, vj ), where

rij ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ki } is the number of instances of type VMi user uj requires in her bundle and
vj is her valuation for this bundle, i.e., the maximum price she is willing to pay for using
the requested VMs for one unit of time. Here we consider the users to be single-minded
bidders. A single-minded bidder uj desires only a specific bundle of items Sj , and values
that bundle at vj . Thus, uj has the following valuation function for a bundle S [35],

 v if S ⊆ S
j
j
v(S) =
 0 otherwise

(3.1)

We would like to mention that the assumption of single-minded bidders does not limit
the users to express more flexible requirements. Our model assumes that auctions are run
periodically and that bidders will request only one bundle in a given auction. Since the
auctions are run periodically, a user may choose to revise her bid based on the previous
auction outcome and her preference. For example, suppose that the time interval between
consecutive auctions is one hour. If a user needs a particular bundle for five units of time
and her deadline to complete the job is ten hours, she needs to win five auctions within ten
hours. She may choose to bid the same value until her job is finished, or she may choose
to start with a low bid and raise it when the deadline is approaching. Users executing
parallel applications may want to request as many VM instances as possible to finish their
jobs quickly. In this case, they could start by bidding for the largest possible bundle they
can afford and if not successful, adjust the requested bundle size for the next auction. If a
user must require continuous allocation of resources, she may continue bidding increasing
values in order to increase her chances of winning every auction.
The goal of the VM allocation problem, given the set of users U and their bids, is to
determine the set of winners W ⊆ U and the price the winners have to pay to the cloud
provider. User uj is a winner (i.e., uj ∈ W ) if she receives her requested bundle of VM
instances. The price user uj pays to the cloud provider is denoted by pj . We formally
define the VM allocation problem as follows:
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Virtual Machine Allocation Problem (VMAP)
Determine the set of winners, W ⊆ U, and payment pj for each user uj , j = 1, . . . , n, such
that
X

j:uj ∈W

rij ≤ ki i = 1, . . . , m

(3.2)

0 ≤ pj ≤ vj

if uj ∈ W

(3.3)

pj = 0

if uj ∈
/W

(3.4)

The constraint in Equation (3.2) ensures that the users are allocated at most ki instances
of VMi . Equations (3.3) and (3.4) ensure that the winners pay at most their valuations
and the losers do not pay at all.
Note that VMAP does not have an objective function. The most reasonable objective
function would be to maximize the cloud provider’s revenue, but very little is known about
revenue maximization in the context of combinatorial auctions [44]. Combinatorial auctions
P
are usually designed to maximize the sum of the bidders’ valuations, i.e., max nj=1 vj . Since
valuation is a measure of willingness to pay, maximizing the sum of the valuations usually

generates more revenue for the resource provider than a fixed-price allocation does. On the
other hand, given the prices of each type of VM instance, a fixed-price allocation mechanism
does not have an objective function to maximize. Therefore, VMAP is formulated here as a
feasibility problem with the constraints that are to be satisfied by all types of solutions. We
shall introduce other constraints and/or objective functions when we discuss the proposed
mechanisms for solving VMAP.

3.3

Virtual Machine Allocation Mechanisms

In this section, we present three mechanisms that solve VMAP. The first, called FIXEDPRICE, is the fixed-price mechanism currently used by several cloud service providers [2, 40].
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The next two mechanisms are the proposed combinatorial auction-based mechanisms, CALP (Combinatorial Auction - Linear Programming) and CA-GREEDY (Combinatorial
Auction - Greedy). CA-LP is an extended version of the mechanism proposed by Archer et
al. [7]. The mechanism proposed by Archer et al. [7] solves a problem similar to VMAP by
using linear programming relaxation and randomized rounding. We extend that mechanism
so that it is able to solve VMAP. CA-GREEDY is an extension of the mechanism proposed
by Lehmann et al. [35]. The mechanism proposed by Lehmann et al. [35] provides the best
achievable approximate solution1 for combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders.
However, this is a general purpose mechanism that does not assume any relative importance of the items being allocated. We extend this mechanism by incorporating the weights
of different types of VMs as described in Section 3.2. We now describe each mechanism in
detail.

3.3.1

FIXED-PRICE Mechanism

The FIXED-PRICE mechanism presented in Algorithm 1 defines a fixed-price vector f =
{f1 , . . . , fm }, where fi is the price a user has to pay for using one instance of VMi for
one unit of time. The mechanism allocates VM instances to the users in a first-come,
first-served basis until the resources are exhausted. It also makes sure that in order to
get the requested bundle, the valuation of user uj is at least Fj , where Fj is the sum of
the fixed prices of each VM instance in her bundle (line 10). It also makes sure that the
allocation does not exceed the number of available VM instances of each type (line 11).
The set of users receiving the requested bundle is denoted by W . A user pays the sum of
the fixed-prices of each VM instance in her allocated bundle.
1

Lehmann et al. [35] showed that the approximation ratio achieved by their proposed mechanism cannot
be further improved unless NP = ZPP.
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Algorithm 1 FIXED-PRICE Mechanism
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:

{Phase 1: Receive requests from users}
for j = 1, . . . , n do
j
Receive (r1j , . . . , rm
, vj ) from user uj
end for
{Phase 2: Allocation}
Sort users according to their time of placing the request, from earliest to latest.
(Here we assume u1 , u2 , . . . , un as the order.)
Initialize W ← ∅
for j = 1,
P.m. . , nj do
Fj ← i=1 ri fi
if (vj ≥ Fj ) and
P
′
(rij + u ′ ∈W rij ≤ ki , i = 1, . . . , m) then
j
W ← W ∪ {uj }
end if
end for
{Phase 3: Payment}
if uj ∈ W then
User uj pays, pj = Fj
else
User uj pays, pj = 0
end if

3.3.2

Combinatorial Auction-Based Mechanisms

The general combinatorial auction problem can be informally stated as determining the
allocation and prices of bundle of items such that the sum of the user’s valuations is
maximized. In a combinatorial auction, user valuations are expressed on bundles of items
rather than on individual items.
A desired property of a combinatorial auction mechanism is truthfulness. A mechanism
is truthful if the participants benefit the most when they reveal their true valuations to the
mechanism. A participant’s benefit in a combinatorial auction is expressed by her utility,
which is defined as the difference between the valuation she receives from the resource allocation and the price she pays to the mechanism. An ideal truthful mechanism determines
the optimal allocation that maximizes the sum of the valuations and computes payments
such that each participant maximizes her utility only by reporting her true valuation to the
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mechanism. A truthful mechanism helps the bidders in that they do not need to compute a
complex strategy or assume other users’ strategies while making their bids. They just need
to bid their true valuations for the bundle since bidding any other value will not improve
their utility.
The winner determination problem of combinatorial auctions is an NP-hard problem [55]. Therefore, research has been conducted to find approximate solutions to combinatorial auctions. In order to obtain a truthful approximation mechanism that solve the
winner determination problem, few issues need to be addressed [8]. The approximation
algorithm needs to be monotone. In a monotone allocation algorithm, a bidder can only
increase her chance of getting her requested bundle by reporting a higher valuation or by
requesting fewer items in her bundle. A monotone allocation algorithm allows finding the
so called critical value of a winning bidder, which is the minimum she needs to bid in
order to get her requested bundle. In a truthful mechanism a winning user has to pay her
critical value to the mechanism. For some combinatorial auction problems, randomization
is involved in the winner determination and/or the payment calculation algorithm. In that
case, the goal of the resulting mechanism is to ensure that the participants maximize their
expected utility by bidding their true values. Such mechanisms are truthful in expectation.
We discuss the useful properties of our proposed mechanisms in the next subsections.
The proposed mechanisms are intended to be run periodically, each time considering
the bids placed by the users during that period. It is assumed that users place their bids
until they have been allocated their requested resources for enough units of time to execute
their job to completion, or it becomes obvious that their job cannot be completed by a
deadline. We also assume that the VM instances are statically provisioned, that is, the
cloud provider has already provisioned a given number of VM instances of each type and
only these instances are available for allocation.
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CA-LP Mechanism
Archer et al. [7] considered a combinatorial auction problem similar to VMAP. The difference is that in their case bidders can request at most one copy of each item type (i.e.,
rij ∈ {0, 1}), whereas in the VMAP, users can request multiple copies of each type of item

(i.e., rij ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ki }). We modify the winner determination algorithm of the original
mechanism such that it is able to solve VMAP. The algorithm for the calculation of payment is kept the same as in [7] because it maintains its properties when applied to VMAP
with the modified winner determination algorithm. We present it here for completeness.
The CA-LP mechanism is given in Algorithm 2.
CA-LP involves solving the linear program given by equations (3.5-3.7). The objective

of the linear program is to find a vector of ‘fractional allocations’ x = {x1 , . . . , xm } that
maximizes the sum of the users’ valuations (Equation (3.5)). In line 6, the total number
of available VMi instances is reduced to ki′ , which is then used in the constraint in Equation (3.6). This constraint limits the allocation of VMi instances to ki′ . Using ki′ s instead
of ki s in this constraint helps reducing the probability of over allocating the VMs during
the randomized rounding performed in lines 9 to 15. This constraint is a modification of
the constraint used in the mechanism presented in [7] by letting rij take any value rather
than only 0 and 1. The next constraint (Equation (3.7)) bounds the fractional allocation
values between 0 and 1.
Lines 9 to 15 implement the randomized rounding where user uj is selected as a winner
with probability xj , if this allocation does not violate any constraint in Equation (3.6).
This operation is executed in order of decreasing xj so that if there is a violation in the
constraint, the user assigned a lower xj is not included in the set of winners W . This step is
another modification of the winner determination algorithm presented in [7]. In the original
algorithm, users are first included in W with a probability of xj and if constraint (3.6) is
violated for any item, all users requesting that item are excluded from W . This method
is suitable for auctions where many different types of items are sold and each type of item
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Algorithm 2 CA-LP Mechanism
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:

{Phase 1: Collect Bids}
for j = 1, . . . , n do
j
Collect bid Bj = (r1j , . . . , rm
, vj ) from user uj
end for
{Phase 2: Winner Determination}
Set ki′ ← (1 − ǫ)ki , where 0 < ǫ < 1, i = 1, . . . , m
Solve the following linear program
n
X
x j vj
max

(3.5)

j=1

subject to
n
X

xj rij ≤ ki′ , i = 1, . . . , m

(3.6)

0 ≤ xj ≤ 1, j = 1, . . . , n

(3.7)

j=1

8: Initialize W ← ∅
9: for each user uj , taken in descending order of xj do
10:
Generate a random number yj ∈ [0, 1]
11:
if (yj ≤ xj ) and
12:

13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:

19:
20:
21:
22:
23:

P
′
(rij + j ′ :u ′ ∈W rij ≤ ki , i = 1, . . . , m) then
j
W ← W ∪ {uj }
end if
end for
{Phase 3: Payment (same as in [7])}
for each user uj ∈ W do
Perform binary search for vj′ in the range [0, vj ]
(i) Set valuation of uj as vj′ in Equation (3.5);
(ii) Solve the LP, let x′j be the fractional allocation computed for uj ;
(iii) Until a vj′ is found such that, setting valuation of uj less than vj′
generates x′j < yj and setting the valuation greater than vj′
generates x′j > yj . This vj′ is the ‘critical value’.
pj ← vj′
end for
for each user uj ∈
/ W do
pj ← 0
end for
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has only a few copies. But in the context of VMAP, this approach will significantly affect
the allocation since each type of VM has many copies and there are only a few different
types of VMs. For example, let a cloud provider offer four types of virtual machines, 500
instances of each type. Suppose that after rounding, VM1 becomes over allocated. The
mechanism proposed by Archer et al. [7] discards all the users that request any instance of
VM1 in her bundle. This results in 500 unsold VM instances. The other VMs requested
by those users are also deallocated. This is the reason we cannot use the original winner
determination algorithm proposed by Archer et al. [7] to solve VMAP.
The payment is calculated in lines 17 to 23. For each winning user uj , CA-LP computes
uj ’s critical payment as follows. It performs a binary search in the range [0, vj ], where vj
is the reported valuation of uj . For each vj′ ∈ [0, vj ], it solves the linear program given in

line 7 until it finds the minimum vj′ that yields xj ≥ yj (line 18). This vj′ is the critical

value for user uj because reporting a valuation less than vj′ will not allow her to win the

bid, and therefore vj′ is what she has to pay. However, a losing user pays zero (lines 21
and 22). Note that the payment computation phase of CA-LP is the same as in the original
mechanism.
We now summarize the changes we made to the original mechanism by Archer et al. in
order to be able to solve VMAP. First, we relaxed the problem formulation to allow users
to request multiple VM instances of the same type in their bundles. This is important
in order to provide the user with more flexibility of bidding. The other modification is
significant in terms of resource utilization. The original mechanism discards all bids that
include a conflicting item. This approach is suitable only in the cases where the auction
involves many item types where the number of each type of items is very small. The cloud
providers usually offer only a few item types (VM instance types), and a large number
of items of each type. Keeping the original approach would result in poor utilization of
resources, and thus, we modified the allocation function to address this issue and at the
same time maintain the truthfulness property.
Archer et al. [7] proved that the original mechanism is truthful in expectation. We
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claim that CA-LP maintains this property.
Theorem 1. CA-LP mechanism is truthful in expectation.
Proof. In order to prove that an approximation mechanism is truthful, we need to prove
that its winner determination algorithm is monotone and that the payment calculated for
a winning user is her ‘critical payment’, i.e., the minimum she needs to bid to obtain her
requested bundle.
It is shown in [7] that the xj values determined by solving the LP in line 7 are monotone
with respect to the user valuations, i.e., a user uj can increase her probability of winning
by increasing her valuation. We now show that the randomized rounding step of CA-LP
maintains the monotonicity of allocation. We can have two different cases in the randomized
rounding step (lines 11-15),
X

rij ≤ ki , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , m}

(3.8)

X

rij > ki , ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , m}

(3.9)

j:xj >0

or
j:xj >0

Equation (3.8) represents the condition at which each user uj having yj ≤ xj is guaranteed
to get her requested bundle. Therefore, the probability of user uj to be finally included in
the set of winners is exactly xj and the allocation is monotone.
On the other hand, when Equation (3.9) holds for some i, we divide the users into two
groups as follows. First, let us assume that x1 , . . . , xn are in decreasing order. Now, let l
be the largest index for which the following equation holds.
X

j∈{1...l},xj >0

rij ≤ ki , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , m}

(3.10)

Therefore, a user uj , j ≤ l, will be included in the winners list with probability xj , which
in turn is monotone with respect to her valuation.
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Now, a user uj , l < j ≤ n, will get her allocation with probability xj if
rij +

X

j ′ <j,uj ′ ∈W

′

rij ≤ ki , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , m}

(3.11)

i.e., there are enough resources available to fulfill user uj ’s request after determining the
winners among u1 , . . . , uj−1. Therefore, the probability of user uj winning her bundle is
given by:


P r rij +

X

j ′ <j,uj ′ ∈W

′



rij ≤ ki , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , m} xj

(3.12)

The probability given by Equation (3.12) decreases as j increases (i.e., xj decreases). User
uj can increase her probability of winning by reporting a higher valuation. Therefore, the
allocation is monotone with respect to her valuation, although it is not directly proportional
to xj .
Considering the above two cases, we claim that the allocation algorithm of CA-LP
determines the set of winners with a probability that is monotone with respect to the user
valuations.
The payment calculated by CA-LP is the critical value that is the minimum a user
must bid to get her requested bundle allocated. Her reported valuation only helps decide
whether she will be a winner, but she has to pay this critical value when she wins, no
matter how large her valuation is. Because of these and following the results given in [7]
the CA-LP mechanism is truthful in expectation.
Example 1. We show the execution of CA-LP for a small VMAP instance illustrated in
Table 3.1. In this VMAP instance, six users are placing their bids and the cloud provider
has two types of VM instances with eight available copies for each type of instance. Each
row of the table represents a user. The first four columns list the user index j, the requested
number of VM instances of type-1 (r1j ) and type-2 (r2j ), and the user’s valuation (vj ). For
example, user u1 ’s bid is B1 = (0, 4, 0.74) specifying a request for zero instances of type
VM1 and four instances of type VM2 , and a valuation of 0.74 for this bundle. Column xj
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Table 3.1: CA-LP Example
j
1
2
3
4
5
6

r1j
0
3
4
1
2
1

r2j
4
4
1
3
1
0

vj
0.74
7.62
6.02
7.54
5.94
0.97

xj
0
0.85
0.62
1
1
0

yj
0.43
0.32
0.61
0.74
0.14
0.95

uj ∈ W
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N

pj
0
3.65
0
2.01
3.49
0

shows the fractional allocation values for each user computed by the LP. The next column
is the random value (yj ) used to decide the allocation. We see that users u2 , u3 , u4 , and u5
have higher xj than the corresponding yj s. But it is not possible to allocate the requested
bundles to all these users, because that will exceed the number of available VMs of both
types. Therefore, we first eliminate u3 from the set of winners since x3 is the minimum
among these xj s. After this elimination, the set of winners satisfies all constraints. We show
the final allocation decision in the column titled ‘uj ∈ W ’, where ‘Y’ means the bundle is
allocated and ‘N’ means the bundle is not allocated.
The values in the yj column are also used in payment calculation. For example, the
amount bidder u4 will pay to the resource provider is determined by solving the LP with
different valuations of u4 . Here, we perform a binary search between zero and 7.54 (i.e.,
v4 ) to find out the valuation v4′ and solve the LP to find a new x′4 , such that x′4 < y4 (i.e.,
x′4 < 0.74) for valuations smaller than v4′ and x′4 > y4 for valuations greater than v4′ . We
find that for v4′ = 2.0138, x′4 = 0.82 > 0.74 and for v4′ = 2.0129, x′4 = 0 < 0.74. The search
ends here by deciding the payment p4 = 2.0129, which is shown rounded to two decimal
digits in Table 3.1. We show the payment for all users in column pj . Thus, users u2 , u4
and u5 obtain their requested bundles and pay 3.65, 2.01, and 3.49, respectively.
CA-GREEDY Mechanism
Lehmann et al. [35] proposed a

√

M -approximation mechanism for combinatorial auctions

with single-minded bidders where the total number of items that need to be allocated is
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Algorithm 3 CA-GREEDY Mechanism
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:

{Phase 1: Collect Bids}
for j = 1, . . . , n do
j
Collect bid Bj = (r1j , . . . , rm
, vj ) from user uj
end for
{Phase 2: Winner Determination}
W ← ∅;
for j = P
1, . . . , n do
j
sj ← m
i=1 ri wi
end for
re-order users such that
√
√
√
v1 / s 1 ≥ v2 / s 2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn / s n
for j = 1, . . . , n do
P
′
if for all i = 1, . . . , m, rij + u ′ ∈W rij ≤ ki then
j
W ← W ∪ uj
end if
end for
{Phase 3: Payment}
for all uj ∈ W do
Wj′ ← {ul : uj ∈
/ W ⇒ ul ∈ W }
l ← minimum index in Wj′
if Wj′ 6= ∅ then
√ √
pj ← (vl / sl ) sj
else
pj ← 0
end if
end for
for all uj ∈
/ W do
pj ← 0
end for

M. We extend this mechanism by redefining M to be the weighted total number of VM
P
instances, i.e., M = m
i=1 ki wi . Here we define the ‘size’ sj of the bundle in bid Bj requested
Pm
P
j
by user uj as sj = i=1 wi rij , while in the original mechanism, sj is defined as sj = m
i=1 ri ,

i.e., the total number of items requested in Bj . Our CA-GREEDY mechanism is given in
Algorithm 3.
CA-GREEDY determines the winners by first ranking the users in decreasing order of
√
their ‘bid density’ (i.e., v1 / s1 ) and then greedily allocating them starting from the top of
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the list. Before allocating a new bundle the mechanism verifies that the new allocation does
not exceed the number of available VM instances of each type (lines 11-15). The payment
√
pj a winner uj pays is calculated by multiplying sj with the highest bid density among
the losing bidders who would win if uj would not be a winner (lines 17-24). That is, the
winner pays the critical value.
Our mechanism differs from the mechanism proposed by Lehmann et al. [35] in the way
the bid density is calculated. The original mechanism computes sj as the total number
of items in Bj , while in our case we consider sj to be the weighted sum of the number of
VM instances requested in Bj . Another difference is in the way our mechanism verifies
if the capacity is exceeded for each type of VM instance (line 12). These two differences
are significant because the original problem formulation assumes that each item is of different type and that different types of items do not have any relative importance to the
auctioneer. In our setting a cloud provider allocates different types of VM instances, which
have different characteristics and are valued differently by the cloud provider. Thus, we
associate a weight to each VM instance type in order to reflect these differences. In line 12,
the original mechanism needs to check whether there is a common item in the bundle of
the user that is currently being allocated and the ones that are already in the set of winners. Since there are lots of VM instances of the same type, we changed this and check
if the number of instances of each type allocated to the winning bidders does not exceed
the number of available instances of each type. We claim that CA-GREEDY has the same
approximation ratio as the original greedy mechanism and it is truthful as well.
Theorem 2. CA-GREEDY is a truthful mechanism that computes a
P
solution to VMAP, where M = m
i=1 ki wi .
Proof. The mechanism proposed by Lehmann et al. [35] is an

√

√

M-approximate

M -approximation mecha-

nism that solves the general combinatorial auction problem, where M is the total number
P
of items. In the case of VMAP, M = m
i=1 ki wi . According to the definition of w, wi is the

number of VM1 instances equivalent to one VMi instance. Therefore, in VMAP, M is the
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total number of equivalent instances of VM1 that are available. The mechanism proposed by
√
Lehmann et al. [35] provides a M -approximation solution when there are M items in to√
tal, therefore the CA-GREEDY mechanism also generates an M -approximation solution
to the VMAP.
Now, we show that the winner determination algorithm of CA-GREEDY is monotone
and the payment calculated for a winner is the critical value. From line 10 of the mechanism,
it is clear that a user can increase her chance of winning by increasing her bid. Also, a user
can increase her chance to win by decreasing the weighted sum of the items. For example,
a user requesting two small and two large VM instances will be higher in the order than
a user requesting one small and three large instances for the same valuation, although the
numbers of VMs requested are the same. Therefore, the winner determination algorithm
of CA-GREEDY is monotone with respect to user bids considering the relative computing
capacities of different types of VMs. Finally, a winning bidder uj pays the minimum amount
she has to bid to win her bundle, i.e., her critical value. This is done by finding the losing
bidder ul who would win if uj would not participate in the auction. User uj ’s minimum
bid density has to be at least equal to the bid density of user ul for winning her bundle.
√ √
Therefore, her critical valuation is (vl / sl ) sj , which is the payment calculated by CAGREEDY. Thus, the CA-GREEDY mechanism has a monotone allocation algorithm and
charges the winning bidders their critical payment. We conclude that CA-GREEDY is a
truthful mechanism.
Example 2. In Table 3.2, we show the allocation and payment computation obtained by
CA-GREEDY for the same instance of VMAP we used in Example 1. Here we also assume
that w1 = 1 and w2 = 2, i.e., one instance of VM2 is two times more powerful than one
instance of VM1 . There are eight available instances of each type of VM. In Table 3.2, the
first four columns represent the user index, the number of VMs of each type in their bundle
and their valuation for that bundle. The value in the column titled ‘sj ’ is the weighted
√
sum of the total number of VM instances in a bundle. The next column, titled ‘vj / sj ’,
gives the relative valuation of users with respect to the weighted bundle size, that is the
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Table 3.2: CA-GREEDY Example
j
1
2
3
4
5
6

r1j
0
3
4
1
2
1

r2j
4
4
1
3
1
0

vj
0.74
7.62
6.02
7.54
5.94
0.97

sj
8
11
6
7
4
1

√
vj / s j
0.26
2.3
2.46
2.85
2.97
0.97

uj ∈ W
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y

pj
0
0
5.63
0.69
4.6
0

‘bid density’.
√
To determine the set of winners, we include users in descending order of vj / sj in the
set of winners unless the inclusion violates the constraint that only eight copies of each
type of VM can be allocated. User u5 is the first winner and we allocate two copies of type
VM1 and one copy of type VM2 to her. The next user to get an allocation is u4 , thus three
instances of type VM1 and four instances of VM2 are allocated so far. Next, u3 is selected
for allocation, raising the total VM allocation to seven for VM1 and five for VM2 . We see
that the next user in the order is u2 , but allocating u2 requires three instances of type VM1
and four of type VM2 , whereas there is only one instance of type VM1 and three instances
of type VM2 remaining. Therefore, u2 is not included in the set of winners. User u6 , is next
in the order not violating the constraints, thus she is included in the set of winners. So
far, eight instances of VM1 and five instances of VM2 are allocated, leaving only three VM2
instances not allocated. The last user, u1 , cannot obtain her allocation since she requests
four instances of VM2 .
We show the payment calculation for user u4 as an example. If u4 is not a winner, there
will be one and six instances of VM1 and VM2 to be allocated. The first non-winning user
with respect to the order is u2 , but the number of VM instances available is not enough
to allocate u2 . But the other remaining user, u1’s request can be fulfilled when u4 is not a
√
winner. Therefore, u4 ’s payment is calculated by multiplying u1 ’s bid density value by 7.
Since no such user could be found for u6 , u6 ’s payment is zero.
Here, we note that the total revenue generated by CA-LP is 9.15 and that generated
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by CA-GREEDY is 10.92. However, it is not guaranteed that CA-GREEDY will always
generate higher revenue than CA-LP. The payment of the CA-LP mechanism depends on
both the random variables yj generated during the allocation phase and the competition
among the bidders. On the other hand, the payment determined by the CA-GREEDY
mechanism depends only on the competition among the bidders. In the example, we see
that the highest four bid densities are between 2.3 and 2.97, where 2.3 is the bid density
of user u2 , which is highest among the losing bids. Since this value is close to the winning
bids, the winning bidders need to pay more to win their bundles. However, in a different
scenario the CA-LP mechanism may generate higher revenues.

3.4

Experimental Results

We perform simulation experiments with different instances of VMAP. We solve these
problems by employing the three mechanisms presented above. We compare the results
and discuss the applicability of these mechanisms under different scenarios.

3.4.1

Experimental Setup

The simulation for one instance of VMAP runs for five simulation days. During each
simulation, a maximum of N = 100, 000 users are generated. Groups of users are created
five times an hour, i.e., every twelve minutes. Therefore, an average of about 167 users are
generated every twelve minutes. We add a deviation randomly chosen from [-20%, +20%]
to this number to determine the actual number of users generated at a particular time. We
invoke all three mechanisms every hour, with all the users generated during that hour and
all users from previous time slots that are still active. An active user is one whose task has
not been finished or the task deadline has not been reached. Each mechanism computes the
allocation and pricing for the next one hour time-frame and keeps track of the users’ status
separately. We would like to emphasize here that each run of the mechanisms computes
the allocation and payment of a given user for only one time slot and not for all the time
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slots required for the user’s task to complete execution. The user will need to participate
in and win several auctions in order to complete her task.
Users are of three categories: type-1, type-2, and type-3. Type-1 users are the most
demanding, type-3 the least, and type-2 users fall in between. User demands are characterized by four factors: number of requested VMs, valuation, duration for which the bundle is
requested, and a deadline by which the task has to be finished. For example, type-1 users
request more VMs than the other two types of users, request the VMs for longer periods of
time, have the highest valuations, and have stricter deadlines than the others. Also, each
category of users are generated at particular times of the day. A simulation day is divided
into three periods: peak (8am–4pm), off-peak (4pm–midnight), and night (midnight–8am).
Type-1 users are generated (and hence submit their bids) during the peak hours only.
Type-2 users submit bids only during peak and off-peak hours while type-3 users submit
bids at any time of the day. To compare with real life scenarios, we can roughly consider
that type-1 users are the big corporations, type-2 are the large and medium businesses,
and type-3 are the small businesses and individual users.
We assume that the cloud provider offers four types of VM instances: small, medium,
large, and huge (VM1 , VM2 , VM3 , and VM4 ). We set their relative weights to w = (1, 2, 4, 8)
and their fixed prices to f = (0.12, 0.24, 0.48, 0.96). This corresponds to the fixed-price
model used in Microsoft’s Windows Azure Platform [41]. We call this vectors a linear price
vector since fi = 0.12 · wi , for i = 1, . . . , 4. Each user uj ’s bid is a 5-tuple (r1j , r2j , r3j , r4j , vj ),

where rij is the number of requested instances of VMi and vj is her valuation. User uj ’s
task is characterized by the tuple (tj , dj ), where tj is the duration for which the resources
are requested and dj is the time by which uj ’s job needs to be completed.
To generate user bids, first the type of the user is randomly chosen from the user

distribution. Then, random numbers are generated from the ranges [r min , r max ], [0, v max ],
and [tmin , tmax ] and assigned to rij , vj , and tj , respectively. These values are then scaled
with a factor associated with the category of user. For example, the scale factors for rij s are
given by the vector ρ. Therefore, after generating rij values from the given range, they are
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Table 3.3: Simulation Parameters
Parameter
m
k1 , . . . , km
w

Description
Types of VMs
Available VMs of each type
Relative weight of VMs

f

Fixed-price vector

φ

Fixed-price factor vector

N
n

dmin , dmax

Maximum number of users
Number of users in an auction
Min. & Max. VM instances
of each type in a bundle
Maximum valuation
Min. & Max. execution time
Min. & Max. deadline

π

Distribution of users

ρ

Scale factor for bundle size

λ

Scale factor for valuation

τ

Scale factor for execution time

δ

Scale factor for deadline

r min , r max
v max
tmin , tmax

Value(s)
4
500, 1000, 2000
(1, 2, 4, 8)
(.12, .24, .48, .96)
(.12, .22, .39, .70)
(.12, .26, .58, 1.28)
(1, 1, 1)
(3, 2, 1)
(4, 2, 1)
100000, 50000, 10000
Varies
0, 5
1, 2, 5, 10
1, 10
2, 10
(10%, 40%, 50%),
(20%, 30%, 50%),
(20%, 40%, 40%),
(30%, 30%, 40%)
(2, 1.5, 1),
(3, 2, 1)
(2, 1.5, 1),
(3, 2, 1)
(2, 1.5, 1),
(3, 2, 1)
(0.5, 0.67, 1),
(0.33, 0.5, 1)

multiplied by ρ1 to determine the actual value when the user is of type-1. To illustrate this,
suppose we generate some rij = 5 for user uj and ρ = (2, 1.5, 1). Now, the actual rij value
of users of type-1, type-2, and type-3 will be 5 × 2 = 10, 5 × 1.5 ≈ 8, and 5, respectively.
Similarly, the elements of vector λ give the scaling factors for valuation of different types
of users. After generating a random number within the range [0, v max ], we multiply it
with the entry in λ corresponding to the type of the generated user. Similarly, vectors τ
and δ denote the factors for scaling the time required and the deadline. The deadline is
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determined by selecting a random number, scaling it, and then adding the result to tj . We
list all simulation parameters in Table 3.3.
To create different instances of VMAP, we vary the parameters that affect the user
distribution, demand, and payment resulting from the allocation. Thus, we choose four
different distributions of type-1, type-2, and type-3 users given by the following tuples:
(10%, 40%, 50%), (20%, 30%, 50%), (20%, 40%, 40%), and (30%, 30%, 40%). We consider
four values of v max , 1, 2, 5, and 10, which give four ranges of valuations (0-1), (0-2), (0-5),
and (0-10). We also vary the number of available VM instances and the factors that distinguish bids of different types of users. Table 3.3 lists the parameters, their description, and
the range of values they take. Combining all these values with each other, our simulation
experiment simulated 768 different instances of VMAP.
In addition to the above set of experiments, we perform six sets of experiments with 768
VMAP instances each – by varying only one of the parameters listed above. We create two
sets of such experiments by setting N, the maximum number of users to 50,000 and 10,000,
respectively. From these experiments we try to evaluate the VM allocation mechanisms for
various degrees of user demands. In the next two sets of experiments, we set N = 100, 000
and consider two different fixed-price vectors f as follows. A sublinear price vector with
prices for instance VMi given by fi = 0.12 · (wi )0.85 , which corresponds approximately
to f = (0.12, 0.22, 0.39, 0.70); and a superlinear price vector with prices for instance VMi
given by fi = 0.12 · (wi )1.15 , which corresponds to f = (0.12, 0.26, 0.58, 1.28). Since the
FIXED-PRICE mechanism heavily depends on the fixed prices of the VM instances, these
experiments let us determine whether the fixed-price vector affect the performance of the
proposed mechanisms.
Finally, we vary the fixed-price vectors during the peak and off-peak hours of the day to
examine whether they can generate higher revenue by capturing the higher demands during
these times. This is accomplished by introducing the fixed-price factor vector φ. This is a 3vector containing factors that are used as multipliers for the fixed-price vector during different hours of the day. For example, φ = (3, 2, 1) indicates the fixed prices of each type of VM
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User and System Parameters for 100,000 Users (log10 scale)
FIXED-PRICE
5.52%
8.00%
5.58%

Served

CA-LP
CA-GREEDY
116,831
272,527
225,936

Revenue

54.67%
94.70%
91.76%

Utilization

< 1 sec
Time

842 sec
28 sec

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

Figure 3.2: Overall performance of the mechanisms with linear fixed-price vector (.12, .24,
.48, .96), fixed-price factor vector φ = (1, 1, 1), and 100,000 users. The plot is drawn at
log10 scale.
instance will be multiplied by 3 during the peak hours, by 2 during the off-peak hours, and
by 1 during night hours. If the fixed price-vector is f = (0.12, 0.22, 0.39, 0.70) then the prices
for the four types of VM instances during peak hours are given by (0.36, 0.66, 1.17, 2.1).
In the regular case, φ = (1, 1, 1), that is, the prices for VM instances are the same for all
periods of the day. In our experiments we use two price factor vectors (3, 2, 1) and (3, 2, 1),
that is, we consider that during peak hours the prices are four, and respectively three times
higher than during the night hours, while the prices during off-peak hours are two times
higher than the prices during night hours. This will allow us to investigate the effect of
taking into account the demand when establishing prices for the fixed-price mechanisms.
Table 3.3 lists these price vectors.

3.4.2

Analysis of Results

The experimental results show that the proposed combinatorial auction-based mechanisms
have clear advantages over the fixed-price mechanism for solving the VMAP. Here we discuss
their overall performance and then investigate the effect of different parameters on various
performance metrics such as generated revenue, utilization, runtime, and the number of

47
User and System Parameters for 50,000 Users (log10 scale)
FIXED-PRICE
8.03%
13.33%
9.55%

Served

CA-LP
CA-GREEDY
104,648
218,499
186,387

Revenue

48.25%
93.94%
90.84%

Utilization

< 1 sec
Time

370 sec
7 sec

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

Figure 3.3: Overall performance of the mechanisms with linear fixed-price vector (.12, .24,
.48, .96), fixed-price factor vector φ = (1, 1, 1), and 50,000 users. The plot is drawn at
log10 scale.
users served by the system.
First, we present the average performance of the mechanisms in Figures 3.2 to 3.5.
All the plots in these figures are represented using a logarithmic scale. The fixed price
mechanism used in these experiments assumes the same fixed price for all the periods of
the day, that is, the fixed price factor vector φ = (1, 1, 1). In Figure 3.2 we present the
summary of the experiments with 100,000 users and the linear price vector. We see that
CA-LP outperforms the other two mechanisms in all the metrics except the running time.
Here the running time is the average time needed to run one auction simulation. About 8%
of the 100,000 users could complete their tasks while running the CA-LP mechanism. We
also see that the overall utilization of the resources and the revenue generated are the best
for CA-LP. This is because the linear program has as objective maximizing the sum of the
valuations, which eventually generates higher revenue by utilizing as many machines as
possible while satisfying the constraint given in Equation (3.6). Utilizing more machines
allocates more users and therefore more users can finish their tasks. On the other hand, the
CA-GREEDY mechanism allocates users based on their relative valuation. Therefore, it
cannot always utilize resources as much as CA-LP can. But the running time of the CA-LP
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User and System Parameters for 10,000 Users (log10 scale)
FIXED-PRICE
15.85%
44.82%
40.18%

Served

CA-LP
CA-GREEDY
60,945
80,839
79,009

Revenue

27.23%
85.71%
87.17%

Utilization

< 1 sec
Time

51 sec
< 1 sec

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

Figure 3.4: Overall performance of the mechanisms with linear fixed-price vector (.12, .24,
.48, .96), fixed-price factor vector φ = (1, 1, 1), and 10,000 users. The plot is drawn at
log10 scale.
is prohibitively high because the payment calculation involves repeated solving of the linear
program. The FIXED-PRICE mechanism obviously has the lowest running time because it
only allocates users on a first-come, first-served basis. The CA-GREEDY mechanism has
very low running time compared to CA-LP since its only major computation is to sort the
list of users.
In Figures 3.3 and 3.4, we show the summary of the results for experiments with 50,000
and 10,000 users and linear price vector. First, we observe that each of the mechanisms
serves higher percentage of users, generates lower revenue, and utilizes less resources as the
number of users decreases. This trend with decreasing demand is natural for any allocation
mechanism. We further observe that the rank of the mechanisms in terms of all the metrics
remain the same regardless of the total number of participants. Also note that compared
to the FIXED-PRICE mechanism, the increase in served users is much higher for CA-LP
and CA-GREEDY. This is due to the fact that FIXED-PRICE only considers those users
who bid at least the fixed value, while the auctions determine allocations based on the
market demand and supply. For the same reason, the utilization of the machines decreases
at a slower rate in the case of combinatorial auction-based mechanisms than in the case of

49

User and System Parameters for Sublinear Price-vector (log10 scale)

User and System Parameters for Superlinear Price-vector (log10 scale)

FIXED-PRICE
6.13%
8.00%
5.59%

Served

CA-LP
Served
CA-GREEDY
108,546
272,583
225,615

Revenue

60.09%
94.70%
91.82%
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FIXED-PRICE
4.96%
8.00%
5.59%

CA-GREEDY
121,586
272,709
225,687

Revenue

50.95%
95.00%
92.00%
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< 1 sec

< 1 sec

Time

Time

860 sec

911 sec
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(a)

100
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103
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(b)

Figure 3.5: Overall performance of the mechanisms with 100,000 users and (a) sublinear
fixed-price vector (.12, .22, .39, .70); (b) superlinear fixed-price vector (.12, .26, .58, 1.28).
The fixed-price factor vector φ = (1, 1, 1). The plot is drawn at log10 scale.
the fixed-price mechanism. However, the gap between the total revenue generated reduces
when there are less participants, as the auction-based mechanisms generate less revenue
when there is less competition.
In Figures 3.5a and 3.5b, we summarize the results of the experiments with 100,000
users and sublinear and superlinear fixed-price vectors, respectively. By comparing them
with the results in Figure 3.2, we see that the only mechanism affected is FIXED-PRICE,
which can serve more users and utilize more resources when the price vector is sublinear.
However, in this case the total revenue decreases as users pay less than what they pay in
the case of a linear price vector. Naturally, we see the opposite trend for the superlinear
price vector. We can conclude that we cannot improve the overall quality of the allocation
generated by the FIXED-PRICE mechanism. By changing the price vector we can only
improve one metric while sacrificing another.
We now investigate different performance metrics by varying other simulation parameters, while setting the total number of users to 100,000 and using the linear price vector.
In Figure 3.6a, we show the revenue generated for different ranges of user valuations. We
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Revenue vs. Valuation Ranges (100,000 Users)

Resource Utilization vs. Valuation Ranges (100,000 Users)
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Figure 3.6: Effect of valuation ranges (with 100,000 users) on (a) Revenue; (b) VM utilization.
see that low user valuations most adversely affect the FIXED-PRICE mechanism. This
is because it does not allocate the requested bundles to users having valuations below the
fixed-price range. On the other hand the combinatorial auction mechanisms can generate
higher revenues because they determine the payments from the user valuations. The revenue increases at the same rate from valuation ranges (0–1) to (0–5). Then, for the valuation
range (0–10), we see a sharp rise in revenue generated by the auction mechanisms, while
the FIXED-PRICE mechanism’s revenue does not increase that much. This is because the
price for an average-sized bundle is 4.5 according to the fixed prices we set. FIXED-PRICE
mechanism’s revenue is bounded by the fixed prices, therefore it cannot take advantage of
higher user valuations. As shown in Figure 3.6b, our experiments reveal that the rate
of resource utilization obtained by the auction-based mechanisms is not affected by the
valuation ranges. The utilization obtained by the FIXED-PRICE mechanism increases as
the valuation range increases, and it is lower than that obtained by combinatorial auction
mechanisms for all the ranges of valuations except for the (1–10) range.
In Figure 3.7, we show the average revenue and resource utilization generated by the
mechanisms when different values of the scale factors for valuation (λ) and deadline (δ)
are used. As a reminder, a scale factor for valuation (or, the price factor) represents how
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Figure 3.7: (a) Revenue and (b) VM utilization vs. ratios of price and deadline factors.
Ratio is defined as a set of ((price-factor), (deadline-factor)) values. Ratio 1 = ((2, 1.5, 1),
(.33, .5, 1)), Ratio 2 = ((2, 1.5, 1), (.5, .67, 1)), Ratio 3 = ((3, 2, 1), (.33, .5, 1)), Ratio 4
= ((3, 2, 1), (.5, .67, 1)).
much more a bundle is valued by a type-1 and type-2 user than a type-3 user. For example,
λ = (2, 1.5, 1) denotes the case where on average a type-1 user bids twice the value than
a type-3 user and a type-2 user bids around 1.5 times higher than a type-3 user. When
λ = (3, 2, 1), these multiplication factors become 3 and 2, respectively and meaning that
those users’ demands are even higher than those of type-3 users. Similarly, a deadline factor
says how strict is the deadline of type-1 and type-2 users compared to that of type-3 users.
We consider four possible combinations of these two factors, which we denote as Ratio 1,
. . . , Ratio 4 in Figure 3.7. We show the revenue generated in different such scenarios in
Figure 3.7a. Ratios 1 and 2 are for the price factors (2, 1.5, 1) and Ratios 3 and 4 are for
the price factors (3, 2, 1). We see that the combinatorial auction-based mechanisms are
capable of generating higher revenues when the type-1 and type-2 bidders bid more, but
the fixed-price mechanism cannot increase the generated revenue that much. However, we
see that deadline factors do not have much effect on the outcome, as evident from similar
values shown for different deadline factors but the same valuation factor (e.g., Ratio 1 and
Ratio 2). From Figure 3.7b we see that these factors have almost no effect on machine
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Figure 3.8: Percentage of served users for simulations with 100,000 users.
utilization achieved by the combinatorial auctions. But utilization is increased a little for
the FIXED-PRICE mechanism with higher valuation factors.
We now examine how the three mechanisms deal with different types of users. Recall
that type-1 users are the most demanding and type-3 users are the least demanding. First,
we show the percentage of users who could complete their tasks in Figures 3.8 to 3.10. We
refer to these users as the served users. In these figures we show the results from three
different sets of experiments, with 100,000, 50,000, and 10,000 users and the linear price
vector. In Figure 3.8, where the total number of users is 100,000, we observe that the
FIXED-PRICE mechanism serves type-3 users the most. This is because it only considers
the order in which users arrive. Type-1 and type-2 users have shorter deadlines and therefore leave the system if they do not get the allocation within a few allocation events. On
the other hand, type-3 users have longer deadlines, and therefore they are active longer
and eventually get the allocation once the users that entered the system earlier finish their
tasks. CA-LP also served more users of type-3 than users of other types, yet it served more
users compared to the FIXED-PRICE mechanism in every category. Here we see a nice
property of CA-GREEDY that is, it serves more type-1 users than the other mechanisms.
It also serves more users of type-1 than other user types. This is because CA-GREEDY
makes decisions based on the bid densities, which are on average the highest for type-1
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Figure 3.9: Percentage of served users for simulations with 50,000 users.
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Figure 3.10: Percentage of served users for simulations with 10,000 users.
users.
Now comparing Figure 3.8 with Figures 3.9 and 3.10, we see that for 50,000 users
the CA-GREEDY mechanism maintains its feature of serving a higher percentage of more
demanding users than less demanding users. But for 10,000 users, the percentage of served
users of type-3 is higher than the ones corresponding to the other two types of users. This
is because for the reduced demand, type-1 and type-2 users cannot occupy most of the
resources as they do for the cases with higher number of users. Also, recall that type-1 and
type-2 users request larger bundles and are active during peak hours and off-peak hours
only. On the other hand, type-3 users are generated any time of the day. Therefore, the
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Figure 3.11: Percentage of partially served users for simulations with 100,000 users.
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Figure 3.12: Percentage of partially served users for simulations with 50,000 users.
type-3 users get more space for occupying the resources facing less competition from the
other users. Also, their bundle size is smaller compared to the other users and therefore a
higher number of users can be served using the same amount of resources. On the other
hand, in the case of CA-LP, we see almost the same trend (although at a different scale)
in terms of serving the three types of users. Hence, we can conclude that CA-GREEDY is
a better choice in terms of fairness and the handling of demand and supply in the market.
In Figures 3.11 to 3.13 we plot the percentage of users that could only partially complete
their tasks. First, we observe that the FIXED-PRICE mechanism has the least number
of partially served users in all three cases. This is because of its inherent first-come, first-
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Figure 3.13: Percentage of partially served users for simulations with 10,000 users.
served policy. These plots also reveal that the percentage of partially served users increases
in the case of CA-LP and CA-GREEDY when fewer users participate. Such effect is natural
to auction mechanisms; a user must be denied the resources once another user with a higher
bid arrives in an already saturated market for resources. However, if the consequences of
having jobs partially completed is very important in some systems, it may be better to
consider FIXED-PRICE as the allocation mechanism. The combinatorial auction-based
mechanisms we propose can also be improved by incorporating some penalty for partially
finished jobs. In the simulations we consider that the bids are generated once and a user
submits the same bid until she gets her job done or her deadline is reached. In practice, a
user is an interactive entity and can adapt her bid depending on the value and urgency of her
job and the current market demand. Creating an automated bidding agent to participate
in the combinatorial auctions could also be an interesting research direction that could
eventually decrease the number of partially served users.
Now we present the average resource utilization obtained by the three mechanisms
during different periods of time of the day. Recall that in the experiments, we divided a
day between peak (8am-4pm), off-peak (4pm-midnight), and night (midnight-8am) hours.
Also, type-1 users are generated during the peak hours, type-2 users during the peak and
off-peak hours, and type-3 users can place their bids any time of the day. In Figure 3.14,
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Figure 3.14: Utilization of resources during different periods of time (100,000 users)
we see that the resource utilization is around 95% for CA-LP for each period of the day.
The utilization achieved by CA-GREEDY is very close to that of CA-LP for all three
periods. The proposed mechanisms are able to effectively balance the load of the system
over time. The utilization obtained by FIXED-PRICE is about 56% and 59% during peak
and off-peak hours and it falls below 50% during night. Since FIXED-PRICE is a firstcome-first-served mechanism, it cannot free up resources that are being used by type-3
users when in the morning type-1 users start placing their requests. Since type-1 users
have shorter deadlines, by the time some resources are freed up, some users have already
left the system. Therefore, the utilization obtained by FIXED-PRICE is far below that
obtained by CA-LP and CA-GREEDY. At night, the utilization further drops because only
the type-3 users request computing resources.
All the above experiments considered the FIXED-PRICE mechanism with a fixed-price
factor vector φ = (1, 1, 1). We now show the results obtained by considering different fixedprice factor vectors, φ. This is equivalent to considering different prices at different times
of the day and it will allow us to investigate the effect of increasing the prices during high
demand hours on the performance of the mechanisms. The combinatorial auction-based
mechanisms dynamically determine the prices of the VM instances. Since demand varies
during peak, off-peak, and night hours, we multiply the fixed prices with different values
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Figure 3.15: Overall performance of the mechanisms with fixed-price factor vector φ =
(3, 2, 1) and 100,000 users. The plot is drawn at log10 scale.
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Figure 3.16: Overall performance of the mechanisms with fixed-price factor vector φ =
(4, 2, 1) and 100,000 users. The plot is drawn at log10 scale.
based on the time of the day. The results presented in Figure 3.15, are obtained when we
multiply the fixed-price vector by 3 for the peak hours, by 2 for the off-peak hours, and
by 1 for the night hours. This correspond to a fixed-price factor vector φ = (3, 2, 1). We see
that when compared to the results presented in Figure 3.2, the percentage of served users
when employing the FIXED-PRICE mechanism has decreased from 5.5% to 3.8% and the
utilization of VM instances has decreased from 54% to 34%. This is expected, since more
users are being rejected allocation during peak and off-peak hours due to the increase in the

58
fixed-prices. However, the revenue generated by the FIXED-PRICE mechanism remains
at almost the same level. This shows that adjusting the fixed-price vector in anticipation
of higher demand may not improve much the overall efficiency. At higher prices, fewer
users are served and resources are under-utilized leading to no significant impact on the
generated revenue. Figure 3.16 shows the results obtained when we changed the fixed-price
factor vector to φ = (4, 2, 1), i.e., we multiply the fixed-price vector by 4 during the peak
hours, by 2 during the off-peak hours and by 1 during night hours. Here we observe that
while serving fewer users and utilizing less resources, the FIXED-PRICE mechanism also
obtains lower revenue. We conclude that it is possible to control the behavior of fixedprice mechanisms by updating the fixed-price vector based on observation or statistical
data about the demands. But combinatorial auction-based mechanisms compute the price
dynamically, therefore no matter how the demand changes, they are able to obtain an
efficient allocation and pricing.
In summary, we can conclude that combinatorial auction-based allocation and pricing
mechanisms are more desirable over the fixed-price based ones currently employed by cloud
providers. CA-LP is a better choice when the objective is to obtain higher revenue and
higher utilization of resources. However, we have to limit the application of CA-LP to systems with small number of users, because otherwise the execution time will be prohibitive.
This is because the CA-LP involves solving a linear program whose number of unknowns
increases with the number of users participating in the auction. In addition to this, in order
to compute the user’s payments, CA-LP needs to solve one linear program for each user,
thus the execution time increases very fast with the number of users. CA-LP can be a good
choice when auctions are run at longer intervals. On the other hand, CA-GREEDY can be
applied to cloud systems with any number of users being able to generate high revenue and
resource utilization with very low execution time. CA-GREEDY is a better choice when
the objective of VMAP is to maximize the social welfare. It is also worth mentioning that
the CA-LP mechanism is designed for bidders with known bundles (i.e., bundles that are
known to the auctioneer) [7]. Therefore, this mechanism is vulnerable to manipulation by
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users who bid for unknown bundles in the hope of obtaining a better allocation or price.
On the other hand, CA-GREEDY is a truthful mechanism with respect to both valuations
and the bundles requested. Considering all the above aspects, we recommend using the
CA-GREEDY mechanism for solving general purpose VM allocation problems in clouds.

3.5

Summary

We investigated the applicability of combinatorial auction-based mechanisms for allocation
and pricing of VM instances in cloud computing platforms. We proposed two combinatorial
auction-based mechanisms for solving the problem of allocating VM instances in clouds.
We compared their performance with that obtained by a currently used fixed-price mechanism. We performed extensive simulation experiments and conclude that combinatorial
auction-based mechanisms are clearly a better choice for VM allocation in clouds. Based
on experimental data and on the theoretical properties of the mechanisms, we also made
recommendations that the CA-GREEDY mechanism should be the choice for general purpose VM instance allocation problems while the CA-LP mechanism can be reserved for
special scenarios.
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CHAPTER 4: EFFICIENT
BIDDING FOR VIRTUAL
MACHINE INSTANCES IN
CLOUDS
4.1

Introduction

In the previous chapter, we showed that combinatorial auctions are efficient mechanisms
for allocating the VM instances in clouds. In a combinatorial auction-based VM instance
allocation mechanism, a user bids for a bundle of VM instances of different types required
for executing her application by specifying the bundle and a value. The value represents
how much the user is willing to pay for the bundle if allocated. The auction mechanism
determines the set of winning users, allocates their requested bundles, and computes the
amount they have to pay. The goal of the cloud provider is to efficiently allocate the
available VM instances to the users and generate the maximum possible revenue. On the
other hand, a user desires to maximize her own utility, that is, the value she derives from
obtaining the bundle minus the amount she has to pay for using the bundle. If the user
does not obtain any bundle, her utility is zero. The combinatorial auction mechanisms we
designed in the previous chapter are incentive-compatible, that is, they guarantee that a user
maximizes her utility by bidding her ‘true’ valuation of the requested bundle. Therefore,
to achieve maximum utility, a user needs to determine (i) the bundle of VM instances that
guarantees the best performance for her application, and (ii) the correct (or true) valuation
of the bundle.
However, generating such an efficient bid is a nontrivial problem, especially if the user
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needs to execute parallel applications on the cloud platform. The degree of parallelism
of the application and the system’s parameters, such as communication delay, limit the
speedup of a parallel application. Thus, it is imperative to incorporate these parameters
when determining the best VM bundle necessary for executing an application. A realistic
valuation of a given bundle of VM instances should also consider the performance gain of
the application achieved by the bundle. Finally, the bid should not exceed the budget of
the user.

4.1.1

Our Contribution

We address the above problem by first designing a user’s valuation function that considers
both the application and the system’s parameters. The proposed valuation function determines the value of a bundle of VM instances on which a user executes her application.
Then, we propose an algorithm that uses this valuation function to generate efficient bids
within the users’ budgets. We analyze the complexity of our proposed bidding algorithm
and perform extensive simulation experiments to investigate its properties.

4.1.2

Organization

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe our proposed
bidding strategy algorithm and analyze its complexity. In Section 4.3, we evaluate the
proposed bidding strategy by extensive simulation experiments. We summarize our results
in Section 4.4.

4.2

Proposed Bidding Strategy

In this section, first we briefly describe the setup of the combinatorial auction for VM
instances allocation in clouds and then present our proposed efficient bidding strategy
algorithm.

62
Among the combinatorial auction-based mechanisms that we designed for VM allocation in clouds, we choose CA-GREEDY to illustrate the design of our bidding strategy.
The bidding strategy is not designed specifically for this mechanism and it is valid for any
mechanism that solves the same VM allocation problem solved by CA-GREEDY. In Chapter 3, we showed that CA-GREEDY guarantees incentive-compatibility i.e., users obtain
maximum utility only by bidding their true valuations for the requested bundles. Following
is a quick refresher of the VM allocation problem that we solve using CA-GREEDY.
A cloud provider needs to allocate k1 , . . . , km copies of m different types of VM instances
among n competing users. The different types of VMs are represented as VM1 , . . . , VMm
and their relative ‘computing powers’ are denoted by w = (w1 , . . . , wm ), where wi is the
number of processors in VMi . We assume that the VM instances have other computing
resources (e.g., memory, storage, and bandwidth) in proportion to the number of processors.
Here we assume that w1 = 1 and wi ≤ wi+1 . An example is w = (1, 2, 4, 8) that means
the cloud provider offers four types of VM instances having 1, 2, 4, and 8 processors,
respectively.
A user uj , j = 1, . . . , n participates in the auction for VM instances by submitting her
j
bid Bj = (r1j , . . . , rm
, vj ). Here, rij is the number of VMi instances that user uj requests and

vj is the maximum amount that uj is willing to pay if the bundle is allocated to her. The
goal of the CA-GREEDY mechanism is to determine an allocation vector x = (x1 , . . . , xn ),
where xj = 0 indicates that user uj does not obtain her requested bundle, and xj = 1
means that uj obtains her requested bundle. The mechanism also determines a payment
vector y = (y1 , . . . , yn ), where yj is the amount user uj has to pay for the allocated bundle.
The combinatorial auction for VM instances is conducted periodically (e.g., once per
hour). Each auction allocates the maximum possible number of resources to the users for
only one period of time. Users who did not complete their application execution in one
period need to bid again for the next period. It is the users’ responsibility to determine
how many units of time they need certain resources and submit their bids until their work
is completed. Now we are ready to present the bidding strategy algorithm that we design
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in this work.
A bidding strategy should create efficient bids for users participating in combinatorial
auctions for VM instances in clouds. The strategy must take into account the type and
workload of the application the user intends to run, and her budget. It should generate a
bundle of VM instances and a valuation of that bundle in order to provide the user with
the best performance within her budget.

4.2.1

Execution Time and Speedup

We consider a set of users who intend to run parallel applications on clouds. In particular,
we consider malleable applications, which are parallel applications that can be executed on
any given number of processors [32]. However, by employing more processors we cannot
gain speedup indefinitely. This is because by adding more processors the overhead added
to the execution time increases. This overhead is a function of both system-specific and
application-specific parameters, as we will discuss in the following.
Let us consider that a user uj needs to run a malleable parallel application aj on a cloud
platform. The application is characterized by its workload ωj , expressed as a processor-time
product. Havill and Mao [32] modeled the execution time Tj of an application aj as:
Tj = ωj /pj + (pj − 1)θ

(4.1)

where pj is the number of processors used, and θ is a system-specific parameter called the
‘setup time’. The setup time is the time spent to create, dispatch, or destroy multiple
processes. The first term represents the time spent executing the workload only, which
is equally divided to pj processors. The second term corresponds to the system-specific
overhead (e.g., time to create or destroy a process).
We argue that the overhead of execution on multiple processors is not only dependent
on the setup time but also on the time spent on distributing the input data during initialization and on the time spent on communication and synchronization during program
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execution. We assume that the amount of information to be exchanged during initialization
and execution can be expressed as a fraction of the total workload. Hence, our proposed
model for the parallel execution time of a malleable application is given by
Tj = ωj /pj + (pj − 1)θ + (pj − 1)δτj ωj + (Rj − 1)δcj ωj

(4.2)

Our new model adds two new terms to the existing two terms of Equation (4.1). The
third term in the new equation for Tj characterizes the initialization overhead. Here, δ is
the time to communicate one unit of data between different VM instances in the system,
and τj is the amount of input data to be transferred, expressed as a fraction of the total application workload. Therefore, the amount of input data that is transferred is τj ωj
and the overhead for data transfer during initialization is (pj − 1)δτj ωj . The fourth term
represents the communication and synchronization overhead incurred during processing.
Here, cj is the communication overhead expressed as a fraction of the workload. Rj is the
number of VM instances the total number of processors are divided into. Here we assume
that communication within a VM instance takes negligible amount of time compared to
the communication between VM instances. Therefore, we multiply the amount of communication by Rj − 1. This implies that if all pj processors reside on one VM instance (i.e.,
Rj = 1), the overhead for communication and synchronization is negligible. Otherwise, it
increases with the number of VM instances employed in running the application.
Using Equation (4.2) we derive the speedup of the application as:
Sj =

ωj
ωj /pj + (pj − 1)θ + (pj − 1)δτj ωj + (Rj − 1)δcj ωj

(4.3)

We examine the characteristics of this speedup function in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. In both
figures, the following parameters are fixed: ωj = 50, δj = 0.01, τj = 0.05, θj = 0.05,
c = 0.01. In Figure 4.1, we plot the speedup vs. the number of processors while keeping
Rj = 1 constant. Here we see that the speedup improves until the number of processors
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Figure 4.1: Characteristics of the valuation function: Speedup vs. number of processors
(Rj = 1)
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Figure 4.2: Characteristics of the valuation function: Speedup vs. number of VM instances
(pj = 26)
reaches about 25, which is the optimal number of processors. In Figure 4.2, we plot the
speedup vs. the number of VM instances (Rj ), where the number of processors is kept
constant at pj = 26. The speedup decreases as the number of VM instances increases.
The speedup function given in Equation (4.3) serves as the basis for the valuation
function and the bidding strategy algorithm that we propose.
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4.2.2

Valuation Function and Algorithm

We now determine a valuation function which gives the ‘value’ a user receives upon completion of her application on a bundle of VM instances. The function should depend on
the parameters of the application and the bundle allocated to it. We define the valuation
for using a bundle for one unit of time as follows:
vj = (λj Sj )(Sj /Sopt )

(4.4)

Here, Sj is given by Equation (4.3) and λj denotes how much user uj values each unit
of speedup. The valuation can be interpreted as follows. When the optimal speedup can
be achieved (i.e., Sj = Sopt ) within the budget of the application the valuation function
is directly proportional to the speedup. When the optimal speedup cannot be achieved
the valuation is proportional to the ‘scaled speedup’, where the scaling factor is given by
Sj /Sopt < 1. That is, if the optimal speedup is not achieved the user values less the unit of
speedup than in the case in which the optimal speedup is achieved.
The valuation vj can also be interpreted as the user’s maximum willingness to pay for
the given bundle. This value is the bid amount that the user submits to the auctioneer (i.e.,
cloud provider) along with her requested bundle. If the bundle is allocated, user uj needs
to pay a price yj determined by the auction. The user’s utility is defined as the surplus
value retained by the user after paying the price for executing her application.

 v −y
j
j
Uj =
 0

if xj = 1

(4.5)

if xj = 0

Here, xj is the indicator variable of whether user uj receives her requested bundle of VM
instances. Obviously, the user’s goal is to maximize her utility.
Now we present our proposed Efficient Bidding Strategy (EBS). As we mentioned before,
an auction is run each unit of time (e.g., every hour). Therefore, a bidding strategy needs to
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Algorithm 4 Efficient Bidding Strategy (EBS)
Require: ωj , τj , cj , Vj , λj
j
Ensure: (Bj = (r1j , . . . , rm
, vj ), Tj )
1: {Phasep
I: Finding optimal bundle and speedup}
2: pj ← ⌊ ωj /(θ + δτj ωj )⌋
3: z ← pj
4: Rj ← 0
j
5: for i := m downto 1 do {initialize ri }
6:
rij ← ⌊z/wi ⌋
7:
z ← z mod wi
8:
Rj ← Rj + rij
9: end for
10: Tj ← ωj /pj + (pj − 1)θ + (pj − 1)δτj ωj + (Rj − 1)δcj ωj
11: Sj ← ωj /Tj
12: Sopt ← Sj {save value of optimal speedup}
13: {Phase II: Finding optimal valuation and adjust if necessary}
14: vj ← (λj Sj )
15: while vj Tj > Vj and pj > 0 do
16:
h←0
17:
for i := m downto 1 do {increase number of VMs}
18:
if h = 0 and rij > 0 then
19:
rij ← rij − 1
20:
Rj ← Rj − 1
21:
h←i
22:
z ← wi
23:
else if h > 0 then
24:
rij ← rij + ⌊z/wi ⌋
25:
Rj ← Rj + ⌊z/wi ⌋
26:
z ← z mod wi
27:
end if
28:
end for
29:
if h = 0 then {maximum possible Rj reached}
30:
pj ← pj − 1
31:
z ← pj
32:
Rj ← 0
33:
for i := m downto 1 do {initialize rij for new pj }
34:
rij ← ⌊z/wi ⌋
35:
z ← z mod wi
36:
Rj ← Rj + rij
37:
end for
38:
end if
39:
Tj ← ωj /pj + (pj − 1)θ + (pj − 1)δτj ωj + (Rj − 1)δcj ωj
40:
Sj ← ωj /Tj
41:
vj ← (λj Sj )(Sj /Sopt ) {scale valuation w.r.t. speedup}
42: end while
43: if pj = 0 then
44:
return “Budget too low”
45: end if
j
j
46: return (Bj = (r1 , . . . , rm , vj ), Tj )
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j
determine the bid Bj = (r1j , . . . , rm
, vj ) and the time required to complete the application,

Tj . Here rij is the number of VM instances of type VMi included in the requested bundle of
uj . The goal of the strategy is to find a bundle and valuation so that the user can obtain
the best possible speedup within her budget Vj , and thus, maximize her utility. Since vj
is the value the user is willing to pay for the allocation of the bundle for one unit of time,
the algorithm has to ensure that the maximum total cost for the user does not exceed her
budget, i.e.,
vj Tj ≤ Vj

(4.6)

Our bidding strategy algorithm presented in Algorithm 4 consists of two phases. In the
first phase (lines 1 to 12), it determines the optimum number of processors (i.e., the number
of processors that gives the maximum speedup). First, the optimal number of processors
is calculated (line 2). To compute the optimal number of processors we consider that all
processors are part of the same VM, that is, we set Rj = 1 in Equation (4.2). We then
differentiate Tj with respect to pj and solve

dTj
dpj

= 0 for pj as follows.

−pj 2 + θ + δτj ωj = 0

(4.7)

Solving the above equation gives us the optimal value of pj as:
popt

q
= ⌊ ωj /(θ + δτj ωj )⌋

(4.8)

We then generate the bundle with the least number of VM instances possible for pj processors (lines 3 to 9). Lines 10 and 11 compute the optimal execution time and the speedup
with respect to the optimal values of pj and Rj , respectively. We save the value of the
optimal speedup for later use (line 12).
Note that we set Rj = 1 while deriving the optimal number of processors in Equation (4.8). This is because the speedup function is linearly decreasing with respect to Rj
(Figure 4.2). Thus, we determine first the optimal value of pj without considering Rj . In
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Optimal Number of Processors vs. Workload
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Figure 4.3: Characteristics of the valuation function: Optimal number of processors (pj )
and time (Tj ) vs. workload.
Figure 4.3, we show the optimal number of processors and the optimal time as a function
of the workload for the same example as the one used to plot Figure 4.2.
In the second phase, the algorithm adjusts the number of processors and/or number of
VM instances if the valuation corresponding to the maximum speedup exceeds the user’s
budget. That is, Rj is increased if the valuation exceeds the user budget. If the valuation
exceeds the budget even when Rj = pj (i.e., the bundle is composed of only one-processor
VM instances), then we decrease the value of pj and iterate until a valuation within the
budget is found, or pj = 0, which means that it is not possible to execute this application
under the given budget Vj .
Lines 13 to 46 constitute the second phase of the algorithm. First, we calculate the
optimal valuation of the bundle for allocation of one unit time, based on the optimal
speedup (line 14). If this valuation cannot satisfy Equation 4.6, the while loop in lines 1542 iterates until a feasible bundle is found or it is determined that no such bundle exists.
The for loop in lines 17 to 28 selects one of the largest VM instances in the bundle and
replaces it with smaller VM instances, thus increasing Rj and generating a lower value
bundle. The indicator variable h initialized in line 16 captures the status of whether we
can increase Rj for the current value of pj or not. If Rj has reached its maximum, we
decrease pj , create a new bundle (lines 29-38), and compute Tj and Sj as above (lines 39-
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40). For this reduced speedup, we compute vj as before, but then scale it with the ratio of
Sj and the optimal speedup (line 41). The implication of this can be understood from the
following equation.
vj Tj = (λj Sj )(Sj /Sopt )Tj = (λj ωj /Tj )(Sj /Sopt )Tj
= (λj ωj )(Sj /Sopt )

(4.9)

From the above equation, we see that scaling the valuation makes sure that the maximum
total cost of executing the application depends on the ratio of the achieved and the optimal
speedup. Thus, the total cost of the application decreases and the loop in line 15 terminates
when a solution is found within the budget constraint. The algorithm returns the bid and
the time requirement if a feasible solution is found, otherwise it returns “Budget too low”.

4.2.3

Analysis of EBS

Effectiveness. From Equation (4.3), we see that the speedup of a malleable parallel application is dependent on two variables, pj and Rj . One way to optimize the speedup
would be to solve a two variable unconstrained optimization problem. We did not consider
solving the two variable optimization problem for two reasons. First, variables pj and Rj
limit each others values. Since there are certain types of VM instances available from the
cloud provider, a given number of processors cannot be mapped into an arbitrary number
of VM instances. Therefore, a solution from solving the two-variable optimization problem
might not be practically implementable and need further adjustments. On the other hand,
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 suggests that only pj has a non-linear relationship with the speedup.
Hence, finding the optimum pj and setting the lowest possible value for Rj will give us one
best estimate of the optimal speedup. If the best speedup leads to a valuation that exceeds
the budget, the algorithm is capable of finding the best speedup within the budget.
Since the EBS algorithm ensures the best speedup within the budget, this maximizes
the user’s utility. This is because the user bids her true valuation in a combinatorial auction
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that is incentive-compatible [71].
Running Time. In Algorithm 4, the while loop starting in line 15 dominates the running
time. In the worst case, this loop will iterate until pj = 0. In that case, the for loop in
line 17 iterates pj times for each value of pj , where 1 ≤ pj ≤ popt . Each iteration of this
loop replaces one larger VM instance with two or more smaller VM instances until the
bundle contains pj one-processor VM instances. Therefore, for one value of pj , the loop in
line 17 iterates pj times in the worst case. The worst-case running time of the algorithm is
Ppopt
2
i=1 i = O(popt ).

4.3

Experimental Results

We perform simulation experiments to evaluate the proposed bidding strategy. Our goal is
to answer the following questions: (i) How does the bidding strategy affect users’ utilities?
(ii) How does the bidding strategy affect the cloud providers’ revenue? (iii) How does the
number of strategic bidders participating in an auction influence other bidders’ utilities?

4.3.1

Naive Bidding

We compare our proposed strategy with a ‘naive strategy’. The naive bidding strategy
does not consider the application’s speedup function when determining the bid, but it is
not completely arbitrary. A naive bidder has different values for different types of VM
instances and assumes the existence of some overhead which she incorporates in her bids.
The Naive-Biding (NB) algorithm is given in Algorithm 5.
The naive user uj assigns a value ρji to each V Mi as follows. She bases the assignment
on a known fixed-price vector f1 , . . . , fm of a cloud provider where fi /fi′ = wi /wi′ , for
i = 1, . . . , m. The value for V M1 is determined by multiplying f1 by a valuation factor
σ1j (line 1). The values of the other VMs, ρji , i = 2, . . . , m, are determined by multiplying
σ1j by the second valuation factor, σ2j , and by the relative values of other VMi instances,
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Algorithm 5 Naive-Bidding (NB)
Require: ωj , Vj , σ1j , σ2j , β1j , β2j
j
Ensure: (Bj = (r1j , . . . , rm
, vj ), tj )
j
j
1: ρ1 ← σ1 f1
2: for i := 2 to m do {set user’s ‘own’ value for V Mi }
3:
ρji ← σ2j ρj1 (wi /w1 )
4: end for
5: repeat {select a random VM type VMi }
6:
i ← random(1, m)
7:
{select rij , tj such that rij tj > ωj /wi }
8:
z ← ωj /wi
√
9:
rij ← ⌈β1j z⌉
10:
tj ← ⌈β2j z/rij ⌉
11:
vj ← ρji rij
12:
{reject VMi if budget exceeded}
13: until vj tj ≤ Vj or all VM types are rejected
14: if vj tj > Vj then
15:
return “Budget too low”
16: end if
j
17: return (Bj = (0, . . . , ri , . . . , 0, vj ), tj )

i = 2, . . . , m (lines 2-4).
The bid is generated in lines 6 to 12. First, a VM type is selected at random (line 6).
Then the user creates a bundle and determines the time required to execute her application
so that her application can be completed based on her assumption about the overhead, given
by overhead factors β1j and β2j . The basis of generating the bundle is that with no overhead,
rij instances of VMi should execute an application aj with workload ωj in tj units of time
if wi rij tj = ωj . Given wi , one set of values of rij and tj that satisfies this condition is
√
rij = tj = z, where z = ωj /wi (line 8). The user tries to avoid requesting an excessive
number of VM instances (i.e., making an attempt to reduce the overhead) by setting rij
√
as z times overhead factor β1j (line 9). tj is computed as the value required to satisfy
rij tj = z times the other overhead factor β2j , in an attempt to allocate some extra time for
completion of the job (line 10). The valuation is simply the product of rij and ρji (line 11).
Lines 6 to 12 are enclosed in a repeat-until loop between lines 5 to 14 that changes the
VM selection when the valuation-time product exceeds the budget. The algorithm returns
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“Budget too low” if no selection of VM type can satisfy the budget constraint.

4.3.2

Simulation Parameters

We perform two sets of simulation experiments. In the first set of experiments, each user
takes part in two separate auctions. In the first auction, all users participate by generating
their bids using the EBS algorithm while in the second auction, they all use the NB algorithm. In the following, the users that bid using EBS are called strategic users, while those
bidding using NB are called naive users. A user bids in both auctions simultaneously until
their application is completed or its deadline is exceeded. The parameters characterizing
the application of a user are kept the same for both auctions. This set of experiments
allows us to investigate the overall effect of the bidding strategies on the system.
In the second set of experiments, we run an auction with mixed user population. In
each experiment, we set a distribution of naive and strategic users. Users are generated
according to this distribution and all users take part in a single auction. These experiments
allow us to investigate how effective our bidding strategy is on helping the users achieve
better utilities. They also allow us to examine the effect of strategic bidders on the naive
bidders and vice versa.
Each simulation experiment generates N = 50, 000 users on a span of D = 5, 10, or 15
simulated days. We run 24 auctions each day, one per hour. Users are generated each hour,
at an average rate of N/(24D) plus a randomly chosen deviation between [−20%, 20%]. The
workload and the budget of a user are randomly selected from [ω min , ω max ] and [V min , V max ],
respectively. Similarly, the parameters τj , cj , λj , σ1j , σ2j , β1j , and β2j are randomly chosen
from their respective minimum and maximum ranges presented in Table 4.1. The bidding
algorithms generate the bundles of VMs, their valuations, and the time required for application completion. The deadline of a task is determined by multiplying a deadline factor
dj with the time required, Tj , thus, the deadline is dj Tj . Here, dj is chosen randomly from
[dmin , dmax ].
We consider m = 4 types of VM instances in the system, each having k copies available,
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Table 4.1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter
D
θ
δ
m
k
w
f
N
n

Description
Simulated days
Constant setup time for an application
Communication time between VMs
Types of VMs
Available VMs of each type
Relative weight of VMs
Fixed price of VMs
Maximum number of users
Users participating in an auction

ω min , ω max

Min. & Max. workload

V min , V max

Min. & Max. user’s budget

dmin , dmax

Min. & Max. deadline factor
Min. & Max. initialization
overhead

τ min , τ max
cmin , cmax

Min. & Max. communication
overhead

λmin , λmax

Min. & Max. valuation
for speedup

σ1min , σ1max

Min. & Max. valuation factor 1

σ2min , σ2max

Min. & Max. valuation factor 2

β1min , β1max
β2min , β2max

Min. & Max. overhead factor 1
Min. & Max. overhead factor 2

π

Distribution of users

Value(s)
5, 10, 15
0.01, 0.05
0.01, 0.02
4
200, 500
(1, 2, 4, 8)
(.12, .24, .48, .96)
50,000
Varies
10, 50
20, 100
5, 25
10, 50
4, 8
1%, 5%
1%, 10%
1%, 5%
1%, 10%
5%, 25%
0.1, 0.25
0.1, 0.5
0.75, 1.50
1.0, 2.0
0.75, 1.50
1.0, 2.0
90%, 95%
105%, 125%
(5%, 95%),
(10%, 90%),
(25%, 75%),
(50%, 50%)

where k = 200, 500. We set the weight and fixed-price vectors of VM instance types to w =
(1, 2, 4, 8) and f = ($0.12, $0.24, $0.48, $0.96). These are taken from the Windows Azure’s
fixed-price VM allocation mechanism [41]. Finally, for the second set of experiments, the
parameter π denotes the distribution of the two types of users. The distributions we use
are (5%, 95%), (10%, 90%), (25%, 75%), and (50%, 50%), where (5%, 95%) means that there
are 5% users who bid strategically using EBS and the rest are naive bidders using NB.
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Figure 4.4: Separate auctions (five-day simulation): Users served
We also vary the system parameters θ and δ in different experiments. We list all
the simulation parameters and their values in Table 4.1.

By varying the parameters

we perform 4,608 experiments with combinatorial auctions with separate user population
and 6,144 experiments with combinatorial auctions with mixed user population.

4.3.3

Analysis of Results

First, we compare and analyze the outcomes of the experiments where each user generates
a naive bid and a strategic bid for the same application and participates in two different
auctions. In Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, we show the percentage of users served, the average
utility, and the total revenue generated for D = 5 simulation days. In these figures, the
users whose applications are completed at the end of the simulation are called the ‘served
users’. ‘Partially served users’ are those whose applications are only partially completed.
The users whose applications did not even start fall into the category of ‘not served’ users.
Finally, the users who did not bid because they exceeded their budget are included in the
‘did not bid’ group.
The utilities of the users are computed using Equation (4.5), where the valuation is
determined using Equation (4.4), because this is the correct valuation of a requested bundle
irrespective of the method of generating the bundle. We see that although the number of
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Figure 4.5: Separate auctions (five-day simulation): Average utility
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Figure 4.6: Separate auctions (five-day simulation): Total revenue
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Figure 4.7: Separate auctions (ten-day simulation): Users served
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Utility of Users (10-day simulation)
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Figure 4.8: Separate auctions (ten-day simulation): Average utility
served users is slightly larger when all users bid naively, the average utility of the served
users is much larger when all bidders bid strategically. The reason behind having more
users served while bidding naively is that each user selects one type of VM instances
at random. Therefore, there is less competition among users as compared to the other
auction (with strategic bidders), where users tend to bid for the largest VM instances
if the budget permits. On the other hand, since naive users are not guaranteed to bid
their ‘true’ valuations, often a naive bidder ends up with a negative utility even when her
application is completed. These factors reduce the average utility of naive users. We also
see that (Figure 4.6) although the total revenue is larger when bidders are naive, a large
portion of it comes from the partially served users, which is not desirable to maintain user
satisfaction. The amount of revenue generated when users bid strategically consists mainly
from the revenue generated by the served users.
Next, we show the results obtained by varying the overall demand on the system. We
do this by expanding the simulation into ten and fifteen days, yet keeping the total number
of users the same. These two sets of experiments enable us to investigate whether the
performance of the EBS algorithm scales in different demand settings. These results are
drawn from the experiments where each user generates one bid of each kind and participates
in separate auctions. In Figures 4.7 to 4.9, we plot the percentage of served users, total
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Figure 4.9: Separate auctions (ten-day simulation): Total revenue
Percent of Users Served (15-day simulation)
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Figure 4.10: Separate auctions (fifteen-day simulation): Users served
revenue, and average utility of users where the simulations run for ten simulated days.
Figures 4.10 to 4.12 show the results for the experiments that run for fifteen simulated
days. Comparing Figures 4.4, 4.7, and 4.10, we see that the percentage of served users
increases as the demand decreases, which is expected. We also see that the percentage of
users served increases more for the EBS algorithm and in the case of fifteen-day simulation
it dominates the one obtained by the NB algorithm. Although the percentage of served
users is better with EBS when the demand is low, we see a different trend while comparing
the average utility of users (Figures 4.5, 4.8, and 4.11). Although naive bidders that are
served have comparable utility with strategic bidders when the demand is low, EBS is able
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Figure 4.11: Separate auctions (fifteen-day simulation): Average utility
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Figure 4.12: Separate auctions (fifteen-day simulation): Total revenue
to generate high utility for the users when the demand grows. However, the average utility
decreases due to higher competition, which pushes the prices up. Finally, we see that the
total revenue generated by the auctions increases with lower demand (as more users can
be served) for both bidding algorithms. Also, when the demand is low, the bids produced
by EBS generate higher revenue than the ones produced by NB.
We now present some plots to show the auction outcomes as the ranges of workload
and budget vary. Figures 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15 show the percentage of served users, the
average utility of served users, and the average revenue collected from the served users
versus four ‘scenarios’ of workload and budget. The scenarios are different combination of
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Percent of Users Served vs. Workload and Budget (5-day simulation)
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Figure 4.13: Users served. Here, each scenario represents a combination of (ω min , ω max ,
V min , V max )-values.
The values are: Scenario 1 ≡ (10, 50, 5, 25), Scenario 2 ≡
(10, 50, 10, 50), Scenario 3 ≡ (20, 100, 5, 25), and Scenario 4 ≡ (20, 100, 10, 50).
Average Utility of Served Users vs. Workload and Budget (5-day simulation)
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Figure 4.14: Average utility. Here, each scenario represents a combination of (ω min , ω max ,
V min , V max )-values.
The values are: Scenario 1 ≡ (10, 50, 5, 25), Scenario 2 ≡
(10, 50, 10, 50), Scenario 3 ≡ (20, 100, 5, 25), and Scenario 4 ≡ (20, 100, 10, 50).
the minimum and maximum workload and budget. For example, Scenario 1 represents the
experiments where the workload varies between 10 and 50 and the budget ranges between 5
and 25. We see in Figure 4.13 that strategic bidding performs better than naive bidding in
terms of the percentage of users served when the workload is higher. This illustrates that
the probability of arbitrarily generating an efficient bid decreases as the workload increases.
This is because the optimal number of processors and time have a non-linear relationship
with the workload. Without this knowledge it is not possible to generate efficient bids
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Average Revenue from Served Users vs. Workload and Budget (5-day simulation)
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Figure 4.15: Total revenue. Here, each scenario represents a combination of (ω min , ω max ,
V min , V max )-values.
The values are: Scenario 1 ≡ (10, 50, 5, 25), Scenario 2 ≡
(10, 50, 10, 50), Scenario 3 ≡ (20, 100, 5, 25), and Scenario 4 ≡ (20, 100, 10, 50).
for any workload. The percentage of users served decreases in Scenarios 3 and 4 because
here users have larger workloads, while the amount of resources are the same in all four
experimental scenarios. Also, Figures 4.14 and 4.15 show that when the workload and the
budget increases, the strategic bidding can yield more utility for the users and more revenue
for the cloud provider. Generating more utility for the users is a desirable property of a
bidding strategy. Generating more revenue for the providers is a positive side-effect.
Since the user utility is the primary performance factor for a bidding strategy, we
further investigate the average user utility with respect to two more sets of simulation
parameters. In Figure 4.16, we plot the average utility of the users vs. the minimum and
the maximum values of the system parameters. Figure 4.16a shows the results for the
case where all system parameters are given the minimum values from Table 4.1, that is,
(θ, δ, τ min , τ max ) = (0.01, 0.01, 1%, 5%). We see that the overall average utility of all users
is higher with naive bidding, which is due to the large difference in utility of the partially
served users. But for the users who were served, strategic bidding yields about 20% more
utility on average. On the other hand, when all the above parameters take their maximum
values (Figure 4.16a), naive bidding suffers a lot as the average utility becomes negative.
We also observe that in both cases the utility of served users is higher than the utility of
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Average user utility vs. system parameters: Scenario 1 (5-day simulation)
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Figure 4.16: (a) Average utility of users vs two extreme combination of values for system
parameters; (a) Scenario 1 ≡ all system parameters have the minimum value; (b) Scenario 2
≡ all system parameters have the maximum value.
Average utility of bidders vs. Bid Parameters (5-day simulation)
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Figure 4.17: Average utility of users vs. four different scenarios of bid parameters. Here,
each scenario represents a combination of (λmin , λmax , σ1min , σ1max , σ2min , σ2max )-values. Scenario 1 ≡ minimum values for all parameters; Scenario 2 ≡ minimum values for λ but
maximum values for both σ parameters; Scenario 3 ≡ maximum value for λ and minimum
value for both σ parameters; and Scenario 4 ≡ maximum values for all parameters.
partially served users, which should be a desired property of a good bidding algorithm.
The next plot, Figure 4.17, shows the average utility of users vs. different sets of values
for the bid parameters (λ, σ). Here, λmin and λmax determine the range of the variable
λ that is multiplied with speedup to determine the valuation of a bundle in EBS. On
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Figure 4.18: Auctions with mixed user population: Users served
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Figure 4.19: Auctions with mixed user population: Average utility
the other hand, σ1min , σ1max , σ2min , σ2max determine the valuation of a bundle for the NaiveBidding (NB) algorithm. In the plot, we show the average valuation of the users vs. the
combination of values of these parameters. We see that in every case except Scenario 3
users achieve higher utility from the EBS algorithm. Scenario 3 is when λ is set to the
maximum value and σ parameters are set to their minimum value. This is because in
this case, EBS generates bids with much higher valuations than the NB. This raises the
payment, and thus, achieves lower utility for EBS.
We now present the results from the second set of experiments, where both naive and
strategic users participate in the same auction. The percentage of users served, the average
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Figure 4.20: Auctions with mixed user population: Average revenue
utility and the revenue per user are shown in Figures 4.18 to 4.20. We see that in terms of
served users, their utility and average revenue collected from them, the strategic bidders
have better performance over the naive bidders. It is notable that in the presence of
strategic bidders, the inefficiency of naive bidding is clearly seen as their average utility is
negative. This is because a naive bidder is not guaranteed to bid for an optimal bundle
with a true valuation. When all the participants are naive bidders, it is possible that some
bidders’ valuations are better than others and they receive positive utility. On the other
hand, when strategic bidders are also participating, even the ‘best’ naive bidders are not
always capable of getting the job done along with receiving a positive utility.
In the experiments with mixed user population, we also vary the percentage of users that
bid strategically. In Figure 4.21, we show the percentage of strategic bidders among the
served users versus the percentage of the strategic bidders in the distribution. It shows, for
example, that when 5% of the users are strategic bidders, about 8% of the served bidders
are strategic. This trend follows for 5%, 10%, and 25% strategic users. But when the
distribution includes 50% strategic users, the percentage of served users falls below 50%.
This is because of the increased competition between the strategic bidders. We also plot
the average utility of served users in Figure 4.22. Here we observe that the naive bidders
could gain some positive utility on average when there are only a 5% strategic users.
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Figure 4.21: Percent of strategic users among served users vs. user distribution.
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Figure 4.22: Average utility of served users vs. user distribution.
In all other cases, the naive bidders receive negative average utility. This shows how the
naive bidders’ utility is affected by the presence of strategic bidders. The average utility
of strategic bidders decreases with more strategic users participating since the competition
increases. We also examine the average revenue generated from served users when the
percentage of strategic users varies in Figure 4.23. We see that as the percentage of served
users increases, the average revenue generated from them increases and the average revenue
from the naive users decreases. This result shows that the presence of strategic users also
benefits the cloud provider.
We can conclude that by using the EBS Algorithm the users are able to generate efficient
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Figure 4.23: Average revenue generated from served users vs. user distribution.
bids, and thus, ensure good completion times and higher utility for their applications. This
also helps the cloud provider generate a fair amount of revenue while maintaining user
satisfaction.

4.4

Summary

We investigated the problem of generating efficient bids in combinatorial auction-based VM
allocation mechanisms in clouds. We designed an efficient bidding algorithm and performed
extensive simulation experiments to investigate its properties. We believe that this research
will encourage users and cloud providers to adopt combinatorial auction-based mechanisms
for allocating their VM instances.
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CHAPTER 5: COMBINATORIAL
AUCTION-BASED DYNAMIC VM
PROVISIONING AND
ALLOCATION IN CLOUDS
5.1

Introduction

Cloud computing systems provide the next computing infrastructure enabling users to
provision remote resources for their computational needs, eliminating the upfront costs of
setting up their own systems. Clouds give users the illusion of an infinite computing resource
available on demand and allow them to acquire and pay for resources on a short term basis.
Examples of cloud computing systems include both commercial (e.g., Microsoft Azure [42],
Amazon EC2 [4]) and open source ones (e.g., Eucalyptus [45]). The usage model of cloud
computing involves virtualization of computing resources. The cloud providers provision
their resources into different types of virtual machine (VM) instances. These instances
are then ‘sold’ to the users for specific periods of time. However, the fixed price-based
resource allocation and trading mechanisms currently in use in cloud computing systems
do not provide an efficient allocation of resources and do not maximize the revenue of the
cloud providers. A better alternative would be to use combinatorial auction-based resource
allocation mechanisms. This argument is supported by the economic theory; when the
auction costs are low, as is the case in the context of cloud computing, auctions are especially
efficient over the fixed-price markets since products are matched to customers having the
highest valuation [67]. In particular, since each user pays a fixed price for an item, the
fixed-price mechanisms cannot guarantee that the user who values an item the most gets
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it. An auction-based mechanism can achieve the economic efficiency because it allocates
items based on the perceived values of the users. The nature of allocation requests for cloud
resources suggests that a combinatorial auction-based mechanism is best suited for the VM
allocation problem in clouds. However, we have to overcome certain challenges while using
combinatorial auction-based mechanisms for VM provisioning and allocation in clouds. The
winner determination in a combinatorial auction is an NP-complete problem [44], therefore
we need approximation algorithms to solve it.
In the previous chapter, we presented two combinatorial auction-based approximation
mechanisms for VM instance allocation. Although these mechanisms are able to increase
the allocation efficiency of VM instances and also increase the cloud provider’s revenue, they
assume static provisioning of VM instances. That is, they require that the VM instances
are already provisioned and would not change. Static provisioning leads to inefficiencies due
to under-utilization of resources if it cannot accurately predict the user demand. Since a
regular auction computes the price of the items based on user demands, a very low demand
may require the auctioneer to set a reserve price to prevent losses.
In this work, we address the VM provisioning and allocation problem by designing a
combinatorial auction-based mechanism that produces an efficient allocation of resources
and high profits for the cloud provider. The mechanism extends the CA-GREEDY mechanism we proposed in the previous chapter to include dynamic configuration of VM instances and reserve prices. The proposed mechanism, called CA-PROVISION, treats the
set of available computing resource as ‘liquid’ resources that can be configured into different numbers and types of VM instances depending on the requests of the users. The
mechanism determines the allocation based on the users’ valuations until all resources are
allocated. It involves a reserve price determined by the operating cost of the resources.
The reserve price ensures that a user pays a minimum amount to the cloud provider so
that the provider does not suffer any losses from the VM provisioning and allocation.
As a reminder, the results shown in Chapter 3 shows that the VM allocation problem
can be best solved by combinatorial auction-based mechanisms. In that work, our focus
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was to evaluate the combinatorial auctions against fixed-price mechanisms in solving the
VM allocation problem with static provisioning in clouds. In this research, we design
a combinatorial auction-based mechanism that dynamically provisions and allocates VM
instances.

5.1.1

Our Contribution

We formulate the dynamic VM provisioning and allocation problem and provide a combinatorial auction-based mechanism to solve it. Our mechanism ensures high profits for
the cloud provider, as well as high utilization of resources. We show that the mechanism
is truthful, that is, it guarantees that a participating user maximizes its utility only by
bidding its true valuation for the bundle of VMs. We evaluate our mechanism by performing extensive simulation experiments using traces of real workloads from the Parallel
Workloads Archive [23]. We analyze the cost and benefit of employing this new mechanism
and provide implementation guidelines.

5.1.2

Organization

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we formulate the problem
of dynamic VM provisioning and allocation in clouds. In Section 5.3, we present our proposed mechanism for solving the VM provisioning and allocation problem and characterize
its theoretical properties. In Section 5.4, we perform extensive simulations using real workload traces to investigate the properties of our proposed mechanism. In Section 5.5, we
summarize our work presented in this chapter.
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5.2

Dynamic VM Provisioning and Allocation Problem

Virtualization technology allows the cloud computing providers to configure computational
resources into virtually any combination of different types of VMs. Hence, it is possible to
determine the best combination of VM instances through a combinatorial auction and then
dynamically provision them. This will ensure that the number of VM instances of different
types are determined based on the market demand and then allocated efficiently to the
users. We formulate the Dynamic VM Provisioning and Allocation Problem (DVMPA) as
follows.
A cloud provider offers computing services to users through m different types of VM
instances, VM1 , . . . , VMm . The computing power of a VM instance of type VMi , i =
1, . . . , m is wi , where w1 = 1 and w1 < w2 < . . . < wm . We denote by w = (w1 , w2 , . . . , wm )
the vector of computing powers of the m types of VM instances. In the rest of this chapter
we will refer to this vector as the ‘weight vector’. As an example of how we use this vector,
let us consider a cloud provider offering three types of VM instances: VM1 , consisting
of one 2 GHz processor, 4 GB memory, and 500 GB storage; VM2 , consisting of two 2
GHz processors, 8 GB memory, and 1 TB storage; and VM3 , consisting of four 2 GHz
processors, 16 GB memory, and 2 TB storage. The weight vector characterizing the three
types of VM instances is thus w = (1, 2, 4). We assume that the cloud provider has enough
resources to create a maximum of M VM instances of the least powerful type, V M1 . The
cloud provider can provision the VM instances in several ways according to the specified
types given by VM1 , . . . , VMm . Let’s denote by ki the number of V Mi instances provisioned
by the cloud provider. The provider can provision any combination of instances given by
the vector (k1 , k2 , . . . , km ) as long as
m
X
i=1

wi ki ≤ M.

(5.1)
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We consider n users u1 , . . . , un who request computing resources from the cloud provider
specified as bundles of VM instances. A user uj requests VM instances by submitting a
j
bid Bj = (r1j , . . . , rm
, vj ) to the cloud provider, where rij is the number of instances of type

V Mi requested and vj is the price user uj is willing to pay to use the requested bundle of
VMs for a unit of time. An example of a bid submitted by a user to a cloud provider that
offers three types of VMs can be Bj = (2, 1, 4, 10). This means that the user is bidding ten
units of currency for using two instances of type V M1 , one instance of type V M2 , and four
instances of type V M3 for one unit of time. The provider runs a mechanism, in our case an
auction, periodically (e.g., once an hour) to provision and allocate the VM instances such
that its profit is maximized. In order to define the profit obtained by the cloud provider
we need to introduce additional notation. Let’s denote by pj the amount paid by user uj
for using her requested bundle of VMs. Note that depending on the pricing and allocation
mechanism used by the cloud provider pj and vj can have different values, usually pj < vj .
Let us assume that the time interval between two consecutive auctions is one unit of
time. Let cR and cI be the costs associated with running, respectively idling a V M1 instance
for one unit of time. Obviously, cR > cI . The cloud provider’s cost of running all available
resources (i.e., all M V M1 instances) is M · cR while the cost of keeping all the available
resources idle is M · cI . We denote by x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) the allocation vector, where

j
xj = 1 if the bundle (r1j , . . . , rm
) requested by user uj is allocated to her, and xj = 0,

otherwise. Given a particular allocation vector and payments, the cloud provider’s profit
is given by
Π=

n
X
j=1

where sj =

Pm

i=1

xj pj − cR

n
X
j=1

xj sj − cI

M−

n
X

xj sj

j=1

!

(5.2)

wi rij is the amount of ‘unit’ computing resources requested by user uj .

The ‘unit’ computing resource is equivalent to one VM instance of type V M1 (i.e., the least
powerful instance offered). The first term of the equation gives the revenue, the second
term gives the running cost of the VM instances that are allocated to the users, and the
third term gives the cost of keeping the remaining resources idle.
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The problem of Dynamic VM Provisioning and Allocation (DVMPA) in clouds is defined
as follows
max Π

(5.3)

sj ≤ M

(5.4)

subject to:
n
X
j=1

xj ∈ {0, 1},

j = 1, . . . , n

(5.5)

0 ≤ pj ≤ vj ,

j = 1, . . . , n

(5.6)

The solution to this problem consists of allocation xj and price pj for each user uj who
j
requested the bundle (r1j , . . . , rm
), j = 1, . . . , n. The allocation will determine the number
P
of VMs of each type that needs to be provisioned as follows. We compute ki = nj=1 xj rij ,

for each type V Mi and provision ki VM instances of type V Mi .

Current cloud service providers use a fixed-price mechanism to allocate the VM instances and rely on statistical data to provision the VMs in a static manner. In Chapter 3,
we have shown that combinatorial auction-based mechanisms can efficiently allocate VM
instances in clouds generating higher revenue than the currently used fixed-price mechanisms. However, the combinatorial auction-based mechanisms we explored in Chapter 3
require that the VMs are provisioned in advance, that is, they require static provisioning.
We argue that the overall performance of the system can be increased by carefully selecting
the set of VM instances in a dynamic fashion which reflects the market demand at the time
when an auction is executed. In the next section, we propose a combinatorial auction-based
mechanism that solves the DVMPA problem by determining the allocation, pricing, and
the best configuration of VMs that need to be provisioned by the cloud provider in order
to obtain higher profits. Since very little is know about profit maximizing combinatorial
auctions [44], we cannot provide theoretical guarantees that our auction-based mechanism
maximizes the profit. The only guarantee we can provide is that the mechanism maximizes
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the sum of the users’ valuations. In designing our mechanism we also use reserve prices
which are known to increase the revenue of the auctioneer, in our case, the revenue of the
cloud provider.

5.3

Combinatorial Auction-Based Dynamic VM Provisioning and Allocation Mechanism

We present a combinatorial auction-based mechanism, called CA-PROVISION, that computes an approximate solution to the DVMPA problem. That is, it determines the prices
the winning users have to pay, and the set of VM instances that need to be provisioned to
meet the winning users’ demand. The mechanism also ensures that the maximum possible
number of resources are allocated and no VM instance is allocated for less than the reserve
price. The design of the mechanism is based on the ideas presented in [35].
CA-PROVISION uses a reserve price to guarantee that users pay at least a given amount
determined by the cloud provider. Thus, the cloud provider needs to set the reserve price,
denoted by vres , to a value which depends on its costs associated with running the VMs. To
do that we observe that the reserve price should be the break-even point between cR and cI ,
which is given by cR − cI . This is because if a unit resource is not allocated, it incurs a loss
of cI . Again, if this resource is allocated for a price cR − cI , the loss is cR − (cR − cI ) = cI .
In other words, the minimum price a user has to pay for using the least powerful VM for a
unit of time is equal to the difference between the cost of running and the cost of keeping
the resource idle. An auction with reserve price vres can be modeled by an auction without
reserve price in which we artificially introduce a dummy bidder u0 having as its valuation
the reserve price, i.e., v0 = vres . The dummy user u0 bids B0 = (1, 0, . . . , 0, vres ), i.e.,
r10 = 1, ri0 = 0 for all i = 2, . . . , m, and v0 = vres . CA-PROVISION uses the density of the
P
j
bids to determine the allocation. User uj ’s bid density is dj = vj /sj , where sj = m
i=1 wi ri ,
j = 0, . . . , n. The bid density is a measure of how much a user bids per unit of allocation. In
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Algorithm 6 CA-PROVISION Mechanism
Require: M ; m; wj : j = 1, . . . , n; cR ; cI ;
Ensure: W ; pj : j = 1, . . . , n; ki : i = 1, . . . , m;
1: {Phase 1: Collect bids}
2: for j = 1, . . . , n do
j
3:
collect bid Bj = (r1j , . . . , rm
, vj ) from user uj
4: end for
5: {Phase 2: Winner determination and provisioning}
6: W ← ∅ {set of winners}
7: vres ← cR − cI
8: add dummy user u0 with bid
B0 = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0, vres )
9: for j = 0,
. . , n do
P.m
10:
sj ← i=1 rij wi
11:
dj ← vj /sj {‘bid density’}
12: end for
13: re-order users u1 , . . . , un such that
d1 ≥ d2 ≥ . . . ≥ dn
14: let l be the index such that
dj ≥ d0 if j ≤ l, and
dj < d0 otherwise
15: discard users ul+1 , . . . , un
16: rename user u0 as ul+1
17: set n ← l + 1
18: R ← M
19: for j = 1, . . . , n − 1 do {leave out dummy user}
20:
if sj ≤ R then
21:
W ← W ∪ uj
22:
R ← R − sj
23:
end if
24: end for
25: for i = 1,
P. . . , m do {determine VM configuration}
26:
ki ← j:uj ∈W rij
27: end for
28: {Phase 3: Payment }
29: for all uj ∈ W do
30:
Wj′ ← {ul : ul ∈
/ W ∧ (vj = 0 ⇒ ul ∈ W )}
31:
l ← lowest index in Wj′
32:
pj ← dl sj
33: end for
34: for all uj ∈
/ W do
35:
pj ← 0
36: end for
37: return (W ; pj : j = 1, . . . , n; ki : i = 1, . . . , m)

our case the unit of allocation corresponds to one VM instance of type V M1 . To guarantee
that the users are paying at least the reserve price, the mechanism will discard all users for
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which dj < do.
CA-PROVISION is given in Algorithm 6. The mechanism requires some information
from the system such as the total amount of computing resources M expressed as the
total number of VMs of type V M1 that can be provisioned by the cloud provider. The
mechanism also requires as input the number of available VM types, m, and their weight
vector w. It also needs to know cR , the cost of running a VM instance of type V M1 , and
cI , the cost of keeping idle a VM instance of type V M1 .
The mechanism works in three phases. In Phase 1, it collects the users’ bids Bj (lines 1
to 4). In Phase 2, the mechanism determines the winning bidders and the VM configuration
that needs to be provisioned by the cloud provider as follows. It adds a dummy user u0
with a bid that contains only one instance of VM1 and has a valuation of vres = cR − cI
(line 8). This dummy user is only used to model the auction with reserve price and will not
receive any allocation. It then computes the bundle size sj and bid density dj of all users
(lines 9 to 12). Then, all users except the dummy user are ordered in decreasing order of
their bid densities and all users uj with dj < d0 are discarded (lines 13 to 15). The dummy
user u0 is then moved to the end of the list of the remaining users since it has the lowest
density in the current set of users. The mechanism reassigns n to be the total number of
users under consideration, including the dummy user (lines 16 and 17).
Next, the mechanism determines the winning users in a greedy fashion. It allocates
the requested bundles to users in decreasing order of their bid density, as long as there are
resources available (lines 18 to 24). However, the dummy user is not considered for allocation. Once the winners are determined, the mechanism determines the VM configuration
that needs to be provisioned by aggregating the bundles requested by the winning users
(lines 25 to 27).
In Phase 3, the mechanism determines the payment for all users. For each winning
bidder uj the mechanism finds the set of losing bidders Wj′ who would otherwise win if
vj = 0, i.e., when user uj is not participating (line 30). From this set, user ul with the
highest bid density is selected. This is determined by taking the lowest indexed user from
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set Wj′ , since the set of users is already sorted in non-decreasing order of users’ bid densities
(line 31). User uj ’s payment is then calculated by multiplying her bundle size sj with the
bid density dl of ul . All losing bidders pay zero. This type of payment is known in the
mechanism design literature as the critical payment [35]. The reason we choose this type
of payment is that it is a necessary condition for obtaining a truthful mechanism, (i.e., a
mechanism that provides incentives to the users to bid their true valuations for the requested
bundles). In the next subsection, we show that our proposed mechanism is truthful.

5.3.1

Properties of CA-PROVISION

We now investigate the properties of the proposed mechanism. An important property of
a mechanism is incentive compatibility, which is also called truthfulness. This is important
because the mechanism computes the allocation and payment based on the information
reported by the users (i.e., bids), which is private information. A rational user may manipulate the mechanism by bidding false valuations if it benefits her to do so. The challenge
of designing a mechanism, therefore, involves designing the winner determination and payment functions that give the users incentives to bid truthfully. This is very important
since the users participating in a truthful allocation mechanism do not have to employ
sophisticated bidding strategies to maximize their utilities. They just need to bid their
true valuation for the bundle of VMs.
In the following, we denote by B = (B1 , . . . , Bn ), the vector representing the bids of all
users and, by B−j = (B1 , . . . , Bj−1, Bj+1 , . . . , Bn ) the vector of all user’s bids except the
bid Bj of user uj . Hence, B can also be represented as B = (Bj , B−j ). We also assume
j
, vj ) is the ‘true bid’ of the user, i.e., the user requires the bundle
that Bj = (r1j , . . . , rm
j
j
(r1j , . . . , rm
) and she values it at vj . We denote by B̂j = (r̂1j , . . . , r̂m
, v̂j ), the bid the user

submits to the mechanism, which may or may not be the same as Bj . We denote by
B̂ = (B̂1 , . . . , B̂n ) the vector of all user’s bids reported to the mechanism.
Here we also abuse the notations for the set of winners W and the payments p1 , . . . , pn .
We will use them as the winner determination function W (.) and the payment functions
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p1 (.), . . . , pn (.). W (B̂) computes the set of winners from the bid vector B̂ and pj (B̂)
computes the payment for user uj from B̂. We express the fact that user uj values her
requested bundle at vj by the valuation function

 v if u ∈ W (B̂)
j
j
Vj (W (B̂), Bj ) =
 0 otherwise

(5.7)

That is, user uj obtains a valuation of vj if her requested bundle is allocated and a valuation
of 0, otherwise.
The utility user uj receives by obtaining the requested bundle is the difference between
her valuation Vj and payment pj as follows
Uj (W (B̂), Bj ) = Vj (W (B̂), Bj ) − pj (B̂).

(5.8)

We assume that the users are rational, that is, their goals are to maximize their utilities.
A truthful mechanism guarantees that a user maximizes her utility only by bidding her true
valuation for the bundle. In the following we define the concept of truthful mechanism.
Definition 1 (Truthful mechanism). A mechanism defined by the winner determination
function W (.) and payment functions p1 (.), . . . , pn (.) is truthful if for all uj , B̂j , and B̂−j ,
Uj (W (Bj , B̂−j ), Bj ) ≥ Uj (W (B̂j , B̂−j ), Bj )

(5.9)

That is, a user participating in a truthful mechanism maximizes her utility only by
bidding her true valuation for the bundle regardless of the other users’ bids.
Truthfulness was well investigated and characterized in the mechanism design literature [44]. One such useful characterization gives the conditions under which a mechanism
is truthful. Stated informally, a mechanism is truthful if the allocation function is monotone and the payments are the critical payments [43]. We define these two properties in
the context of CA-PROVISION below.
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Definition 2 (Monotonicity). An allocation function W (.) is monotone if for every user
j
, vj ) is a winning bid, then every Bj′ = (r ′ j1 , . . . , r ′ jm , vj′ )
uj and every B̂−j , Bj = (r1j , . . . , rm
P
Pm
j
′j
with s′j ≤ sj and vj′ ≥ vj is also a winning bid. Here s′j = m
i=1 wi r i and sj =
i=1 wi ri .

In other words an allocation function is monotone if a winning user also wins if she bids

a higher valuation for a smaller size bundle.
Definition 3 (Critical value). The critical value vjc for user uj ∈ W (B̂) is defined as the

j
unique value such that Bj = (r̂1j , . . . , r̂m
, vj ) is a winning bid for any vj ≥ vjc and a loosing

bid for any vj ≤ vjc .
In other words, the critical value is the minimum valuation a user must declare in order
to obtain her requested bundle.
Next, we present two lemmas and one theorem to prove that CA-PROVISION is truthful.
Lemma 1. CA-PROVISION implements a monotone allocation function.
Proof. CA-PROVISION allocates resources to users in non-increasing order of dj = vj /sj ,
where sj is the sum of the weights of VMs in the requested bundle. Hence, a bid with
higher vj and lower sj is preferable to the mechanism. Assume user uj gets the allocation
j
j
, v̂j ) where
, vj ). If she changes her bid to B̂j = (r1j , . . . , rm
by bidding Bj = (r1j , . . . , rm

v̂j ≥ vj , she stays at least at the same rank in the ordered list. Since she is requesting the
same resource, this implies that her bid is a winning bid. On the other hand, if user uj
P
j
j
bids B̂ = (r̂1j , . . . , r̂m
, vj ) where ŝj = m
i=1 wi r̂i ≤ sj , then dj increases and user uj stays
at least at the same rank in the greedy order of users (Algorithm 1, line 13). Since she is
requesting fewer resources, her bid B̂j is a winning bid. By Definition 2, CA-PROVISION
implements a monotone allocation function.
Lemma 2. CA-PROVISION charges the winning users their critical payments.
Proof. To compute the payment for a winning user uj , CA-PROVISION finds a losing user
ul who would win if user uj would not participate. That means user uj needs to defeat
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user ul with her bid to get her required bundle (i.e., dj ≥ dl ). This means that vj /sj ≥ dl ,
and therefore vj ≥ dl · sj . CA-PROVISION charges pj = dl · sj to user uj (line 32 of
Algorithm 1) which is the minimum valuation uj must bid to obtain her required bundle.
Therefore CA-PROVISION implements the critical value payment (Definition 3).
Theorem 3. CA-PROVISION is truthful.
Proof. According to Lemma 1 and 2, CA-PROVISION implements a monotone allocation
function and charges the winning users their critical payments. Following the results of
Mu’alem and Nisan [43], CA-PROVISION is a truthful mechanism. The reserve prices
do not affect the truthfulness of the mechanism since they are basically bids put out by
the dummy user controlled by the cloud provider and truthful bidding is still a dominant
strategy for the users.
Now, we investigate the complexity of CA-PROVISION. The loops in lines 19-24 and
lines 29-33 constitute the major computational load of Algorithm 6. The first loop has
a worst case complexity of O(M). The worst case is when all winning bidders bid for
bundles containing exactly one unit of VM1 instances. The total execution time of the loop
in lines 29-33 is O(n). This is because it iterates over the set of winning bidders and the
search is performed on the losing bidders. Since the bidders are already sorted, the search
for a critical payment for a winner uj+1 actually starts from the ‘critical payment bidder’
ul of uj (without loss of generality, we assume both uj and uj+1 are winners in this case).
Hence, the overall worst case complexity of this loop is O(n), whereas the sorting in line 13
costs O(n log n). Thus, the complexity of CA-PROVISION is O(M + n log n).

5.4

Experimental Results

We perform extensive simulation experiments with real workload data to evaluate the
CA-PROVISION mechanism. We compare the performance of CA-PROVISION with the
performance of the CA-GREEDY mechanism that we designed in the previous chapter. In
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Chapter 3, we designed CA-GREEDY as a mechanism that allocates statically-provisioned
VM instances and investigated the performance of CA-GREEDY against the performance of
the fixed-price VM allocation mechanism in use by current cloud providers. The mechanism
showed significant improvements over the fixed-price allocation mechanism thus making it
a good candidate for our current experiments. We perform a total of 264 experiments with
data generated using eleven workload logs from the Parallel Workloads Archive [23] and 24
different combination of other parameters for each workload. In this section, we describe
the experimental setup and discuss the experimental results.

5.4.1

Experimental Setup

The experiments consist of generating job submissions from a given workload and then
running both CA-GREEDY and CA-PROVISION concurrently to allocate the jobs and
provision the VMs. For setting up the experiments we have to address several issues such
as workload selection, bid generation, and setting up the auction. We discuss all these
issues in the following subsections.
Workload selection
To the best of our knowledge, standard cloud computing workloads were not publicly
available at the time of writing this chapter. Thus, to overcome this limitation we rely
on well studied and standardized workloads from The Parallel Workloads Archive [23].
This archive contains a rich collection of workloads from various grid and supercomputing
sites. Out of the twenty-six real workloads available, we selected eleven logs that were
recorded most recently. These logs are: 1) ANL-Intrepid-2009, from a Blue Gene/P system
at Argonne National Lab; 2) DAS2-fs0-2003 - DAS-fs4-2003, from a research grid of five
clusters at the Advanced School of Computing and Imaging in the Netherlands; 3) LLNLAtlas-2006 and LLNL-Thunder-2007 from two Linux clusters (Atlas and Thunder) located
at Lawrence Livermore National Lab; 4) LLNL-uBGL-2006, from a Blue Gene/L system
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Table 5.1: Workload logs
Logfile
ANL-Intrepid-2009
DAS2-fs0-2003
DAS2-fs1-2003
DAS2-fs2-2003
DAS2-fs3-2003
DAS2-fs4-2003
LLNL-Atlas-2006
LLNL-Thunder-2007
LLNL-uBGL-2006
LPC-EGEE-2004
SDSC-DS-2004

Duration
8 months
12 months
12 months
12 months
12 months
11 months
8 months
5 months
7 months
9 months
13 months

Jobs
68,936
225,711
40,315
66,429
66,737
33,795
42,725
121,039
112,611
234,889
96,089

Processors
163,840
144
64
64
64
64
9,216
4,008
2,048
140
1,664

at Lawrence Livermore National Lab; 5) LPC-EGEE-2004, from a Linux cluster at The
Laboratory for Corpuscular Physics, Univ. Blaise-Pascal, France; and 6) SDSC-DS-2004,
from a 184-node IBM eServer pSeries 655/690 called DataStar located at the San Diego
Supercomputer Center.
In Table 5.1 we provide a brief description of the workloads we use in our experiments.
The table contains the name of the log file, the length of time the logs were recorded,
the total number of submitted jobs, and the total number of processors available in the
system. The log file name generally contains the acronym of the organization, the name
of the system, and the year of its generation. From the duration column, we see that the
logs were generated for long periods of time, as long as thirteen months for the SDSC
log. The number of jobs submitted ranges from many thousands to more than a couple of
hundred thousands, while the number of processors ranges from 64 to 163,840. These large
variations in the number of processors and the number of submitted jobs make these logs
very suitable for experimentation, providing us with a wide range of simulation scenarios.
The workloads are given in the Standard Workload Format (swf) described in [24]. In
this format, the information corresponding to every job submitted to the system is stored
as a record with eighteen fields. To generate the workload for our simulation experiments,
we need the information from six fields of the log files as follows: (1) Job Number: stores
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Table 5.2: Statistics of workload logs
Logfile
ANL-Intrepid-2009
DAS2-fs0-2003
DAS2-fs1-2003
DAS2-fs2-2003
DAS2-fs3-2003
DAS2-fs4-2003
LLNL-Atlas-2006
LLNL-Thunder-2007
LLNL-uBGL-2006
LPC-EGEE-2004
SDSC-DS-2004

Duration
(hours)
5759
8744
8633
8760
8712
7963
4308
3605
5339
5728
9387

Jobs /
hour
12
26
5
8
8
4
10
34
21
41
10

Avg.
Runtime
2.09
1.09
1.23
1.29
1.17
1.67
2.52
1.52
1.25
1.80
2.88

Avg procs.
per job
5063
10
8
9
5
4
401
43
576
1
62

the job’s identifier; (2) Submit Time: stores the job submission time; (3) Run Time: stores
the time the job needs to complete its execution. We use this as the time required to
complete the job. We round this up to the nearest hour because we run hourly auctions in
the experiments. (4) Number of Allocated Processors: for our purposes this represents the
number of requested processors; (5) Average CPU Time Used: Average time a CPU was
running. We use this field in conjunction with the preceding two parameters to determine
the amount of communication and the parallel speedup of the job. (6) User ID: stores the
ID of the user who submitted the job. We use this ID to place users into different classes
having different bidding behaviors. We list some statistics of the workload files in Table 5.2.
The logs from the Parallel Workloads Archive [23] were collected from different heterogeneous sources and then converted into the standard format. Therefore, in some logs,
some of the fields are not specified since the original files had missing information. Some
records in a log file may also have fewer fields than the other records from the same file.
We make corrections on these records as follows.
• If the job starting time is missing, we consider it to be equal to the previous job’s start
time. The logs record the jobs in order of their arrival times. Matching a missing
arrival time with the previous job maintains the job order.
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• If the execution time is missing, we randomly generate an execution time between
one and two hours from a uniform distribution. As can be seen in Table 5.2, most of
the workloads have an average runtime within this range.
• If the number of processors is missing, we generate a number between 10 and 60
randomly, from a uniform distribution. Since the average number of processors per
job differs widely among the workload logs (from 1 processor/job up to 5063 processors/job), we select a distribution that has a mean (35 processors/job) approximately
equal to the average of the two-digit numbers in the list (i.e., 10, 43, and 63 processors/job).
• If the average CPU time is missing we generate a random number between 50%
and 100% of the total run time using the uniform distribution. This generates jobs
with communication to computation ratios between 0 and 0.5.
• We assign user IDs randomly in cases in which they are not provided.
Job and bid generation
For each record in a log file we generate a job that a user needs to execute and create a bid
for it. There are two important parameters associated with a job that we need to generate,
the requested bundle of VMs and the associated bid. First, to generate the bundle of VM
instances for a job j, we determine its communication to computation ratio as follows
TjCP U
ρj = 1 −
TjR

(5.10)

where TjCP U is the average CPU time and TjR is the total run time of the job. The
communication to computation ratio measures the fraction of the total runtime that is
spent by the job on communication and synchronization among its processes. Based on
this value, we categorize the job into one of m categories, where m is the number of VM
types available. The job category specifies a ‘first choice’ of VM type for the job. This
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works as follows. We define a factor µ that characterizes how many of the total requested
VMs will be requested as ‘first choice’ type VM instances. A job of category i requesting Pj
processors will create a bundle comprising a number of VMi instances required to allocate
µPj processors. The rest of the processors will be requested by arbitrarily choosing other
VM types. After creating the bundle, we generate the associated bid. To do that we first
determine the speedup of the job as follows
Sj = P j ×

TjCP U
TjR

(5.11)

where Pj is the number of CPUs used, TjCP U is the average CPU time, and TjR is the total
run time of the job. This speedup is multiplied by a ‘valuation factor’ to generate the bid.
This valuation factor is linked to the type of user. We divide the users into five categories
using their user ID, modulo five. The last parameter we set for a job is its deadline. Since
there is no deadline information provided in the workload logs, we assume that the deadline
is between 4 and 8 times the time required to complete the job. Hence, we set the deadline
of a job to the required time multiplied by a random number between 4 and 8.
We run CA-GREEDY and CA-PROVISION mechanisms concurrently and independently considering the users who have jobs available for execution. A user (or job) participates in the auction until her job completes or it becomes certain that the job cannot
finish by the deadline. A user is ‘served’ if her job completes its execution and ‘not served’
otherwise. Without loss of generality, we assume that each user is submitting only one job
and we will use ‘user’ and ’job’ interchangeably in the rest of the chapter.
Auction setup
We consider a cloud provider that offers four different types of virtual machines instances
VM1 , VM2 , VM3 , and VM4 . These VM types are characterized by the weight vector w =
(1, 2, 4, 8). From each workload file, we extract N, the total number of users and M, the
total number of processors available. The number of users participating in a particular
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Table 5.3: Simulation Parameters
Name
N
M
T
(cI , cR )
µ
h
f
C1 , C2 , C3

Description
Total users
Total CPUs
Simulation hours
Idle and running
cost of unit VM
Factor for CPUs for ‘first
choice’ VM type
Static distribution of
processors among VM types
Valuation factors
for types of users
Boundaries of communication
ratios

Value(s)
From log file
From log file
From log file
(.05, .1), (.1, .25),
(.15, .5)
0.5, 0.75
(.25, .25, .25, .25),
(.07, .13, .27, .53)
(.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5),
(1, 1.5, 2, 3, 4)
(.05, .15, .25)

auction is determined dynamically as the auction progresses. That is, n is the number of
users that have been generated, not yet been served, and whose job deadlines have not
been exceeded yet.
We setup few parameters to generate bundles specific to the jobs submitted by a user.
The vector (C1 , C2 , C3 ) determines the communication ratios used to categorize the jobs.
We use (C1 , C2 , C3 ) = (0.05, 0.15, 0.25), as follows. A job having communication ratio
below 0.05 is a job of type 1 and the majority of its needed VM instances µpj will be
requested as VM1 , where pj is the number of processors requested by user uj . We consider
the following values for µ, 0.5 and 0.75. The rest of the bundle is arbitrarily determined
using the other types of VM instances. We use the user ID field of the log file to determine
the valuation range of the user. There are five classes of users submitting jobs. The class
t of a user is determined by ((user ID) mod 5). The logs have real user IDs, therefore
this classification virtually creates a realistic distribution of users. Each class t of users
is associated with a ‘valuation factor’ ft . Having determined that a user is of class t,
we determine the valuation of her bundle using the speedup (as shown in the previous
subsection) and the ‘valuation factor’ ft from the vector f. The vector f has five elements
(equal to the number of classes of users), each representing the mean value of how much a
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user of that class ‘values’ each ‘unit of speedup’. In particular, a user uj having a speedup
of Sj for her job is willing to pay ft Sj on average for each hour of her requested bundle of
VMs, given that uj falls in class t. We generate a random value between 0 and 2ft , and
then multiply it with Sj to generate valuations with a mean of ft Sj . We use two sets of
vectors for f, as shown in Table 5.3.
CA-PROVISION determines by itself the configuration of the VMs that needs to be
provisioned by the cloud provider, whereas CA-GREEDY assumes static VM provisioning,
and thus, needs the VM configuration provisioned in advance. To generate the static
provision of VMs required by CA-GREEDY we use a vector h as follows. We consider
two instances of h in the simulation. The first one, h = (0.07, 0.13, 0.27, 0.53) ensures
that, given the weight vector w, the number of VM instances of each type is not the same.
The other instance of this vector, h = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) ensures that the total number
of processors are equally distributed to different types of VMs. We list all simulation
parameters in Table 5.3. With all combinations of values, we perform 24 experiments with
each log file, for a total of 264 experiments.

5.4.2

Analysis of Results

We investigate the performance of the two mechanisms for different workloads. Since the
workloads are heterogeneous in several dimensions, we first define a metric in order to
characterize the workloads, and thus, be able to establish an order among them. Then,
we normalize the performance metrics of the mechanisms and compare them with respect
to the workload characteristics. Finally, we try to gain more insight by comparing the
allocation determined by the two mechanisms side by side.
We define a metric for comparing the workload logs as follows. Looking at the workload
characteristics listed in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, we determine that the best metric to compare
the workloads is the normalized load defined as:
ηω =

Jω × Tω × Pω
.
Mω

(5.12)
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Figure 5.1: Average revenue per processor-hour by CA-PROVISION and CA-GREEDY
vs. normalized load.
In the above expression, ηω is the normalized load of workload ω, Jω is the average number
of jobs submitted per hour, Tω is the average runtime of the jobs, Pω is the average number
of processors required per job, and Mω is the total number of processors in the system
corresponding to workload ω. The number of jobs per hour multiplied by the average
processors per job determines how many processors are requested by the jobs arriving each
hour. Multiplying this with the average runtime gives an estimate of the average number
of processors requested by all jobs in an hour. The normalized load gives us an ordering of
the set of workloads.
From each set of simulation experiments, we compute the total revenue generated, the
total cost incurred, and the total profit earned by each mechanism. Since the workloads were
generated for different durations of time for systems with different number of processors
we scale the profit, revenue, and cost with respect to the total simulation hours and the
number of processors. We define the profit per processor-hour as:
Πph
ω =

Πω
Mω × Lω

(5.13)

where Πω is the profit computed on workload ω, Mω is the total number of processors,
and Lω is the number of hours of data provided in workload ω. We define revenue per
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Figure 5.2: Average cost per processor-hour by CA-PROVISION and CA-GREEDY vs.
normalized load.
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Figure 5.3: Average profit per processor-hour by CA-PROVISION and CA-GREEDY vs.
normalized load.
processor-hour and cost per processor-hour in a similar fashion.
We plot the average revenue, the average cost, and the average profit per processor-hour
versus the workload logs in Figures 5.1 to 5.3. In these figures, the workloads are sorted in
ascending order of their normalized load. Note that the CA-PROVISION mechanism yields
higher revenue in most of the cases. For workloads with normalized loads greater than 1.44,
the revenue obtained by CA-PROVISION steadily increases exceeding that obtained by
CA-GREEDY by up to 40%. This leads us to conclude that CA-PROVISION is capable
of generating higher revenue where there is high demand for resources.
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Figure 5.4: Resource utilization by CA-PROVISION and CA-GREEDY vs. normalized
load
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Figure 5.5: Percent users served by CA-PROVISION and CA-GREEDY vs. normalized
load
In Figure 5.2 we observe that CA-PROVISION incurs a higher total cost for all workloads. Since CA-PROVISION decides about the number of VMs dynamically, it can allocate
a higher number of VM instances than CA-GREEDY in an auction with identical bidders.
This explains the higher cost incurred by CA-PROVISION; a unit VM instance costs cI per
unit time when idle and cR > cI per unit time while running (i.e., allocated to a user), as
we assumed in Section 5.2. Therefore, by provisioning and allocating more VM instances,
CA-PROVISION incurs higher cost to the cloud provider.
Now, the question is whether the interplay between increased revenue and increased
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cost can generate a higher profit. Utilizing more resources means serving more customers
hence selecting more bidders as winners. This interplay has two mutually opposite effects
on the revenue. Obviously, increasing the number of winners has a positive effect on the
revenue. On the other hand, selecting more winners pushes down their critical values,
and thus, individual payments decrease. If the net effect is positive, we get a higher
revenue and when it surpasses the increase in cost, we obtain a higher profit, and thus,
achieve economies of scale. From Figure 5.3 we see that for normalized loads greater
than 1.44, CA-PROVISION consistently generates higher profit than CA-GREEDY and
the difference in profit grows rapidly. We also observe that for the workloads having load
factors below 1.44 CA-PROVISION and CA-GREEDY obtain higher profit in equal number
of cases. This suggests that for low loads the relative outcome of the mechanisms depends
on other parameters.
In Figures 5.4 and 5.5 we compare the resource utilization and the percentage of served
users obtained by the two mechanisms. CA-PROVISION achieves higher values for both
utilization and percentage of served users. We want to draw the attention of the reader to
the fact that in most of the cases the difference in utilization is around 30%. This is where
we can improve a lot if we switch from static to dynamic provisioning and allocation. Since
combinatorial auctions are already established tools for efficient allocation, combining them
with dynamic provisioning can lead to a highly efficient resource allocation mechanism for
clouds.
The number of users served is higher for CA-PROVISION because the VM instances
are not statically provisioned. Therefore, a user requesting two VM1 instances will not be
left unallocated if there are no VM1 instances available but a VM2 instance is available as
in the case of CA-GREEDY. Rather, CA-PROVISION ‘sees’ the available resource as a
computing resource equivalent to two VM1 instances and will allocate this, for instance, to
a user bidding for two VM1 instances or a user bidding for one VM2 instance, depending
on whose reported valuation is higher. This approach increases the number of users served
by CA-PROVISION mechanism.
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CA-PROVISION vs CA-GREEDY: Allocation of VM1
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Figure 5.6: Allocation of VM1 instances: (a) by CA-PROVISION; (b) by CA-GREEDY.
Workload file: DAS2-fs3-2003.
We now go into the details of the VM allocation by CA-GREEDY and CA-PROVISION
for the DAS2-fs3-2003 workload. We pick a sample scenario from various combination of
input parameters. In this experiment, the static VM allocation consists of 16 instances of
type V M1 , 8 instances of type V M2 , 4 instances of type V M3 , and 2 instances of type V M4 ,
This is equivalent to 64 instances of unit size (i.e., type V M1 ). For this workload, a total
of 4100 auctions were held and in Figures 5.6 to 5.9, we show the allocation of different
VM instances in all these auctions. The figures corresponding to the CA-PROVISION
mechanism show the number of the VM instances that are provisioned by the mechanism
as box plots. For example, in Figure 5.6a, we see that in many auctions, all 64 processors
are configured as VM1 instances. On the other hand, there are auction outcomes where
no VM1 instances are provisioned, as evident by the white strips touching the horizontal
axis. The box plots in the figures corresponding to the CA-GREEDY mechanism show the
number of the VM instances that are allocated to the users. In both categories of plots,
we show the static allocation line to compare the differences between static and dynamic
provisioning.
Figure 5.6a is particularly interesting because it shows that at times the demand for
VM1 goes far beyond what we would even think of allocating in advance. In some auctions

112

CA-PROVISION vs CA-GREEDY: Allocation of VM2
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Figure 5.7: Allocation of VM2 instances: (a) by CA-PROVISION; (b) by CA-GREEDY.
Workload file: DAS2-fs3-2003.
CA-PROVISION vs CA-GREEDY: Allocation of VM3
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Figure 5.8: Allocation of VM3 instances: (a) by CA-PROVISION; (b) by CA-GREEDY.
Workload file: DAS2-fs3-2003.
demands for VM1 instances are much higher and therefore they push the allocation to the
boundary. On the other hand, if we compare it with Figure 5.6b, we see that CA-GREEDY
indeed can capture the demand and allocate all sixteen available instances of VM1 in most
of the auctions, but is limited to the availability of statically provisioned VMs. Eventually
it has to serve other less valued bids and looses revenue. Also, CA-GREEDY suffers from
under-allocation as it is clear from Figures 5.8a and 5.8b. We see that the actual demand of
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CA-PROVISION vs CA-GREEDY: Allocation of VM4
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Figure 5.9: Allocation of VM4 instances: (a) by CA-PROVISION; (b) by CA-GREEDY.
Workload file: DAS2-fs3-2003.
VM3 instances is lower than what we allocate statically (Figure 5.8a) and the VM instances
indeed remain unallocated in many cases (Figures 5.8b).
We can summarize the experimental results as follows. The CA-GREEDY mechanism is
capable of generating higher revenue than CA-PROVISION when there is matching demand
with the supply. Also, in an auction where items are not ‘configurable’ as in the case of cloud
auctions, CA-GREEDY is a very efficient auction. But when we have reconfigurable items
as in clouds, it is very hard to predict the demand very well in advance. In that case, CAPROVISION is a better option and as today’s technology supports, it can be deployed as a
stand-alone configuration and allocation tool without much human intervention. There is
also another use of this mechanism. One can combine CA-GREEDY and CA-PROVISION
in a way that periodically CA-PROVISION will be executed to capture the current market
demand, determine the static allocation that best matches the demand, and instantiate
CA-GREEDY. If the utilization falls below a certain threshold, CA-PROVISION can be
called to determine a good configuration again. This can also eliminate the need of detailed
statistical analysis of demand to find an efficient static configuration for CA-GREEDY.
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5.5

Summary

We addressed the problem of dynamically provisioning VM instances in clouds in order to
generate higher profit, while determining the VM allocation with a combinatorial auctionbased mechanism. We designed a mechanism called CA-PROVISION to solve this problem. We performed extensive simulation experiments with real workloads to evaluate our
mechanism. The results showed that CA-PROVISION can effectively capture the market
demand, provision the computing resources to match the demand, and generate higher
revenue than CA-GREEDY, especially in high demand cases. In some of the low demand
cases, CA-GREEDY performs better than CA-PROVISION in terms of profit but not in
terms of utilization and percentage of served users. We conclude that an efficient VM
instance provisioning and allocation system can be designed combining these two combinatorial auction-based mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 6: AN ONLINE
MECHANISM FOR DYNAMIC VM
PROVISIONING AND
ALLOCATION IN CLOUDS
6.1

Introduction

Virtualization technologies have created convenient ways for the cloud providers to allocate their computing resources. They define different configurations of virtual machines
(VMs) and ‘sell’ the resources in units of VM instances. Currently, the cloud providers use
fixed price-based mechanisms to allocate and sell VM instances (e.g., Windows Azure [40],
Amazon EC2 [2]) or auction-based mechanisms to sell resources that are not utilized after
the fixed-price based selling [3].
There are certain features of the problem of VM allocation in clouds that makes online
mechanisms suitable for solving it. First of all, it is quite natural for users to submit bids
for bundles of VMs rather than for individual VMs. For example, if a user requires one
‘small’ and one ‘large’ VM instance for a particular application, she would prefer to get
both of them together, otherwise she would prefer nothing to getting only one of the VMs.
Therefore, the allocation mechanism must allow users to express their preferences for a
bundle of VMs and not only for individual VMs. On the other hand, the users submit their
requests (or arrive at the system) continuously and would prefer to have their allocation
decision as soon as possible, at the best possible price. Once they obtain the requested VM
bundles, they would like to complete their entire task on the acquired resources.
Another consideration is that the cloud provider would prefer a mechanism that sup-
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ports dynamic provisioning so that they can decide on the number of instances of different
types of VMs based on the market demand. The cloud provider is also interested in maximizing its revenue or profit. Considering all the desired properties mentioned above, in
this chapter, we design an online mechanism that provisions computing resources into VM
instances, allocates them to users, and determines the payment for each user. Online mechanisms solve allocation problems without having all the information available. An online
mechanism calculates allocation and payment as the participants arrive at the system and
place their requests. This is particularly useful to guarantee allocation efficiency in systems where users arrive continuously and items being allocated are expiring items [47].
For the problem of VM instance allocation in clouds, the resources can be considered as
expiring since the allocation is dependent on time: a resource not allocated at time t loses
its utilization for that particular moment.
We design an online mechanism for provisioning and allocating VM instances in clouds.
We design the bidding protocol so that a user requests a bundle of VMs expressing that
she is only interested in the whole bundle and not a subset of it. Upon receiving such bids,
the mechanism calculates the allocation and payment online. Also, the allocation cannot
be preempted: a user receiving an allocation at time t continues to hold the resources for
the time period she requested the resources for, while submitting her bid. We also provide
theoretical results proving the properties of the proposed mechanism.

6.1.1

Our Contribution

We formulate the online VM provisioning and allocation problem and design an online
mechanism to solve it. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that proposes
an online mechanism for VM provisioning and allocation in clouds. We provide theoretical
results that prove that the proposed mechanism is incentive compatible and runs in a reasonable amount of time. We perform extensive experiments and show that this mechanism
improves the efficiency of allocation of VM instances in clouds.
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6.1.2

Organization

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we formulate the problem
of online VM provisioning and allocation. In Section 6.3, we introduce the basic concepts
of mechanism design in general and online mechanism design in particular in the context
of the problem we are addressing. In Section 6.4, we present our proposed online mechanism for VM provisioning and allocation. In Section 6.5, we characterize the properties of
the proposed mechanism. In Section 6.6, we investigate the performance of the proposed
mechanism by extensive simulation experiments. In summarize the research in Section 6.7.

6.2

VM Instance Allocation Problem

We consider a cloud provider that provisions its computing resources into m different types
of VM instances. We denote these types of VM instances by V M1 , . . . , V Mm . With each
type V Mi we associate a ‘weight’ wi ∈ R∗+ which specifies the relative computing power
of V Mi with respect to the most powerful VM instance offered by the cloud provider
(i.e., the instance of type V M1 ). We consider, without loss of generality, that w1 = 1
and w1 ≤ . . . ≤ wm . The total power of the computing resources available for allocation
is denoted by M, and is defined as the equivalent power of M instances of type V M1 .
For example, let us consider a cloud provider that offers VM instances of three types:
small (V M1 ), medium (V M2 ), and large (V M3 ). The configurations of these VMs are as
follows: V M1 ≡ (one 2GHz processor, 4GB memory, 1TB hard drive), V M2 ≡ (two 2GHz
processors, 8GB memory, 2TB hard drive), and V M3 ≡ (four 2GHz processors, 16GB
memory, 4TB hard drive). For this setting, the weights of the VMs would be w1 = 1, w2 = 2,
and w3 = 4. If, for example, the cloud provider has enough resources to provision 100,000
V M1 instances, then M = 100, 000. The goal of the cloud provider is to dynamically
provision its available resources into VM instances and allocate them to users efficiently
and at the same time maximize its profit.
There are n users j = 1, . . . , n who submit their requests (or ‘bids’) to the cloud
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provider in order to secure bundles of VM instances for certain amount of time in order
to execute their applications (jobs) on the cloud. A user j is characterized by her ‘type’
j
j
θj = (r1j , . . . , rm
, aj , lj , dj , vj ) ∈ Θj , where Θj is her type space. Here, (r1j , . . . , rm
) is the

bundle of VM instances requested by user j, where rij ∈ N is the number of V Mi instances
P
j
requested by user j. We also denote the bundle by Sj and its total weight by sj = m
i=1 wi ri .

The other components of user j’s type θj are: aj ∈ N, the arrival time (i.e., the time at

which user j submits her bid); lj ∈ N, the amount of time the requested bundle must be
allocated for; and, dj ∈ N, the deadline for user j’s job completion. We denote by δj , the
time by which the bundle must be allocated to the user in order for her job to complete
its execution. That is, δj = dj − lj . The last component of θj is vj ≥ 0, the value user j
receives if her requested bundle of VMs is allocated within time δj . We assume that the
users are single-minded, i.e., each user j requires that either her requested bundle Sj be
allocated to her and she pays for it, or she does not get any allocation and pays nothing.
In the following we give an example to clarify the meaning of the components of the user
type. Suppose user j requires two V M1 and one V M3 instances for five hours to complete
a particular application. Hence, she requests the bundle Sj = (2, 0, 1) with a total weight
sj = 2+4 = 6. She submits her bid at time t = 0 and must get her job done by time t = 10.
Hence, aj = 0, lj = 5, and dj = 10. There is no use of the requested bundle if she gets it
after t = 5, therefore δj = 5. Finally, suppose the successful completion of the application
yields a value of $50 to her, hence the valuation of her bundle is vj = 50. Altogether, user
j’s type is θj = (2, 0, 1, 0, 5, 10, 50). We also call it her ‘true bid’, because she may choose
to report a different type from her type space (i.e., all possible combinations of the values)
to the cloud provider if she benefits by doing so.
The cloud provider allocates bundles of VM instances to users by dynamically provisioning the available resources and charges them money. The provider must decide the
allocation of a bundle Sj within the time interval [aj , δj ]. If a user is not granted the allocation within this interval, her request is declined and she withdraws her request. Formally,
the cloud provider computes an allocation set A ⊆ Θ × N and a payment set P ⊆ Θ × R+ .
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A tuple (θj , tj ) ∈ A represents that bundle Sj of user j of type θj has been allocated at
time tj , where aj ≤ tj ≤ δj . A tuple (θj , pj ) ∈ P says that user j of type θj has to pay pj
to the cloud provider. For the above user j, if she is granted the allocation at time t = 3
and charged $30, we would have (θj , 3) ∈ A and (θj , 30) ∈ P . Users who do not get the
requested allocation pay zero.
We also consider that the cloud provider decides about the provisioning and allocation
online, i.e., whenever some users and resources are available. Once a bundle Sj is allocated
to a user j, it will not be reclaimed until lj units of time after the allocation. Due to the
limited resources, the cloud provider cannot allocate the VM bundles to all users at any
given time. Also, unallocated users are going to potentially leave the system when their
respective δj time has passed and they will not contribute to the provider’s revenue. Therefore, the challenge of the cloud provider is to make provisioning and allocation decisions
dynamically while trying to maximize its profit.
Since very little is known about revenue maximization in the mechanism design literature, mechanisms are usually designed with the goal of maximizing the sum of the valuations
of the users [44]. Thus a reasonable goal is to allocate the VM instances so that the sum
of the valuations of the users who receive their bundles is maximized. We formulate the
Online VM Provisioning and Allocation Problem (OVMPA) as follows.
max

X

vj

(6.1)

sj ≤ M

(6.2)

j:(θj ,tj )∈A

subject to:
X

j:θj

∈Ñ (t)

Equation (6.1) is the objective of the problem, that is, the cloud provider maximizes the
sum of the values of the users who obtain their requested bundles. The constraint in
equation (6.2) says that at any given time t the allocation is limited to M, the total
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amount of resources available. Here,
Ñ (t) = {j | (∃tj ≤ t : (θj , tj ) ∈ A) ∧ (tj + lj > t)}
is the set of users who have been allocated prior to or at t and have yet to complete their
allotted time slot at time t.
A straight-forward solution to the above problem would be to select users with the
highest values, and then charge them their reported values. However, the users are rational
and they may misreport their types if it benefits them to do so. For example, a user may
report a lower valuation to pay less or a higher valuation to enhance her chance of winning.
If the cloud provider prefers jobs with an earlier deadline while breaking a tie for values,
users may choose to report a deadline that is earlier than their actual deadline. Since this
information is private, the provider needs to employ a mechanism to compute the allocation
and payment based on the users’ reported values in such a way that the system-wide goals
set by the provider are achieved.
Therefore, the problem of designing an online mechanism for solving the OVMPA is
as follows. Design an online mechanism that computes an allocation set A and payment
set P on the problem space Θ = Θ1 × . . . × Θn to maximize the objective function in
Equation (6.1) satisfying the constraint given in Equation (6.2). The information reported
by the users to the mechanism is denoted as θ̂ = (θ̂1 , . . . , θ̂n ) ∈ Θ, where θ̂j ∈ Θj . The
goal of the mechanism is to compute an efficient allocation even if θ̂j 6= θj and calculate
payments in a way so that it provides incentives to the users to report their true types.

6.3

Online Mechanism Design Framework

A mechanism M = {A, P} is a set of functions A for computing the allocation and P for
computing the payment for each user. Here, A : Θ → A and P = (p1 (.), . . . , pn (.)), where
pj : Θ → R for j = 1, . . . , n. In the context of OVMPA, the allocation function A computes
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the allocation set A ⊆ Θ × N from the bids reported by the users. The allocation set A is
the set of the tuples (θj , tj ), where j is the user receiving her requested bundle at time tj .
Function pj (.) determines user j’s payment based on the bids of all users.
Each user j is characterized by a valuation function Vj defined as follows:

 v if(θ , t ) ∈ A ∧ t ≤ d′
j
j j
j
j
Vj (A(θ̂), θj ) =
 0 otherwise

(6.3)

This means that the user receives the value vj if she secures the requested bundle, and
no value, otherwise. We quantify user j’s benefit through a utility function defined as the
difference between the value she receives from the mechanism and the payment charged to
her:
Uj (A(θ̂), θj ) = Vj (A(θ̂), θj ) − pj (θ̂)

(6.4)

In the example presented above user j derives a utility of $20 if she values the bundle
at $50, receives her bundle at time t ≤ 5, and pays $30 for it (as shown in Section 6.2).
If the mechanism decides not to allocate her the requested bundle, she receives a value of
zero. In that case, if the mechanism does not charge her any payment, her utility will be
zero as well.
We are interested in designing mechanisms which have two important properties, incentive compatibility and individual rationality. In the following, we denote by θ̂−j =
(θ̂1 , . . . , θ̂j−1, θ̂j+1 , . . . , θ̂n ) ∈ Θ−j the bids of all users except j. Recall that the true type of
user j is θj and her reported type (or bid) θ̂j may not be equal to θj .
Definition 4 (Incentive compatibility). A mechanism M is incentive compatible if for all
j, θ̂j ∈ Θj , and θ̂−j ∈ Θ−j ,
Uj (A(θj , θ̂−j ), θj ) ≥ Uj (A(θ̂j , θ̂−j ), θj )
That is, the users maximize their utilities by reporting their true types to the mecha-
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nism, irrespective of the other users’ bids. This is a very important property, because if
satisfied, the users participating in the mechanism will not have incentives to report other
types than their true types to the mechanism. That is, truthful reporting is their best
strategy.
Definition 5 (Individual rationality). A mechanism is individually rational if a user never
incurs a loss by reporting her true type. Formally, for all j, true type θj ∈ Θj , and
θ̂−j ∈ Θ−j ,
Uj (A(θj , θ̂−j ), θj ) ≥ 0
That is, regardless of other users’ bids, a user reporting her type truthfully will never obtain a negative utility by participating in the mechanism. This is a very important property
of a mechanism since it encourages users to voluntarily participate in the mechanism.
In order to obtain an incentive compatible mechanism the allocation function A must
be monotone and the payment function P must implement the critical value payment [43].
We introduce a preference relation, , on the set of user bids. For example, θ̂j′  θ̂j

means that bid θ̂j′ is more preferred to the mechanism than bid θ̂j . In our context θ̂j′  θ̂j
if ŝ′j ≤ ŝj , â′j ≤ âj , ˆlj′ ≤ ˆlj , dˆj ≥ dˆj and v̂j′ ≥ v̂j .

Definition 6 (Monotone allocation function). An allocation function A is monotone if for
all j, θ̂j , θ̂j′ ∈ Θj , and θ̂−j ∈ Θ−j ,

(θ̂j′  θ̂j ) ∧ (∃tj : (θ̂j , tj ) ∈ A(θ̂j , θ−j )) ⇒ ∃t′j : (θ̂j′ , t′j ) ∈ A(θ̂j′ , θ−j )
This means that if user j gets her requested bundle by declaring type θ̂j , she will also
get the resources by declaring type θ̂j′ , where type θ̂j′ is more preferred over θ̂j .
Definition 7 (Critical value payment). Critical value vjc for user j is defined as
j
(∃tj : (θ̂j = (r1j , . . . , rm
, aj , lj , dj , vj′ ), tj ) ∈ A(θ̂j , θ−j ))
vjc = arg min
′
vj ≥0
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This means that the critical value for a user is the minimum amount she needs to report
to the mechanism in order to receive her requested bundle. The payment function should
charge a user her critical value in order to obtain an incentive compatible mechanism.
The challenges of designing online mechanisms come from the fact that the mechanisms
do not have full information on the requests and from the richer dimension of user types.
In the context of OVMPA, the users can misreport their arrival time (i.e., submit bid at
a different time than the actual time when the task is available) to gain higher chances
of allocation or lower payments. For example, the critical value of a user may be lower
if she submits her bid at a later time. Therefore, the mechanism must ensure that users
do not gain by misreporting the arrival time as well as other parameters. Misreporting
the other parameters may affect the allocation and payment for both online and offline
mechanisms. In the following section, we design an online mechanism that solves OVMPA
while addressing the above challenges.

6.4

Online Mechanism for VM Allocation

We now present our mechanism for Online VM Provisioning and Allocation (MOVMPA)
that solves the OVMPA problem.

6.4.1

Mechanism MOVMPA

The mechanism MOVMPA is structured as an event handler, which is invoked when a
new bid arrives or a user completes her time for the allocated bundle and releases the
VM instances to the provider. We assume that the information about the users and the
resources is made available to the mechanism via some standard protocol. MOVMPA uses
this information to determine the set of users and resources available for allocation at the
current time and calls the allocation and the payment functions. We present the MOVMPA
mechanism in Algorithm 7.
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Algorithm 7 Mechanism MOVMPA
Require: Event, A, P
Ensure: A, P
1: t ← Current time
2: N (t) ← {θ̂j ∈ N | âj ≤ t ∧ ¬∃tj < t : (θ̂j , tj ) ∈ A}
3: Ñ (t) ← {θ̂j | ∃tj < t : (θ̂j , tj ) ∈ A ∧ tj + ˆ
lj > t}
P
4: M (t) ← M − j:θ̂ ∈Ñ (t) ŝj
j
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:

if M (t) = 0 ∨ N (t) = ∅ then return
R ← M (t)
A(t) ← MOVMPA-ALLOCATE(t, N (t) , R)
A ← A ∪ A(t)
P (t) ← {(θ̂j , v̂j ) | (θ̂j , tj ) ∈ A(t) }
P ← P ∪ P (t)
P ← MOVMPA-PAYMENT(t, P, N (t) , Ñ (t) , M (t) )
N P ← {θ̂j ∈ N | t′ < δj ≤ t}
for each θ̂j ∈ N P do
if ∃pj : (θ̂j , pj ) ∈ P then
user j pays pj
else
user j pays 0
end if
end for
t′ ← t
return A, P

MOVMPA takes as input the event, the current allocation set and the payment set. An
event is either a release of resource or an arrival of a user request. We assume that the
system stores these two sets and passes them to MOVMPA when it is invoked. MOVMPA
updates the sets and returns back to the system. In lines 1-4, MOVMPA sets the current
time to t and initializes three variables as follows: N (t) , the set of bids of the users that
have not been allocated so far; Ñ (t) , the set of bids of the users that have been allocated
in the past and have not finished their time of allocation; and, M (t) , the total weight of
the resources that are available for allocation at time t. The mechanism proceeds only if
resources and users are available. It calls the allocation function MOVMPA-ALLOCATE
with the user bids that have not been allocated yet and the resources that are available at
time t. MOVMPA-ALLOCATE returns set A(t) , the set of users who would receive their
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requested bundles at time t (line 7).
Next, MOVMPA updates the overall allocation set A to A(t) . The bids in A(t) are also
inserted into the payment set, with pj = v̂j as their initial payment. However, this payment
is updated by calling the payment function MOVMPA-PAYMENT (line 11). In fact, the
payment of user j is going to be updated several times until t = δj , i.e., until the time
instance the user must receive allocation of the bundles she requires. Thus, MOVMPAPAYMENT calculates the payments for these users and updates the payment set P . The
next step for MOVMPA is to determine the set N P of the bids of users j for whom the
current time has gone past their respective δj times (line 12). However, this set only
includes the users whose δj has passed after t′ , where t′ is the time of the last invocation
of MOVMPA (line 12). If user j has been already provided with her bundle, her payment
will no longer change and the payment that is up to date at the current time will be her
final payment charged to her. If user j has not received her requested bundle until t and
t > δj , she will not be successful in getting an allocation to get her job done. In this case,
user j will pay pj = 0 (lines 14-19). The computation of the prices will be presented when
we discuss the MOVMPA-PAYMENT function.

6.4.2

Allocation function

The allocation function MOVMPA-ALLOCATE is given in Algorithm 8. In order to describe this function we define a new parameter called ‘bid density’, ρj =

v̂j
.
ŝj ×l̂j

The intuition

behind bid density is as follows. We can reformulate the VM allocation problem as the
problem of allocating rectangles in a two-dimensional space of VM weight and time. The
bid by user j for a bundle of VM instances of weight ŝj for time ˆlj can be interpreted as
requesting a rectangle with area ŝj × ˆlj in that two-dimensional space, and user j values
this area at v̂j . Hence, ρj is how much user j values a ‘unit area’ of the rectangular space.
Obviously, the cloud provider is interested in users who want to pay more per unit of their
resources per unit time. MOVMPA-ALLOCATE uses ρj to determine the relative values
of the bids.
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Algorithm 8 MOVMPA-ALLOCATE
Require: t, N (t) , R
Ensure: A(t)
1: A(t) ← ∅
2: Sort all θ̂j ∈ N (t) in non-increasing order of ρj
3: for each θ̂j ∈ N (t) in sorted order do
4:
if sj ≤ R then
5:
A(t) ← A(t) ∪ (θ̂j , t)
6:
R ← R − ŝj
7:
end if
8: end for
9: return A(t)

First, MOVMPA-ALLOCATE sorts all bids in non-increasing order of ρj s. Ties are
broken in the following order: prefer earlier δj , smaller ˆlj , and then smaller ŝj . Further
ties are broken arbitrarily. Then the algorithm allocates bundles requested by these users
while resources last. Finally, it returns the set A(t) of users who are selected for allocation
at time instance t.
MOVMPA-ALLOCATE simply tries to maximize the sum of the reported valuations
of the users who would be granted their requested bundles. In the case of a tie, by giving
priority to users with a smaller δj , (i.e., users who need to leave the system earlier if they
don’t get their bundles), it also makes sure that the highest possible number of users are
served. For the same reason, in case of a tie with δj , priority is given to users who request
the resources for a smaller amount of time.

6.4.3

Payment function

We give the payment function MOVMPA-PAYMENT in Algorithm 9. The payment function requires as input the current time t, the payment set P , the amount of resources
available before calling the allocation function M (t) , the set of users who were considered
at the allocation function N (t) , and, the set of users who are occupying resources at the
current time t, Ñ (t) . It is worth mentioning that users that were granted the requested
bundle at time t also belong to the set N (t) .

127
Algorithm 9 MOVMPA-PAYMENT
Require: t, P, N (t) , Ñ (t) , M (t)
Ensure: P
1: sort all θ̂j ∈ N (t) in non-increasing order of ρj
2: for each (θ̂j , pj ) ∈ P : δj ≤ t do
3:
N ′(t) ← N (t) \ θ̂j
4:
if θ̂j ∈ Ñ (t) then
5:
R′ ← M (t) + ŝj
6:
else
7:
R′ ← M (t)
8:
end if
9:
for each θ̂j ′ ∈ N (t) do
10:
v̄j ← ρj ′ × ŝj × ˆlj
j
11:
θ̄j ← (r1j , . . . , rm
, t, ˆlj , dˆj , v̄j )
′
12:
A ← MOVMPA-ALLOCATE(t, N ′(t) ∪ {θ̄j }, R′ )
13:
if (θ̄j , t) ∈ A′ then
14:
pj ← min(pj , v̄j )
15:
end if
16:
end for
j
17:
θ̄j ← (r1j , . . . , rm
, t, ˆlj , dˆj , 0)
′
18:
A ← MOVMPA-ALLOCATE(t, N ′(t) ∪ {θ̄j }, R′ )
19:
if (θ̄j , t) ∈ A′ then
20:
pj ← 0
21:
end if
22: end for
23: return P

The main idea of MOVMPA-PAYMENT is to calculate the critical payment of each
user j with δj ≤ t as if their time of arrival is t. By repeatedly calling this function at each
event, MOVMPA ensures that the critical payment of a user j is calculated every time an
event occurs between âj and δj . Formally, MOVMPA-PAYMENT calculates the critical
value
j
, t, ˆlj , dˆj , vj′ ), tj ) ∈ A(θ̂j , θ−j ))
vjct = arg min
(∃tj : (θ̂j′ = (r̂1j , . . . , r̂m
′
vj ≥0

(6.5)

at time t, for all users j with δj ≥ t. Based on this critical value the MOVMPA mechanism
computes the critical value as
vjc = min′ vjct
t∈[âj ,dj ]

(6.6)
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Table 6.1: User bids
θ̂j
θ̂1
θ̂2
θ̂3
θ̂4
θ̂5
θ̂6

ŝj
3
3
2
2
3
3

âj
0
0
1
1
3
3

ˆlj
3
3
5
2
4
6

dˆj
5
4
8
5
9
10

v̂j
5
4
6
3
8
9

δj
2
1
3
3
5
4

ρj
0.56
0.44
0.60
0.75
0.67
0.50

That is, vjc is the minimum value user j must report to get her requested bundle for any
arrival time a′j ∈ [âj , d′j ].
MOVMPA-PAYMENT considers users from the payment set that have δj ≤ t. For
each user j, the arrival time component of her type is set to t and her value is set to the
values of each user to find the minimum value to be reported by user j in order to get her
requested bundle (lines 2-16). If no such minimum value is found, the payment is set to
zero (lines 17-21). One can also set this value to a predefined reserve price. Finally, the
updated set P is returned to the mechanism.
The mechanism keeps updating P by calling MOVMPA-PAYMENT and charges the
updated payment at time t to users j for which δj < t. Users who were not allocated any
resources pay zero.
Example 1. We show the execution of the mechanism by considering a setting in which
the users bid as shown in Table 6.1. For example, user 1’s bid θ̂1 contains the following
information: the weight of her requested bundle is ŝ1 = 3, she submits her bid at â1 = 0,
she requests the bundle for ˆl1 = 3 time units, her deadline is dˆ1 = 5, and she values the
allocation of the bundle for the entire time at v̂1 = 5. We also show for each user, the value
of δj = dˆj − ˆlj , the time by which the bundle must be allocated to meet the deadline, and
ρj =

v̂j
,
ŝj ×l̂j

the bid density.

We show the execution of MOVMPA for this setting in Table 6.2. The execution is
shown as a time diagram, where the respective sets N (t) , Ñ (t) , M (t) , A, P , and N P are
shown for each time t. As a reminder, N (t) is the set of bids of users that participate at time
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Table 6.2: Execution of MOVMPA
t
N (t)
Ñ (t)
M (t)
A
P
N (P )

t = 0−
∅
∅
5
∅
∅
∅

t=0
{θ1 , θ2 }
{θ1 }
2
{(θ1 , 0)}
{(θ1 , 4)}
∅

t=1
{θ4 , θ3 , θ2 }
{θ4 , θ1 }
0
{(θ1 , 0), (θ4 , 1)}
{(θ1 , 4), (θ4 , 2.4)}
∅

t=2
{θ3 }
{θ4 , θ1 }
0
{(θ1 , 0), (θ4 , 1)}
{(θ1 , 4), (θ4 , 2.4)}
{θ2 }

t=3
{θ5 , θ3 , θ6 }
{θ5 , θ3 }
0
{(θ1 , 0), (θ4 , 1), (θ5 , 3), (θ3 , 3)}
{(θ1 , 4), (θ4 , 2.4), (θ5 , 6), (θ3 , 0)}
{θ4 , θ1 }

t, Ñ (t) is the set of bids of users that are holding some resources at time t (including those
who win their bids at time t), M (t) is the amount of resources available after allocation at
time t, A and P are the allocation and payment sets, and N P is the set of users whose
payments are ‘finalized’ at time t. We assume that the sum of the VM weights in this
example is M = 5.
In the second column, the initial value of all the variables are shown, where M (t) =
M = 5 and all set variables are empty. At t = 1, users 1 and 2 submit their bids and
hence N (t) = {θ1 , θ2 }. Since ρ1 > ρ2 , user 1 is given the allocation of size ŝ1 = 3. The

remaining resources M (t) = 2 are not sufficient to allocate user 2 (ŝ2 = 3), so she loses at

time t = 0. User 1’s payment is computed as p2 = ρ2 × ŝ1 × ˆl1 , since user 2 needs to bid

at least this amount to defeat user 2 and get the allocation. The sets Ñ (t) , A, and P are
updated to reflect the current allocation. At time t = 1, users 3 and 4 submit their bids,
where ρ4 > ρ3 > ρ2 . The set N (t) shows the bids in order of non-increasing ρj values. Here
we see that the new winner is 4 and user 1 is still holding the resources allocated to her,
since she requires them for three time units. At time t = 2, θ2 is discarded from the bidding
users set N (t) , because t > δ2 = 1 and she cannot meet her deadline. θ2 is moved to N P
to finalize her payment pj = 0. Note that here no auction is executed since the available
resources are still zero.
At t = 3, both users 1 and 4 complete their allocated time. Their bids are moved to N P
and their current payments are set as their final payments. In this example, their payments
did not change in any subsequent auction after they received the allocation. Users 5 and 6
arrive in the system and users 5 and 3 win their bundles at this time. User 3 pays zero
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because she requests a bundle with ŝj = 2, which matches with the remaining resources.
User 6 requests more than what is available at time t = 3, therefore user 3 would win even
if she would bid zero. In a scenario with reserve price, user 3’s payment will be set to the
reserve price.

6.5

Properties of MOVMPA

In this section, we prove that the MOVMPA mechanism is incentive compatible and individually rational. We also perform competitive analysis and determine the runtime complexity
of the mechanism.
Theorem 4. MOVMPA is an individually rational mechanism.
Proof. Let user j declare her true type θj to the mechanism. If she gets her requested
bundle, then she pays pj ≤ vj , because initially she is assigned the payment equal to vj ,

and it is updated at each invocation of the mechanism until the time becomes d′j . The

update takes the minimum of the payment computed so far, therefore it will be always that
pj ≤ vj . Therefore, her utility Uj = vj − pj ≥ 0. On the other hand, if she does not win
her bundle, her valuation and payment are zero and hence the utility is zero.
We prove the following lemmas and use them to prove that MOVMPA is incentive
compatible.
Lemma 3. User j can only misreport a θ̂j with r̂ij ≥ rij for all i, âj ≥ aj , ˆlj ≥ lj , and
dˆj ≤ dj .

Proof. The true arrival time of a user into the system is when her intended task is ready to
execute. There is no reason for a user to submit her request earlier than when the application is ready for execution. On the other hand, reporting a lower number of VM instances
or a low required time will not allow the user to execute and complete her application.
Similarly, reporting a later deadline may result in getting the bundle too late to complete
the desired application in time.
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Lemma 4. Let Θ̂j ⊂ Θj be the type space of possible types user j may report to the

mechanism, according to Lemma 3. Then for each θ̂j′ , θ̂j ∈ Θj , θ̂j′  θ̂j , if ∃tj : (θ̂j , tj ) ∈

A(θ̂j , Θ−j ), then ∃t′j : (θ̂j′ , t′j ) ∈ A(θ̂j′ , Θ−j ). In other words, if user j wins by bidding θ̂j ,
then she will also win if she reports a more preferable bid.

Proof. Clearly, if user j reports v̂j′ ≥ v̂j , her bid θ̂j′ will be allocated if θ̂j is also allocated.

Similarly, if a user gets the allocation by reporting dˆj , she will also get it by reporting
dˆ′j ≥ dˆj . Proofs for the other parameters follow the same logic, based on the priorities set
for ordering the reported types in MOVMPA-ALLOCATE (Subsection 6.4.2).

Lemma 5. Suppose user j wins her bid by reporting both θ̂j and θ̂j′ , where they differ only
on the arrival time â′j ≥ âj , then their payment p′j ≥ pj .
Proof. Since the mechanism calculates the critical value payment for all a′j ∈ [âj , d′j ], the
minimum calculated over the range [âj , d′j ] must be less than or equal to the minimum

calculated over the range [â′j , d′j ].
Lemma 6. If user j gets the requested allocation by bidding both θ̂j and θ̂j′ , where the types
differ only on the valuation, v̂j 6= v̂j′ , then they pay the same amount.
Proof. Since we compute the minimum value that the users must report to get the allocation, the minimum value is the same for both θ̂j and θ̂j′ , given that the other users’ reported
types remain the same. Hence, j pays the same amount for reporting both types. This is
the critical value payment that we calculate in MOVMPA-PAYMENT.
Theorem 5. MOVMPA is an incentive compatible mechanism.
Proof. Lemmas 3 and 4 show that the allocation algorithm is monotone. Lemmas 5 and 6
show that the mechanism implements the critical payment. Hence, MOVMPA is incentive
compatible.
Theorem 6. The time complexity of MOVMPA is O(n log n).
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Proof. The costliest operation in MOVMPA-ALLOCATE is sorting the users in line 2.
This requires a runtime of O(n log n). However, n is the total number of users and each
time the mechanism encounters only a fraction of them.
MOVMPA-PAYMENT seems rather complicated because it repeatedly calls MOVMPAALLOCATE. But in an actual implementation, we do not need to call the allocation function to determine the critical payment. For each user j that is a winner, we need to consider
only the users j ′ who lose at time t, in non-increasing order of their bids, and check whether
user j ′ can win her bid if j does not participate. This check is done in a single comparison
of resources occupied by j and the resources requested by j ′ . When we find first such j ′ ,
user j’s payment is v̂j ′ . We need to sort the losing bids only once at the beginning of the
algorithm, which again has a running time of O(n log n), where n is a much larger number
than what that algorithm encounters in practice. We present the payment algorithm in
this fashion in order to show the underlying concepts.
Now we prove the competitive ratio of MOVMPA. The competitive ratio of an online
algorithm is c > 1 if the ratio of its performance to an optimum offline algorithm is 1/c. We
prove the competitive ratio of MOVMPA by choosing an input that produces the worst-case
scenario for MOVMPA.
Theorem 7. MOVMPA mechanism has a competitive ratio of M.
Proof. Consider two bids θ1 and θ2 where s1 = 1, s2 = M, (a1 , l1 , d1 , v1 ) = (0, l, l, v),
and (a2 , l2 , d2 , v2 ) = (1, l, l + 1, Mv + ǫ), where l > 1. MOVMPA will allocate user 1 her
requested bundle that she will release at time l > 1. Now, since for θ2 , a2 + l2 = 1 + l = d2 ,
user 2 must get the allocation at time a2 = 1, otherwise she withdraws her bid because
she cannot satisfy her deadline. Therefore, MOVMPA will allocate VM instances only to
user 1 and obtain a value of v (Equation (6.1)). On the other hand, an optimum offline
algorithm will allocate resources to user 2 and obtain a value of Mv + ǫ > M × v. Hence,
the competitive ratio of MOVMPA is M.
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6.6

Experimental Results

In this section, we evaluate MOVMPA through simulation experiments. We compare
MOVMPA with a good offline mechanism to identify its strengths and weaknesses. We
generate user bids from real workload data, which are then parallelly submitted to both
mechanisms. Of the experiment outcome, we mainly focus on three parameters: percent of
users served (i.e., those who received their requested bundle for the entire bundle required),
average revenue generated per served user, and average utility received by each served user.
These three metrics are most important to evaluate a mechanism, because they determine
the resource utilization, provider’s profit, and user satisfaction.

6.6.1

Experimental Setup

We choose the offline mechanism CA-PROVISION from the previous chapter. to compare
with MOVMPA. As we recall, CA-PROVISION solves the dynamic VM provisioning and
allocation problem in clouds. It is invoked at regular intervals, (e.g., hourly). When it is
invoked, it considers all the bids collected during the past interval and runs a combinatorial
auction to determine the set of winners, their payments, and the number of different VM
instances to provision. The VM instances are allocated for one time interval and users
requiring subsequent access must continue to bid until their time requirement is fulfilled.
A bundle allocated to a user at current period may be preempted later if the demand
increases.
We choose CA-PROVISION to compare with MOVMPA because of two reasons. First,
it is the closest mechanism to MOVMPA in the literature and the major difference between the two mechanisms are that one of them are online and the other is offline. Another
reason for choosing CA-PROVISION is that we compared it with another successful mechanism CA-GREEDY and found that CA-PROVISION performs better in different aspects.
This leads us to the decision that comparing with CA-PROVISION will correctly position
MOVMPA in VM allocation mechanisms in terms of different performance metrics. It will
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Table 6.3: Workload logs
Logfile (ω)
DAS2-fs0-2003
DAS2-fs1-2003
DAS2-fs2-2003
DAS2-fs3-2003
DAS2-fs4-2003
LLNL-uBGL-2006
LPC-EGEE-2004

Collection
period
12 months
12 months
12 months
12 months
11 months
7 months
9 months

Total
Jobs
225,711
40,315
66,429
66,737
33,795
112,611
234,889

Total
hours
8744
8633
8760
8712
7963
5339
5728

Total no. of
Procs. (Mω )
144
64
64
64
64
2,048
140

Jobs /
hour (Jω )
25.81
4.67
7.58
7.66
4.24
21.09
41.00

Avg. runtime
in hour (Tω )
1.09
1.23
1.29
1.17
1.67
1.25
1.80

Avg procs.
per job (Pω )
10.27
8.38
9.45
4.96
3.66
575.79
1

Normalized
load (ηω )
2.01
0.75
1.44
0.69
0.40
7.41
0.53

also show us the merits and demerits of going online with VM allocation mechanisms in
clouds.
The input data we use are collected from The Parallel Workload Archive [23], as in
the previous chapter. We briefly describe the Parallel Workload Archive here for the sake
of completeness. It is a rich collection of well studied and standardized workloads from
various grid and supercomputing sites. These workloads provide us with an opportunity to
experiment with real data in the absence of publicly available cloud workload data (to the
best of our knowledge, there were no such workloads at the time of writing this chapter).
In the previous chapter, we used eleven workload logs from the Parallel Workload Archive
to compare CA-PROVISION with CA-GREEDY. Here we narrow it down to the seven
logs for which CA-PROVISION outperformed CA-GREEDY in all categories. These logs
are: 1) DAS2-fs0-2003 - DAS2-fs4-2003, from a research grid of five clusters at the Advanced
School of Computing and Imaging in the Netherlands; 2) LLNL-uBGL-2006, from a Blue
Gene/L system at Lawrence Livermore National Lab; and 3) LPC-EGEE-2004, from a
Linux cluster at The Laboratory for Corpuscular Physics, Univ. Blaise-Pascal, France.
We show the information about the workload logs and some statistics associated with
them in Table 6.3. The table shows the name of workload logs, the duration for which the
logs were collected, the number of jobs, and the total log hours in the first four columns.
The table also shows the total number of processors of the system the logs were generated
from. We assume that the weight of a VM instance corresponds to the number of processors
allocated to it. Hence, the total number of processors of a system represents the total weight
of the computing resources M. We denote the total computing resources allocated to a
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Table 6.4: Simulation Parameters
Parameter
Average bundle weight
Average time per job
Average deadline factor
Average valuation
Cost of running and idle VM

Notation
savg
lavg
davg
vavg
cR , cI

Values
from workload (Pω )
from workload (Tω )
3
5, 10, 20
1, 0.5

workload ω by Mω . The next four columns in Table 6.3 are statistical data and are defined
as follows. Jobs/hour (Jω ) is the average number of jobs submitted to the system per hour.
The average runtime (Tω ) and the average number of processors per job (Pω ) are calculated
over all records of the workload log. The last column shows ηω , the ‘normalized load’ of
workload ω, which is computed as follows
ηω =

Jω × Tω × Pω
.
Mω

Normalized load measures the average amount of resources requested against each unit of
computing resources available. It helps us in ranking the otherwise heterogeneous workloads
and also explaining some of the experimental results.
We setup the simulation experiments as follows. We assume that a cloud provider
provisions its resources into four types of VM instances, V M1 , . . . , V M4 with weights w =
j
(1, 2, 4, 8). User’s bids (θj = r1j , . . . , rm
, aj , lj , dj , vj ) are generated using a workload file ω

and its pre-computed statistics that are shown above. The time of arrival aj of user j
P
j
is taken from the log file. sj = m
i=1 wi ri , i.e., the total weight of the requested bundle

is chosen from an exponential distribution with mean savg = Pω , the average number of
processors per job in workload ω. We arbitrarily set the values of rij s once we determine sj .
The required time for allocation, lj , is also determined using exponential distribution with
mean lavg , which is derived from Tω , average runtime of the jobs in workload ω. Deadline
dj and valuation vj are computed as dj = aj + lj × exp(davg ) and vj = exp(vavg ). We show
the values chosen for davg and vavg in Table 6.4. We bring more variation in the input data
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by randomly choosing about 50% users and multiplying any of their bid parameters by 2.
CA-PROVISION computes a reserve price vres = cR − cI from the cost parameters associated with a running or idling unit VM instance. Although we did not present MOVMPA
with a reserve price, it can be easily incorporated by discarding users below the reserve
price and then charging a winning user the reserve price instead of zero at line 20 of Algorithm 9. In our experiments, the reserve price for MOVMPA is the same as that used for
CA-PROVISION. We show all the parameter values in Table 6.4. We run 18 experiments
per workload log with different combinations of parameters.

6.6.2

Analysis of Results

We summarize the results per workload in Figures 6.1 to 6.3. In this figure, we show the
workload logs with their normalized load on the horizontal axis and the percent of users
served, the average revenue per served user, and the average utility per served user on
the vertical axis. In Figure 6.1, we observe that MOVMPA serves a higher percentage
of users than CA-PROVISION. The most significant gain is with logs LLNL-uBGL-2006
(normalized load 7.41) and DAS2-fs0-2003 (normalized load 2.01), which are the highest
among the workloads used here. The percentage of served users is nearly doubled for the
case of DAS2-fs0-2003 workload and it increases more than six-fold for LPC-EGEE-2004
workload. This is because in CA-PROVISION, even if there are available resources, a user
must wait until the next auction time. By that time more users may arrive and she may
lose the auction. On the other hand, preemption also makes some users leave even if they
receive the allocation in some auction but still require the resources for additional time to
complete their task. Since the above two workloads generate high bid density, this leads
to an increase in the number of auctions and MOVMPA could accommodate more bids,
thanks to its online design.
On the other hand, in Figure 6.2, we see a decline in the average revenue generated
from each served user. As we discussed in Section 6.5, online mechanisms cannot obtain an
optimal outcome because they determine the allocation based on incomplete information.
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Figure 6.1: Overall results comparing CA-PROVISION and MOVMPA: percent of users
served vs. workload logs
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Figure 6.2: Overall results comparing CA-PROVISION and MOVMPA: average revenue
per served user vs. workload logs
This leads to a suboptimal value of the social welfare given by Equation (6.1). An intuitive
explanation is that by deciding about an allocation as soon as possible, MOVMPA helps a
user avoid facing competition with the future bidders. With CA-PROVISION, users must
compete with other users that bid during the same period and hence the price of the items
increases. But the increased number of served users offsets some of this revenue loss.
However, we see in Figure 6.3 that MOVMPA produces comparable results for the
average utility of the served users. Although it is expected that by paying less, users would
gain higher utility, but that will happen if both auctions select the same set of users for
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Average utility per served user
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Figure 6.3: Overall results comparing CA-PROVISION and MOVMPA: average utility per
served user vs. workload logs
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Figure 6.4: Average revenue vs. rate of arrival
allocation. This is not possible because of two reasons: CA-PROVISION preempts a user
with low valuation for one with higher valuation, but MOVMPA allocates VMs to a user
for the entire period she requested for them. This may lead to losing a high valued user
who arrived at a time when there is no resources available. On the other hand, MOVMPA
allocates more users than CA-PROVISION, which means it accommodates users with low
valuations and these users contribute to the low average utility.
Next, we try in a different way to find out what factors might affect the mechanisms
in generating higher revenue for the cloud provider. To do this, we select one log, LPCEGEE-2004, and tweak its parameters in two different dimensions. In Figure 6.4, we show
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Figure 6.5: Average revenue vs. average length of each request
the results obtained by multiplying the arrival rate of the log by a factor of 2, 4, 8, 16,
and 32. We see that CA-PROVISION follows the trend of the rate of arrival and generates higher revenue as the rate increases. However, the average revenue generated by
MOVMPA increases very slowly. On the other hand, Figure 6.5 shows the average revenue by both mechanisms where the average length of requests (lavg ) is multiplied with
different factors. We see that this affects MOVMPA more than CA-PROVISION. Since
the payment in MOVMPA is determined by finding the critical value in an interval, longer
allocation requests increase competition among bids submitted about the same time. But
only increasing the rate of arrival does not increase the competition in MOVMPA, because
it only needs one moment with available resources for a user to get the allocation in low
price.
In summary, we claim that MOVMPA improves the overall cloud experience for both
the users and the providers. In current auction mechanisms in cloud, the flexibility of price
comes with a risk of preemption of the resources. But MOVMPA ensures that the auction
environment will suit more to the real computing tasks and still the users will have an
option to bid for their required resources. The cloud provider benefits by serving more
users, gaining user satisfaction, and eventually increasing its overall revenue.
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6.7

Summary

In this research work, we designed an online mechanism for VM provisioning and allocation in clouds. The mechanism provisions and allocates VM instances whenever enough
resources and matching bids are available. We proved that the mechanism is incentive
compatible, has a competitive ratio of M and runs in polynomial time. We performed
extensive experiments to determine the strength and weaknesses of the mechanism. The
mechanism increases the number of users served but at the cost of decreased average revenue. However, the loss in average revenue may be offset by the increased number of served
users. We conclude that the proposed mechanism is a good choice for provisioning and
allocation of VM instances in clouds.
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CHAPTER 7: FUTURE
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this chapter, we outline possible research projects that may advance our research in
different directions in the future. We believe that our research will encourage new research
work in the area of resource provisioning and allocation in clouds. Here we mention three
research directions that can be pursued following our work.

7.1

Combinatorial Auction-Based Mechanisms

A direct extension of our work would be to setup a private cloud and implement the
mechanisms. These mechanisms then may be tested with simulated and actual workloads.
A theoretical extension of our work would be to consider a cloud computing platform that
does not have any preset configuration for virtual machines. In this setting, the users will
specify the resources they need on their VM instances and the mechanism will provision the
resources dynamically for them, following a combinatorial auction. Currently, the cloud
computing platforms offer VM instances with fixed configurations. Therefore, this research
can be a part of a project aiming at a more flexible future cloud provisioning and allocation
system.

7.2

Bidding in Combinatorial Auction-Based Mechanisms

We designed an efficient bidding strategy for submitting non-malleable parallel jobs in
clouds. This research can be extended towards designing bidding strategies for different
types of jobs, eventually achieving a general bidding strategy that includes many different
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types of tasks to be submitted on clouds. There are also open problems in assessing the
effect of the presence of different types of users (e.g., risk neutral, risk averse) in the system.
This research will be more interesting once cloud providers start deploying combinatorial
auction-based mechanisms to actually allocate VM instances through them.

7.3

Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions in
Clouds

We investigated the problem of combinatorial auction-based mechanism design for singleminded users. Although we provided insight about how different user behaviors can be
modeled using the single-minded property, it would be interesting to design mechanisms
for users with multiple alternatives in mind. In that case, researchers will be required to
define new bidding languages for VM allocation in clouds and design mechanisms pertaining
to these languages. The work by Wang et al. [66] could be a good starting point for research
in this direction.

7.4

Auction-Based Marketplace for Federation of Clouds

Recently, researchers investigated the idea of building federations of clouds [10], but to the
best of our knowledge, it is not deployed as a real system yet. However, building federations
of clouds will open a new track of research problems in auction-based mechanisms. We
envision that a combinatorial auction-based marketplace would be the center of resource
allocation in a federated cloud. In such a marketplace, both users and providers will have
an opportunity to host and take part in auctions. This marketplace may also implement
an exchange for allocating cloud resources.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
In this Ph.D. dissertation, we presented our research accomplishments in the field of combinatorial auction-based virtual machine provisioning and allocation in clouds. We discussed
the background knowledge and presented a survey of relevant literature to lay the foundation of our work. We identified important open problems in the field, formalized them,
and solved the problems by designing mechanisms and algorithms for them. We evaluated
each mechanism, both theoretically and experimentally. We discussed the advantages and
limitations of our solutions and identified their application areas. Throughout our thesis, we focused on a specific problem domain and investigated many different aspects of
this problem to get a comprehensive picture of the domain. Finally, we outlined future
directions of research that may stem from our work.
We believe that our thesis is a significant contribution to both the cloud computing industry and academic research. Following its many successful implementations in different
fields, we adapted combinatorial auction-based mechanisms to solve the VM provisioning
and allocation problem in clouds. These mechanisms will provide the cloud providers the
flexibility of dynamically determining the price of their resources. Also, the providers will
be free from building complex pricing models or generating user statistics for prediction
of system usage. On the other hand, different types of users will be able to select their
convenient and economic usage of cloud resources. If a huge system like cloud computing platforms start using combinatorial auctions, it will drive more theoretical researchers
to further improve the efficiency of these mechanisms. Finally, yet another successful
implementation of combinatorial auctions in computing will encourage computer science
researchers to look into other problems that may be solved using combinatorial auctions or
auction-based mechanisms in general.
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Current cloud providers use fixed-price based mechanisms to allocate Virtual Machine
(VM) instances to their users. But economic theory states that when there are large amount
of resources to be allocated to large number of users, auctions are the most efficient allocation mechanisms. Auctions achieve efficiency of allocation and also maximize the providers’
revenue, which a fixed-price based mechanism is unable to do. We argue that combinatorial auctions are best suited for the problem of VM provisioning and allocation in clouds,
since they provide the users with the most flexible way to express their requirements. In
combinatorial auctions, users bid for bundles of items rather than individual ones, therefore they are able to express whether the items they require are complementary to each
other. The objective of this Ph.D. dissertation is to design, study, and implement combinatorial auction-based mechanisms for efficient provisioning and allocation of VM instances
in clouds. The central hypothesis is that allocation efficiency and revenue maximization
can be obtained by inducing users to fully express and truthfully report their preferences
to the system. The rationale for our research is that, once efficient resource provisioning and allocation mechanisms that take into account the incentives of the users and cloud
providers are developed and implemented, it will become more efficient to utilize cloud computing environments for solving challenging problems in business, science and engineering.
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In this dissertation, we present three combinatorial auction-based offline mechanisms for
provisioning and allocating VM instances in clouds. We also present an online mechanism
for dynamic provisioning of virtual machine instances in clouds. Finally, we designed an
efficient bidding algorithm to assist users submitting bids to combinatorial auction-based
mechanisms to execute parallel jobs on the cloud. We outline our contributions and possible
direction for future research in this field.
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